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WHO WILL WATCH THE WATCHDOGS?
HUMAN RIGHTS NONGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE CASE
FOR REGULATION
Robert Charles Blitt*
—There is a widespread attitude that NGOs consist of altruistic people
campaigning in the general public interest, while governments consist of
self-serving politicians. On some issues, such as human rights, this may
generally be valid and NGOs are ‘the conscience of the world’. Even so,
such an attitude should not be adopted as an unchallenged assumption . . .
NGOs do not automatically deserve support and governments are not necessarily in the wrong.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Academics and activists alike attribute much of the momentum surrounding the study of human rights and its on-going entrenchment in the
post-World War II international system to the human rights movement. In
particular, these observers credit the work of an ever-growing assembly of
non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) whose sole purpose is monitoring, reporting and advocating in favor of human rights.2 Much praise has
been lavished upon these organizations for their tireless efforts, dedication
to the justice and morality of their cause, and bravery in the face of adversity. Indeed, these traits have resulted in impressive accomplishments, including advancing the drafting and passage of international legal
instruments designed to curtail human rights abuses, such as the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
* LLM University of Toronto Faculty of Law, 2003. I would like to extend
thanks to Karen Knop, for providing enthusiasm and guidance throughout the
course of this endeavor, to Rebecca Cook, for her invaluable comments as this
paper neared completion, and to Lorraine Weinrib, for her support and input as the
initial ideas underpinning this paper took shape. I also remain deeply indebted to
Stephanie Kodish, for her boundless faith, energy and patience. This paper is dedicated with love to my family, Mom, Dad, Jon and Happy.
1
P. Willetts, Introduction to ‘THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD’: THE INFLUENCE
OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE UN SYSTEM 1, 11 (Peter Willets,
ed., 1996).
2
For a taxonomy outlining the scope of the term NGO for the purposes of this
paper, see infra Part II(C).

\\server05\productn\B\BFH\10-1\BFH107.txt

262

unknown

Seq: 2

8-FEB-05

13:58

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 10

or Punishment,3 and providing key evidence necessary for the prosecution
of alleged war criminals including Slobodan Milosevic.4 Milestones such as
these are a testament to the evolving role of human rights NGOs and underscore the sharp departure from their humble roots within the international
system. Unquestionably, human rights organizations (HROs)5 in operation
today enjoy amplified standing at the United Nations and other intergovernmental bodies, expanded mandates and networks scrutinizing a wider array
of rights and international actors, and widespread dissemination of their
message across a broad range of media outlets. Significantly, these dramatic
transformations have emerged despite the fact that HROs lack any international legal personality,6 “formal jurisdiction over specified domains,”7 or a
source of formal accountability within the international system or at international law.
The dearth of formal accountability and authority that characterizes
NGOs is particularly troubling when one considers that HROs deal in a
3

U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 at 197 (entered into
force June 26, 1987). James Avery Joyce noted as early as 1978 that there “is no
doubt that NGOs are playing a special role in promoting international guidelines to
prevent torture.” J. A. JOYCE, THE NEW POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 85 (1978).
4
William Korey pays tribute to NGOs, particularly Human Rights Watch
(HRW), for urging the establishment of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (ICTY) and
for providing that body “with an endless flow of documentary evidence on the
details of ethnic cleansing”, as well as invaluable public support regarding financing and ensuring that major NATO governments work to apprehend indicted war
criminals. Korey also commends the work of Physicians for Human Rights, which
“made available forensic scientists, who through exhumation of grave sites and
examination of corpses provided the most essential type of evidence.” WILLIAM
KOREY, NGOS AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: “A CURIOUS GRAPEVINE” 13 (1998). Indeed, the Tribunal itself commended HRW for “the
research work [it conducted] on behalf of the Tribunal.” Chief Prosecutor Richard
Goldstone also extolled HRW’s “invaluable” assistance concerning the provision of
“testimony and other materials.” Id. at 326.
5
For the purposes of this essay, the terms “HRO” (human rights organization)
and “human rights NGO” are used interchangeably. See infra Part II(C).
6
M. Noortmann, Non-State Actors in International Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 71 (B. Arts et al, eds., 2001).
7
J. Boli, Conclusion: World Authority Structures and Legitimations, in CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE: INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1875 288-89 (J. Boli & G. Thomas, eds., 1999).
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unique commodity—“human rights”—which elicits instinctive support
amongst the general public, yet is also easily subject to manipulation. Moreover, this absence of regulation is made even more unsettling given that the
human rights NGO community at large boasts an imperfect track record
regarding objectivity and accurate reporting, particularly when operating in
conflict situations. Taken together, these factors alone would be sufficient
to justify a case in favor of regulating the human rights NGO industry.8
However, this case grows even more urgent when considered against the
backdrop of an environment in which the international community increasingly favors the articulation and enforcement of human rights norms, and
consequently—albeit perhaps unwittingly—has placed an increased reliance on NGOs for the purpose of fact-finding, investigating and reporting
human rights violations.9 Admittedly, any proposal for regulating the HRO
sector may provoke vehement objection from the HRO community, a group
known for fiercely safeguarding its independence,10 or worse yet, glee and
endorsement from human rights violators. However, to paraphrase a relevant caveat invoked elsewhere, any violator of human rights who believes
this essay sanctions his or her activities is profoundly mistaken, while any
human rights activist who feels undermined or threatened equally has mis-

8

By regulation, I do not intend to mean government legislation but rather some
formal set of standards that can be independently developed, implemented, monitored and enforced. This notion is discussed in greater detail. See infra Part V.
9
The end of the cold war facilitated the burgeoning of international and regional
human rights mechanisms such as the UN human rights treaty bodies and the European, African and Inter-American human rights systems, as well as the establishment of international criminal tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
More recently, this trend has expanded with the entry into force of the Treaty of
Rome establishing the International Criminal Court and the establishment of a Special Court for war crimes in Sierra Leone. Each of these examples confirms that the
international community’s interest in human rights enforcement appears durable
and is unlikely to recede.
10 An example of this tendency may be seen in the strident opposition triggered by
the launch of www.ngowatch.org, a website dedicated to monitoring NGO activities and funded by two U.S.-based conservative foundations. See R. Nader, Has the
American Enterprise Institute Lost Contact with Reality?, available at http://www.
commondreams.org/views03/0613-01.htm (June 13, 2003); Jim Lobe, Bringing the
War Home: Right Wing Think Tank Turns Wrath on NGOs, available at http://
www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0306antingo.html (June 13, 2003); and Naomi
Klein, Bush to NGOs: Watch Your Mouths, GLOBE & MAIL, available at http://
www.commondreams.org/views03/0620-06.htm, last visited June 20, 2003.
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understood the argument I propose here.11 This paper is not intended to
undermine international human rights principles or the value of the NGOs
that defend those rights; nor is it meant to provide a shield for regimes
violating human rights or fodder for other groups critical of HROs. Rather,
the case that is advanced here argues that professionalization, standardization and regulation of human rights NGOs are long overdue, and moreover,
crucial to the responsible growth of HROs and the continued significance of
human rights principles within the international system.
At first glance, such an undertaking may appear modest, perhaps
even humble. However, a review of the literature surrounding human rights
NGOs reveals that an objective and comprehensive critique of the industry
is glaringly absent, with few, if any, proposals addressing the fundamental
problems that threaten the entire enterprise of human rights NGOs. Instead,
most observers have elected to heap praise on the role of NGOs within the
international system without considering precisely what responsibility need
be attached to their increasingly influential role.12 Where criticism of NGOs
is manifested, it is typically limited to the narrow questions of internal representativeness and accountability, or the perceived bias of NGOs in favor
of western-style liberal rights.13 In essence, therefore, this article cuts a previously untraveled path by pulling together the various issues impinging the
legitimacy and credibility of NGOs and scrutinizing their larger impact on
the HRO industry as a whole in light of changing international circumstances. Ultimately, the need for formal regulation reflects the logical conclusion of this analysis, and it is intended that the latter part of this paper
provide some ideas to stimulate a discussion of what approaches and models might be introduced to best enhance human rights NGO legitimacy and
protect the development of international human rights law.

11

C. Brown, Universal Human Rights: A Critique, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL
POLITICS 104 (T. Dunne & N.J. Wheeler, eds., 1999).
12 Indeed, some observers, such as Andrew Clapham, advance demands for even
greater HRO influence at the UN where that influence already far surpasses anything formally provided at international law. See A. Clapham, UN Human Rights
Reporting Procedures: An NGO Perspective, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING (P. Alston & J. Crawford, eds., 2000).
13 See, e.g., P.J. Simmons on internal accountability and Makau Mutua on the
western-liberal domination of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). P.J. Simmons, Learning to Live with NGOs, 112 FOREIGN POL’Y 82 (1998);
and Makau Mutua, Human Rights International NGOs: A Critical Evaluation, in
NGOS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE (C.E. Welch, Jr., ed.,
2001).
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To build the case for regulation, the first part of this essay sketches
the historical foundation of modern international human rights and the initial role assigned to human rights NGOs therein. The paper then moves on
to track the extraordinary growth experienced by human rights NGOs
across all areas, from expansion in numbers and financing to expansion of
activities and influence. With the benefit of this context, a critique of the
existing informal tools used to ensure credibility and accountability within
the HRO sector will reveal the ineffectiveness of these measures and underscore the shortcomings of arguments raised in defense of informal standards
and unfettered NGO independence. It is this analysis that points to the need
for dramatic—and formal—changes within the human rights industry, and
ought to serve as a wakeup call for all those genuinely concerned with the
future effectiveness of HROs and the value ascribed to international human
rights principles. The final part of this paper introduces some ideas aimed at
providing a baseline for standardizing performance and promoting greater
legitimacy and accountability among HROs. These preliminary guidelines
may underpin a new framework of independent regulation initiated by
NGOs and are meant to answer basic questions and address potential arguments against instituting some formal regulatory tools. However, it is important to stress that these guidelines are not meant to reflect the sole
possibility for reform, but rather to stimulate discussion and consideration
of all meaningful and “doable” options. In any event, the arguments regarding the need for reform within the HRO industry reflect findings that are
independently valid from the regulatory proposal advanced in the latter part
of this paper. In other words, those who may contest the need for formal
HRO regulation ought not disregard the fundamental nature of the problems
disclosed in this paper which point to a serious dearth of standards and an
over-reliance on informal—and ultimately ineffective—means of quality
control within the NGO industry.
— [Nongovernmental relations]. . .go far beyond the officially-sanctioned
diplomatic networks and the narrowly-defined contacts implied by a legalistic approach. NGOs are based upon interpersonal ties and relationships
among people with similar convictions, goals and interests. The result is a
web of personal connections that do not fit within a formal, legal
framework.14

14

L. Gordenker & T.G. Weiss, Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions, in NGOS, THE UN, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 26 (T.
G. Weiss & L. Gordenker, eds., 1996).

\\server05\productn\B\BFH\10-1\BFH107.txt

266

unknown

Seq: 6

8-FEB-05

13:58

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 10

II. THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
HUMAN RIGHTS NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

AND

A. Modern Human Rights Principles and Institutions
The contemporary campaign for international human rights
emerged from the ruins of the Second World War, embodying a concerted
response to the unprecedented horror of Nazi death camps, fleeing refugees
and tortured prisoners-of-war.15 While the roots of modern international
human rights principles may be traced further back to the 19th century,16
the aspirations encompassed in the post-World War II Zeitgeist embodied
an international spirit that soon came to be inscribed in the form of a universal declaration. Significantly, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights heralded the individual—not the state—as the “foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”, and sought to extend a protective
umbrella of rights to these individuals “without distinction of any kind.”17
Yet, to be certain, the Universal Declaration was exactly that—a declara15

JOYCE, supra note 3, at 45.
For example, the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded on the Field of Battle (22 August 1864) served as the precursor to the
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field (12 August 1949), commonly referred to as the First
Geneva Convention. The main principles laid down in the 1864 Convention and
preserved by the later Geneva Conventions include:
16

• relief to the wounded without any distinction as to nationality;
• neutrality (inviolability) of medical personnel and medical establishments and units; [and]
• the distinctive sign of the red cross on a white background.
See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded on the Field
of Battle, Aug. 22, 1864, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawof
war/geneva04.htm; and Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/q_genev1.htm, last visited December 21,
2004. From this perspective, the post-World War II human rights movement may
also be viewed as a continuation of earlier efforts to entrench international norms
respectful of basic human rights.
17 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, U.N. Doc. A/811,
pmbl., art. 2, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 256 (I.
Brownlie, ed., 4th ed. 1995). The Universal Declaration articulated a broad range
of rights including fair trial (art. 10), freedom of movement (art. 13), the right to
work (art. 23), and the right to education (art. 26). The Declaration also sought to
enunciate protections against a number of practices including slavery (art. 4), torture (art. 5), and arbitrary arrest (art. 9).

R
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tory document adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and lacking any binding impact or legal enforceability.18 As Michael Ignatieff has
observed, the parties to the Universal Declaration “never actually believed
that it would constrain their behavior”, since the document “lacked any enforcement mechanism.”19 Indeed, the Declaration failed, at least initially, to
dethrone the state as the primary, if not sole, actor at international law.
Even without legally binding obligations or formal enforcement
mechanisms, the Universal Declaration did express international legal recognition for the rights of individuals20 and the shared ideals and will of the
nascent United Nations. Moreover, this instrument promised to “serve as
the lodestar” for criticizing governments which failed to adhere to the
human rights principles enunciated within the document.21 Indeed, the Universal Declaration served as “the point of departure for the concern and
activism of nongovernmental organizations.”22 From this standpoint, the
Universal Declaration effectively laid the foundation for the edifice of
modern human rights, providing the blueprint that would serve to guide
virtually all human rights developments from 1948 forward. Although initially these developments may have been slow in emerging, over time there
would be no stopping the accumulated momentum derived from the idealism of the Universal Declaration.
Nearly twenty years after its historic adoption, the international
community reached agreement concerning the first legally binding expression of some of the rights contained in the Universal Declaration. This
significant breakthrough resulted in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and its counterpart, the International Covenant on
Economic and Social Rights (ICESR).23 These Covenants “laid down the
18

Brownlie notes that the Declaration is “not a legally binding instrument as such,
and some of its provisions depart from existing and generally accepted rules.”
Brownlie, supra note 17, at 255.
19 M. IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 8 (2001).
20 Id. at 5.
21 KOREY, supra note 4, at 44.
22 Id. However, as Korey notes, “the Declaration itself [would not] ever have been
conceived of. . .were it not preceded by the UN Charter, whose human rights provisions were products of NGO determination and persistent lobbying.” Id. at 2.
23 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
Dec. 16, 1966, UN Doc. A/6316, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976),
reprinted in Brownlie, supra note 17, at 276 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International
Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
UN Doc. A/6316 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), reprinted in Brownlie, supra
note 17, at 263.

R

R

R

R
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legal foundation for a world order of human rights that had not existed
before,”24 such that even for non-parties to the treaties, the substance of the
Covenants represented “authoritative evidence of the content of the concept
of human rights.”25 In sum, between the late 1940s and 1960s, a seismic
shift rocked the international landscape, moving the notion of human rights
from one of vague moral principles to legally binding norms. As a consequence of this dramatic change, the framework for addressing human rights
soon demanded a burgeoning bureaucracy and other mechanisms designed
to monitor and ensure compliance with legal obligations.
At their outset, the twin international covenants required “the erection of international institutions and procedures to give concrete expression” to its objectives.26 Yet, the international covenants represented only
the inaugural salvo of what would become a streak of successive international treaties that sought to entrench minimal guarantees for human rights
protections. In sheer numbers, this emerging trend favoring the legalization
of human rights norms would lead to the adoption of no less than seven
major UN treaties with affiliated monitoring and enforcement bodies. In
addition to the ICCPR’s Optional Protocol and Second Optional Protocol,27
the UN implemented the following key treaty bodies:
• The International Covenant on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and its enforcement body, the Committee for the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination;28
• The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and its enforce24

R

25

R

JOYCE, supra note 3, at 46.
Brownlie, supra note 17, at 262.
26 JOYCE, supra note 3, at 46 (quoting Moses Moskovitz).
27 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), reprinted in
Brownlie, supra note 17, at 298, and Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 44/128 (1989) (entered into force
July 11, 1991), reprinted in Brownlie, supra note 17, at 303. The First Optional
Protocol permits individuals to communicate alleged human rights violations directly to the treaty’s Human Rights Committee. The Second Optional Protocol requires State Parties to the Protocol to abolish the death penalty within their
respective jurisdictions.
28 International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX) (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969), reprinted in Brownlie, supra note 17, at 310.

R

R
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ment body, the Committee on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women;29
• The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), and
its enforcement body, the Committee Against Torture;30
• The Convention on the Rights of the Child, and its enforcement body, the Committee on the Rights of the
Child.31
In addition to these international conventions, the UN also spawned
myriad declaratory statements on human rights issues ranging from the
Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons to the Declaration on the
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities.32 All told, from the core Universal Declaration, the UN human
rights framework—encompassing both political statements and legally enforceable rights—rapidly expanded to cover themes as diverse as cultural
development, war crimes, marriage, family and youth. Moreover, the initiation of world conferences and working groups only served to further reinforce international public awareness and advocacy surrounding human
rights.33
Coupled with developments on the international level, the idea of
enforceable human rights received another significant boost when the administration of US President James Carter announced that human rights
“would be the ‘soul’ of its foreign policy.” This move confirmed “the new
wave of interest in the issue and substantially increased the wave’s momen-

29

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, at 193 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
30 U.N. Convention Against Torture, supra note 3.
31 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 at
166 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).
32 Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 3447 (XXX), U.N.
GAOR 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 88, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975) and Declaration
on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, Annex, 47 U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at
210, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1993).
33 The UN Commission on Human Rights maintains no less than eight working
groups, dealing with issues such as the right to development and the preparation of
a draft declaration on the rights of indigenous people. United Nations Commission
on Human Rights, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/chrwg.htm#
standard, last visited December 21, 2004.

R
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tum.”34 Indeed, this interest had already washed across a number of regional
fora, including the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States
(OAS) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). For example, the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms reaffirmed the rights recognized in the Universal Declaration by
enumerating a similar catalogue of civil and political rights and freedoms
and establishing a mechanism for the enforcement of the obligations assumed by State Parties.35 This Convention ultimately led to the establishment of a full-time European Court of Human Rights, boasting an
expansive jurisdiction and the ability to bind parties to its judgments.36 The
European regional system further deepened its human rights regime by introducing additional human rights instruments including the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment and the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s
Rights.37

34

L.W. LIVEZEY, NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE IDEAS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS x-xi (1988). See also J. POWER, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL: THE
HUMAN RIGHTS STORY 19 (1981) and KOREY, supra note 4, at 7.
35 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, pmbl. (entered into force Sept. 3 1953),
reprinted in Brownlie, supra note 17, at 328 and available at http://conventions.
coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/155.htm, last visited December 21, 2004.
36 Protocol No. 11 to European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms Restructuring the Control Machinery Established
Thereby, May 11, 1994, Europe T.S. No. 155, arts. 32, 46 (entered into force Nov.
1, 1998), reprinted in Brownlie, supra note 17, at 372. Protocol No. 11 “replaced
the existing, part-time Court and Commission [with] a single, full-time Court”, Protocol No. 2 conferred on the Court the power to give advisory opinions, and Protocol No. 9 boosted the Court’s jurisdiction to hear inter-State cases by enabling
individual applicants, including NGOs, to bring their cases before the Court “subject to ratification by the respondent State and acceptance by a screening panel.”
Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, The European Court of Human
Rights: Historical Background, Organisation and Procedure, available at http://
www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/HistoricalBackground.htm, last visited December 21,
2004.
37 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Nov. 26, 1987, Europe T.S. No. 126 (entered into force
Feb. 1, 1989), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/126.
htm; European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights, Jan. 25, 1996
(entered into force July 1, 2000), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/
Treaties/Html/160.htm, last visited December 21, 2004.
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Similarly, in 1969, the OAS adopted the American Convention on
Human Rights, which established the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACHR).38 Like its European counterpart, the IACHR enabled individual petitioners to directly file complaints with the Court alleging human
rights violations by member States.39 The OAS also produced a number of
additional regional human rights conventions, including the Inter-American
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture40 and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against
Women.41 In Africa, likewise, the OAU’s African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights drew inspiration from the principles of the Universal Declaration,42 empowering the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights with a mandate that included, inter alia, the formulation of principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating to human and peoples’ rights and fundamental freedoms, and ensuring the protection of
human and peoples’ rights.43 Finally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also developed “human dimension” tools to
“supervise the implementation of commitments undertaken [by participating States] in the field of human rights and democracy.”44 The Vienna
Mechanism and its latter supplement, the Moscow Mechanism,45 enable
participating states to raise questions relating to the human dimension situa38

American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San Jose), Nov. 22, 1969,
OASTS 36 (entered into force July 18, 1978), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/
Basicos/basic3.htm, last visited December 21, 2004.
39 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Form for Presenting Petitions
on Human Rights, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/denuncia.eng.htm, last visited December 21, 2004.
40 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, 25
I.L.M. 519 (entered into force Feb. 28, 1987).
41 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of
Violence Against Women, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534 (entered into force Mar. 3,
1995).
42 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58,
67, art. 60 (entered into force Oct. 21 1986).
43 Id. at art. 45.
44 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), The
OSCE Human Dimension Mechanism, available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/
human_rights/moscow_mechanism/, last visited December 21, 2003.
45 Vienna Mechanism, Vienna 1989 (“Human Dimension of the CSCE”, par. 1 to
4) and Moscow Mechanism, MOSCOW 1991 (Par. 1 to 16) as amended by ROME
1993 (Chapter IV, par. 5), reprinted in ODIHR, Human Dimension Commitments:
A Reference Guide (Warsaw: ODIHR, 2001), available at http://www.osce.org/
odihr/documents/oscecommitments.pdf, last visited December 21, 2003.
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tion in another OSCE state, create ad hoc missions to assist in the resolution
of specific “human dimension” problems and, in exceptional circumstances,
even order investigations into alleged human rights violations without the
consent of the member state in question.46
To be certain, the 1980s and 1990s were witness to “an unprecedented upsurge of human rights concerns and activities” and “the proliferation of international treaties and institutions,”47 resulting most recently in
the creation a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,48 an international
treaty to ban anti-personnel mines,49 and the International Convention on
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families.50 Ultimately, this outpouring of new norms crisscrossing various
levels of jurisdiction and enforceability through any number of overlapping
conventions, protocols, declarations and working groups reflects a cascade
that may be traced back directly to the result of early efforts to cultivate
international human rights principles. Perhaps most significantly for the
purpose of this paper, this web of human rights mechanisms—in large part,
the creation “of NGOs, whether in the drafting process or the lobbying process51—reflects an ever-expanding framework thanks to the continuous
46

Moscow Mechanism, supra note 45, at para. 9.
A. Rosas, State Sovereignty and Human Rights: Towards a Global Constitutional Project, in David Beetham, ed., POLITICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 62 (David
Beetham, ed., 1995).
48 The General Assembly created the post of High Commissioner under A/RES/
48/141, adopted without vote Dec. 20, 1993. See http://www.un.org/documents/ga/
res/48/a48r141.htm, last visited December 21, 2004. Korey reasons that the creation of the High Commissioner reflected “the most important” NGO initiative for
creating “effective mechanisms for implementing the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.” KOREY, supra note 4, at 11.
49 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 UNTS 211
(entered into force Mar. 1, 1999), available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/
notpubl/26-5eng.htm, last visited December 19, 2003.
50 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, G.A. 45/158, 30 I.L.M. 1517
(entered into force July 1, 2003). This treaty “provides a set of binding international
standards to address the treatment, welfare and human rights of both documented
and undocumented migrants, as well as the obligations and responsibilities on the
part of sending and receiving States.” United Nations Press Release, Convention
On Protection of Rights of Migrant Workers To Enter Into Force Next July, Mar.
19, 2003, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/B87E9E
85C7147498C1256CEF00385E50?opendocument, last visited December 21, 2004.
51 KOREY, supra note 4, at 4.
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flow of NGO information, lobbying and activism. As the following section
explains, this revelation is even more surprising when considering that the
origins of the human rights system never envisioned such a crucial and
central role for NGOs.
B. An Inauspicious Foundation for Global NGO Activism: The Charter
of the United Nations and ECOSOC Resolution 1296
The budding human rights principles alluded to in the Charter of
the United Nations and made manifest in the Universal Declaration did not
reflect solely the will of governments across the world. Rather, individual
activists and public organizations alike converged on the issue of human
rights following the Second World War. While this effort did not represent
the first time public organizations sought to shape government action and
policy to better reflect respect for morality and human dignity, it certainly
did signal the most vigorous and focused effort of individuals to impact
international affairs in a broad and durable manner.52
In large part, the Federal Council of Churches and the American
Jewish Committee, two US-based NGOs, are credited with initiating the
main lobbying effort in favor of incorporating human rights principles into
the UN Charter and later, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.53
Although details on the precise contribution of NGOs to the Universal Declaration’s drafting are imprecise, a general consensus exists that NGOs actively contributed and were instrumental in embedding this dramatic new
52

While a detailed analysis of the precursor to modern human rights NGOs falls
outside the scope of this paper, it is important to recognize that these organizations
owe a debt to groups such as the Anti-Slavery Society, an NGO with roots extending back to the late 18th century and considered to be “the ‘prototype’ for all
later NGOs.” Id. at 118. Ignatieff confirms that “extraterritorial moral activism”
predated the Universal Declaration and manifested itself in “the campaigns to abolish the slave trade and then slavery itself.” Ignatieff, supra note 19, at 10. For a
detailed account of this history, see Korey, supra note 4, and P.G. LAUREN, THE
EVOLUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN (1998).
53 KOREY, supra note 4, at 33. The largest obstacle preventing the true incorporation of enforceable human rights into the UN Charter stemmed from the fact that
the document was intended to become a binding treaty. Id. at 41. Willetts adds that
the “first draft of the UN Charter did not make any mention of maintaining cooperation with private bodies.” Rather, it was the lobbying effort of a “variety of
groups, mainly but not solely from the USA. . . [that rectified] this at the San
Francisco conference, which established the UN in 1945.” Peter Willetts, What is a
Non-Governmental Organization?. Jan. 4, 2002, available at http://www.staff.city.
ac.uk/p.willetts/CS-NTWKS/NGO-ART.HTM, last visited December 21, 2004
[hereinafter Willets 2002].
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component in international affairs.54 Along these lines, Leon Gordenker argues that NGOs “played a pivotal role in securing the inclusion of human
rights language in the final draft of the UN Charter.”55 More profoundly,
according to Antonio Cassese, the principles espoused by the Charter and
Universal Declaration ultimately served to consecrate NGOs “as agents for
the promotion of human rights,” thus ensuring that they would “become a
focus for public opinion” and “the mouthpiece of world conscience.”56
In light of the modest window of opportunity open to NGOs as they
struggled to impart some influence upon national policymakers and UN officials, it is difficult to conceive of how this miniscule movement could
evolve to spawn today’s truly global human rights NGO community, which
credits itself with the passage of numerous international human rights treaties and accounts for a multi-million dollar industry. Indeed, the humble
roots and narrow scope of influence allotted to human rights NGOs following World War II becomes even clearer when one moves beyond the UN
Charter’s sanguine words “we the peoples.”57 In a treaty totaling 111 articles, the Charter acknowledges NGOs but once, at Article 71, thus deviating ever so slightly from the unqualified endorsement of states as the
solitary rights-holders at the international level. If the drafters of Article 71
sought to expose international relations to the constructive influence of
NGOs, the opening they provided represented a hairline crack at best. Article 71 provides the following:
The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental
organizations which are concerned with matters within its
competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national
organizations after consultation with the Member of the
United Nations concerned.58
Significantly, by relegating NGOs to the lowly Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Charter effectively barred NGOs from having
any role in the UN’s more substantive organs—namely the General Assembly and the Security Council. Moreover, the permissive drafting of Article
71 “[did] not require the Economic and Social Council to make arrangements for consultation with NGOs.” Nevertheless, the inclusion of Article
54
55
56
57
58

KOREY, supra note 4, at 45-46.
Gordenker &Weiss, supra note 14, at 39-40.
A. CASSESE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD 173 (1990).
U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
Id. at. art. 71.
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71 in the Charter effectively “brought NGOs greater formal recognition
than they had enjoyed previously with any other intergovernmental organization.”59 Indeed, even from this inauspicious departure point, NGOs rapidly overcame the apparent limitations of the role proffered by the Charter
and moved to assert a more influential—albeit informal—function within
the international system and in the shaping of international human rights
law. Accordingly, while Article 71 established a “formal relationship” between the UN and NGOs,60 it ultimately spawned multiple informal channels of communication, each one serving to entrench and expand the
function and centrality of human rights NGOs within the international
system.
From the cue provided by Article 71, ECOSOC assumed responsibility for carving out a role for NGOs within the UN system. To this end,
the Council subsequently determined, in accordance with its Resolution
1296, that recognition of an NGO’s consultative status would require formal approval, contingent on several key principles, including:
1. the aims and purposes of the organization shall be in
conformity with the spirit, purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations;61
2. the organization shall undertake to support the work of
the United Nations and to promote knowledge of its
principles and activities;
3. the organization shall be of representative character and
of recognized international standing; and
4. the organization shall be international in its structure.62
Even after satisfying the criteria outlined by Resolution 1296, an
NGO’s consultative status could be suspended or revoked in cases where:
(a) . . . there exists substantiated evidence of secret governmental financial influence to induce an organization to
59

E. A. BOCK, REPRESENTATION OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AT
UNITED NATIONS 2 (1955).
60 R. Brett, The Role and Limits of Human Rights NGOs at the United Nations, in
POLITICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 96.
61 That is, the NGO cannot advocate violence and must respect the principle of
non-interference in the internal affairs of states.
62 Arrangements for Consultation with Non-Governmental Organizations, E.S.C.
Res. 1296, U.N. ESCOR, 1520th plen. mtg. at arts. 1-9 (1968), available at http://
www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/ngo-un/info/res-1296.htm, last visited December 21,
2004, and http://habitat.igc.org/ngo-rev/1296.html, last visited December 21, 2004.
THE
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undertake acts contrary to the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) . . . the organization clearly abuses its consultative status by systematically engaging in unsubstantiated or
politically motivated acts against States Members of
the United Nations contrary to and incompatible with
the principles of the Charter; or
(c) . . . an organization [fails to make] any positive or effective contribution to the work of the Council or its
commissions or other subsidiary organs.63

In addition to these general criteria, ECOSOC created two rigid categories of consultative status: Category I NGOs were required to be “concerned with most of the activities of the Council” and be able to
demonstrate “that they have marked and sustained contributions to make”
(i.e., broad economic and social interests and geographical scope).
ECOSOC extended Category II status to organizations which demonstrated
“a special competence in, and [were] concerned specifically with, only a
few [of] the fields of activity covered by the Council, [and] which [were]
known internationally within the fields for which they have or seek consultative status.”64
Further curtailing the budding role of human rights NGOs specifically, Article 17 of Resolution 1296 established that:
Organizations accorded consultative status in category II
because of their interest in the field of human rights should
have a general international concern with this matter, not
restricted to the interests of a particular group of persons,
a single nationality of the situation in a single State or restricted group of States. Special consideration shall be
given to the applications of organizations in this field
whose aims place stress on combating colonialism,
apartheid, racial intolerance and other gross violations of
human rights and fundamental freedoms.65
In essence, this provision restricted consultative status to human rights
NGOs advancing broad goals of international human rights, except in a
number of specifically defined exceptions. Thus, it effectively precluded the
possibility that human rights groups having a national mandate could gain
63
64
65

Id. at art. 36.
Id. at art. 16(a) and (b).
Id. at art. 17 (emphasis added).
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consultative status at the UN.66 Moreover, the fact that Resolution 1296
relegated human rights NGOs to Category II placed these organizations at a
further disadvantage by limiting their voice within the Council and its subsidiary organs on a number of levels. First, these NGOs, unlike their Category I counterparts, were unable to propose that “the Secretary-General . . .
place items of special interest to the organizations on the provisional agenda
of the Council.”67 Second, Category II NGOs were handicapped by a 500word limit on their written statements to the Council, in contrast to the
2,000 words extended to Category I NGOs. Third, with regard to oral hearings before the Council, Resolution 1296 provided additional rights to Category I NGOs while simultaneously restricting the participation of Category
II NGOs.68 These limitations on Category II organizations trickled down
from relations on the Council level, and reproduced themselves on secondary and tertiary levels within the Council’s commissions and other subsidiary organs.69
Article 71 of the UN Charter arguably “initiated a new experiment
in linking private international voluntary organizations . . . with an intergovernmental organization.”70 However, a close reading of Resolution 1296
reveals built-in safeguards designed to prevent too much NGO participation. Article 14 is typical of the resolution’s restrictive tendency, providing
that:
[C]onsultative arrangements are to be made, on the one
hand, for the purpose of enabling the Council . . . to secure
expert information or advice from organizations having
special competence. . .and, on the other hand, to enable organizations which represent important elements of public
opinion in a large number of countries to express their
views.71
66

M.N. Posner, The Establishment of the Right of Nongovernmental Human
Rights Groups to Operate, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 410 (L. Henkin & J.L. Hargrove, eds., 1994).

67

E.S.C. Res. 1296, supra note 62, at art. 21.

68

Id. at arts. 24-25.

R

69

Id. at arts. 26-34.
BOCK, supra note 59, at 1.
71 E.S.C. Res. 1296, supra note 62, at art. 14 (emphasis added). The precursors to
the principles set forth in Resolution 1296 are found in Resolution 288 B. See
BOCK, supra note 59, at 3 (quoting E.S.C. Res. 288 B, U.N. ESCOR, 10th Sess.,
1950).
70
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From this passage, it may be argued that the vision laid out in Resolution 1296 sought to create an exchange between ECOSOC and NGOs,
whereby NGOs provided ECOSOC with expert information and ECOSOC
furnished NGOs with a platform for expressing their views. Yet this potential platform is frustrated by two factors: First, the drafting of Article 14
points to an expectation that ECOSOC would listen to only NGOs representing public opinion “in a large number of countries,” that is, NGOs having an international presence and a focus on truly “international” issues.
Second, the potential representative function held out by Article 14 is tempered by Article 13, which emphasizes that any communication between
ECOSOC and NGOs “should not be such as to overburden the Council or
transform it from a body for co-ordination of policy and action. . .into a
general forum for discussion.”72 In other words, the ability of NGO to express views could be stifled either based on the fact that the opinions were
not of a genuinely international character, or simply based on the catch-all
need to preserve ECOSOC’s function as a policy body. Consequently, despite the promise of meaningful NGO participation in the UN system, Resolution 1296 ultimately preserved a bright-line distinction between NGOs
and states. As the resolution plainly asserts:
[T]he arrangements for consultation should not be such as
to accord to non-governmental organizations the same
rights of participation as are accorded to States not members of the Council and to the specialized agencies brought
into relationship with the United Nations.73
The desire to manage, even control, the potential impact of NGOs
and compartmentalize the extent of their role within the UN system is inherent in the text of Resolution 1296. Yet, however limiting this initial vision may have seemed, NGOs would soon capitalize on its flexibility and
imprecision. While “it appeared that the officials at the headquarters of
many NGOs did not fully understand the potentialities and responsibilities
of consultative status,”74 in the wake of Resolution 1296—and even prior to
its passage—NGOs gradually clamored to secure consultative status and
also expand their informal role. As Bock notes, even in the short period of
nine years from the creation of the UN, developments were already slowly
and informally broadening the framework for NGO participation, thus overtaking the establishment of formal rules.75 Indeed, as will be seen below,
72
73
74
75

E.S.C. Res. 1296, supra note 62, at art. 13 (emphasis added).
Id. at art. 12.
BOCK, supra note 59, at iv.
Id. at 9-10.
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this expansion would continue despite the fact that the original ECOSOC
guidelines remained unchanged for nearly 30 years, until the Council completed an extensive intergovernmental review that culminated in a new resolution expanding the formal role extended to NGOs at the UN.76
C. An NGO Taxonomy and Survey of NGO Sources of Authority,
Activities, Goals and Methodologies
i) Taxonomy
Before moving on to address questions related to the sources of
authority, objectives and status of human rights NGOs within the international system, it is important to determine the precise meaning of a “nongovernmental organization” and also establish the parameters for which
type of NGOs will attract the primary focus of this paper. While the former
task may be an elusive one, the latter is facilitated by reducing the number
of players allowed onto the field. ECOSOC first introduced the term “nongovernmental organization” or NGO, as a means of clarifying its relationship with organizations that had previously been labeled ‘private organizations,’ ‘international institutes,’ ‘international unions’ or simply
‘international organizations.’ The introduction of what was intended to be
“precise legal jargon”77 meant that, as far as the UN was concerned, use of
the term NGO referred exclusively to those organizations having consultative status with the United Nations.78 However, this technical terminology
soon “passed into popular usage, particularly from the early 1970s onwards,”79 to the extent that today, numerous organizations self-describe
themselves as “nongovernmental”, regardless of not having secured UN
consultative status. Consequently, the precise legal jargon coined by the UN
has taken on a much more sweeping colloquial usage that encompasses a
broad range of organizations working in what they perceive to be the public
76

Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations and Non-Governmental
Organizations, E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, U.N. ESCOR 49th plen. mtg. (1996), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1996/eres1996-31.htm, last visited
December 21, 2004.
77 P. Willetts, Representation of Private Organizations in the Global Diplomacy
of Economic Policy-Making, in PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 36
(K. Ronit & V. Schneider, eds., 2000).
78 BOCK, supra note 59, at 1.
79 Willetts 2002, supra note 53. As Willetts notes, the League of Nations officially
referred to its “liaison with private organizations.”
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interest.80 Thus, as Willetts remarks, there is “no generally accepted definition of an NGO and the term carries different connotations in different
circumstances.”81
From this slippery starting point, Willetts goes on to identify some
general features typically ascribed to NGOs. These features include:
•
•
•
•

independence from the direct control of any government;
no status as a political party;
a non-profit-making structure; and
a non-criminal—including non-violent—purpose.82

According to Willetts, therefore, an NGO may be defined as “an independent voluntary association of people acting together on a continuous basis,
for some common purpose, other than achieving government office, making
money or illegal activities.”83 These sweeping criteria both skirt the reality
that the term NGO may be freely misappropriated by any number of individuals or organizations, and in any event, basically function to mirror the
conditions already required for United Nations recognition. Thus, Willetts’
definition effectively does little to narrow the range of organizations that

80

Still, the term raises the ire of some observers, who have deemed ‘nongovernmental organization’ “politically unacceptable,” since it “implies that government
is the centre of society and people its periphery,” and leaves NGOs as “only marginal or auxiliary bodies.” These critics prefer the term “international people’s organizations” as more apt. See Theo van Boven, The Role of Non-Governmental
Organizations in International Human Rights Standard-Setting: a Prerequisite of
Democracy, in HUMAN RIGHTS FROM EXCLUSION TO INCLUSION; PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE: AN ANTHOLOGY FROM THE WORK OF THEO VAN BOVEN 347 (Fons
Coomans et al, eds., 2000).
81 Willetts 2002, supra note 53.
82 Willetts concedes that these features may not always be present, as “some
NGOs may in practice be closely identified with a political party; many NGOs
generate income from commercial activities, notably consultancy contracts or sales
of publications; and a small number of NGOs may be associated with violent political protests.” Id.
83 Id. Ultimately, the UN itself gradually adopted a sweeping interpretation, applying the NGO label to any “non profit entity whose members are citizens or
associations of citizens of one or more countries and whose activities are determined by the collective will of its members in response to the needs of the members or of one or more communities with which the NGO cooperates.” W.
Schoener, Non-Governmental Organizations and Global Activism: Legal and Informal Approaches, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 537, 538 (1997).
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may merit or demand NGO status.84 Indeed, a brief survey of organizations
having consultative status with ECOSOC reveals a diverse list of organizations including the La Leche League International (LLLI), “a communitybased nongovernmental organization. . .active. . .in breastfeeding promotion, protection and support,”85 and the World’s Poultry Science Association (WPSA), a non-profit organization which “strives to advance
knowledge and understanding of all aspects of poultry science and the poultry industry.”86
While it may be argued that a case for regulation can or should be
formulated vis a vis NGOs generally, by limiting the scope of this argument
to those organizations whose primary concern is human rights, this paper is
able to narrow the breadth and depth of the NGO field considerably and
focus attention on a specific and pressing area in need of reform. Indeed,
the fact that human rights NGOs have situated themselves at a powerful and
influential junction and deal uniquely in the fragile and morally infused
commodity of human rights makes the need for investigating their status
and conduct doubly urgent. This said, even within the subset of human
rights NGOs, many diverse practices and formal distinctions remain. First,
human rights NGOs may operate on international, regional or national
levels. Second, the activities of these organizations vary from international
advocacy to pure fact-finding and research. Third, human rights NGOs may
be membership-driven, or alternatively rely on foundational or corporate
support to maintain operating budgets. Fourth, these organizations may use
volunteers to undertake projects or insist on employing professional, paid
staff members. Finally, the size of these organizations ranges from multimillion dollar international NGOs to small, one or two person operations
with little or no real budget. Nevertheless, given that most of the problems
uncovered by the analysis presented below cut across these differences, examining the spectrum of HROs in its entirety ultimately serves to strengthen
the case in favor of regulation. For example, the risks to objectivity inherent
in larger, better organized international human rights NGOs are passed
onto—and perhaps further exacerbated among—smaller, national human
84

As will be demonstrated in Part IV(A)(ii) below, any number of groups and
individuals has co-opted the neutrality of the term NGO, including governments,
donors and businesses. See infra note 305 for a brief discussion of these NGO
subcategories.
85 LA LECHE LEAGUE INTERNATIONAL, available at http://www.lalecheleague.org/
advocacy/whostatement.html, last visited Mar. 11, 2004. LLLI obtained ECOSOC
Roster status in 1979.
86 WORLD’S POULTRY SCI. ASS’N, available at http://www.wpsa.com/wpsa2/, last
visited December 21, 2004. WPSA is recognized by ECOSOC as a Roster C NGO.
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rights organizations which are typically less concerned with reputation and
other informal, market-generated quality controls that may serve to enhance
organizational independence. From this standpoint, therefore, the subset of
human rights NGOs as a whole is particularly useful since it most immediately exposes the shortcomings of an unregulated NGO sector and arguably
may also serve as a test case for formally regulating other NGO subgroups,
such as those active in development, social services and health.
With the question of scope settled, several terms should also be
defined for the purpose of clarity. The label NGO is used colloquially here
and is therefore not intended to denote an organization with UN consultative status. In addition, the term INGO, or international NGO, is used to
distinguish between a human rights NGO with international focus or presence and a nationally-oriented HRO, where such a distinction between the
two is necessary or relevant. International NGOs include name-brand HROs
such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW). Finally,
the umbrella term human rights organization (HRO) is used here to denote
both national and international NGOs engaged in human rights work.
ii) NGO Sources of Authority
In order to appreciate the exponential growth in the number and
influence of human rights NGOs, it is important to understand the structure
of these organizations and their sources of authority, activities, goals and
methodology. Generally speaking, NGOs lack the conventional sources of
influence and power attributed to states. Moreover, nowhere are the
grounds for their authority established at international law. As noted, even
within the UN, NGOs were relegated to bottom-feeder status and left without any institutional clout for influencing events at Turtle Bay. Consequently, it would appear that NGOs ought to have been unable to dominate
policymaking or influence state parties in the conventional sense. Yet, despite these apparent limitations, according to the political science literature
NGOs have increasingly acted:
[A]s if they were authorized in the strongest possible terms.
They make rules and expect them to be followed; they
plead their views with states. . .and express moral condemnation when their pleas go unheeded; they formulate codes
of ethics and endow them with sufficient legitimacy to ensure that flagrant violators will lose standing in the relevant
community.87
87

J. Boli & G. Thomas, INGOs and the Organization of World Culture, in CONWORLD CULTURE, supra note 7, at 37.
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According to Boli, NGOs are able to assert this authority due to the power
they derive from “the agency presumed to inhere in rational individuals
organizing for purposive actions.” Boli sources this power in “the diffuse
principles of world culture” since he concludes that it “does not flow from
any legal-bureaucratic or supernatural source.”88 In other words, NGO authority is informal and stems from cultural sources capable of triggering
“powerful logics of compulsion that are masked by the theory of rational
voluntarism.”89 Unlike states, whose power is restrained by forces such as
constitutions, the rule of law, and increasingly, intergovernmental arrangements and other international controls, nothing is established at law to delineate limits or boundaries on the wielding of NGO authority. Rather,
according to Boli, persuasiveness amounting to authority flows from international (state and individual) identification with the elemental principles of
morality, voluntarism and individual action.
Using this general notion as a springboard, Boli refines three more
specific sources of NGO authority:
1) autonomous authority: where state efforts at control are
negligible and NGOs are left to operate unfettered;
2) collateral authority: where inter-governmental agencies
are central actors and NGOs share a secondary role; and
3) penetrative authority: where NGOs influence states or
bypass states to influence local organizations directly.90
According to Boli, the last category is most indicative of the type of authority sought and wielded by human rights NGOs. Effective cultivation of this
authority “depends absolutely” on an NGO’s “moral fervor and political
nonpartisanship, which combine with their rational voluntaristic character
to make them a sort of ‘voice of humanity’ to which states must listen.”91
Stated differently, human rights NGOs harness authority from the power
inherent in morality, objectivity and the spirit of voluntarism.
Boli is not alone in attempting to unpackage the riddle of NGO
authority from a political science perspective. As part of her groundbreaking work on transnational actors, Kathryn Sikkink identifies four key
sources of NGO authority: impartiality, reliability, representativeness, and

88

Id.
Boli, supra note 7, at 288-89.
90 Id. at 289. This point underscores again the reliance of NGOs on appeals to
world public opinion and the significance this influence holds.
91 Id. at 293.
89
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transparency.92 In discussing the significance of these markers, Sikkink
notes that “few INGOs . . . meet [the] ideal of pristine autonomy” or impartiality that generates authority.93 Moreover, she stresses the centrality of an
NGO’s reliability insofar as its authority “is so linked to the power of information and the images they project, they are harmed by any suggestion that
their information is less than accurate.”94 While there is a great deal of
overlap in these two conceptualizations of NGO authority, Sikkink’s approach serves as a broader and more concrete foundation for tracing the
sources of NGO authority. Rather than be satisfied with Boli’s overly ambiguous notional cocktail of “rational voluntarism,” Sikkink rightly traces
the concrete output of this phenomenon to the question of reliability. Boli’s
thinking seems to engage an automatic conclusion based on the assumption
that if efforts follow basic and rational principles and reflect a voluntary
spirit, these efforts ought to generate veracity and reliability. Clearly, no
guarantee for this outcome exists, and thus greater accuracy in pinpointing
the source of authority may be achieved by focusing on the end product of
reliability and coupling this with the persuasive function of transparency.
Indeed, Boli subjects himself to an additional trap by attributing authoritative weight to the fuzzy notion of moral fervor and is thus faced with the
difficult task of trying to measure such an intangible. Still, in this latter
point, Sikkink falls into agreement, citing the work of Rodney Hall and
concluding that moral authority (admittedly still distinct from Boli’s “moral
fervor”) is a “power resource that gives [NGOs] influence beyond their limited material capacities.”95
Although some significant distinctions may be drawn when contrasting the foundations of NGO authority offered by Boli and Sikkink, both
92

Clark mirrors Sikkink’s sources of authority, arguing that “it is the NGOs’ established history of accuracy, independence, and impartiality that will determine
their credibility and authoritative power within international political and public
arenas.” A.M. CLARK, DIPLOMACY OF CONSCIENCE: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND
CHANGING HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS 33 (2001).
93 K. Sikkink, Restructuring World Politics: The Limits and Asymmetries of Soft
Power, in S. Khagram, J.V. Riker, and K. Sikkink, eds., RESTRUCTURING WORLD
POLITICS: TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, NETWORKS, AND NORMS 313 (S.
Khagram et al. eds., 2002).
94 Id. at 314. As will be seen, allegations of inaccuracy have served as a primary
tool for criticism of NGOs. Yet, in addition to using the cloak of reliability as a
shield to defend against these allegations, NGOs have also wielded the power of
past reliability as a sword, to fend off insinuations that more formalized sources of
accountability may be necessary within the industry.
95 Id. at 312.
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approaches confirm that NGO authority hinges upon informal sources that
are difficult to quantify and lacks any formal tools for measuring or scrutinizing its inevitable ebb and flow. Indeed, even Sikkink’s expectation of
impartiality, reliability, representativeness and transparency rings hollow
when considering that these markers may simply be a question of what lies
in the eye of the beholder rather than based on any objective test. For example, with regard to relying on something as seemingly straightforward as
representativeness, Hurrell remarks that the “the lack of apparent means of
. . . evaluating [NGO] representational authority” results in many NGOs
being “little more than self-appointed and self-created lobbies, despite their
pervasive rhetoric of authenticity.”96
For better or worse, a legal analysis does little to shed additional
light or meaning on how NGOs have come to assert authority within the
international system. As Math Noortmann has observed, NGOs lack any
international legal personality that formally sets out its sources of authority.97 Indeed, NGOs also lack legal personality under various regional instruments as well. For example, consider the dearth of formal guidelines
that characterize NGO participation within the European Community. Despite the fact that “there is no legal basis in the Treaty [of Maastricht] for
dialogue or consultation” with NGOs, a number of informal forums have
been developed across a range of policy fields.98 Ultimately, it is the creation of such informal arrangements that lend legitimacy and authority—
however difficult to measure—to various NGO voices. Indeed, it is this
very phenomenon that underscores “the contrast between the growing influence of NGOs in international decision- and law-making processes and
their lack of formal accountability under international law.” According to
Noortmann, this situation will not resolve itself since “international accountability can only be required from NGOs in combination with
recognised rights under international law.”99 As seemingly clear-sighted as
this statement may appear, its logic is disingenuous, as it attempts to assert
new legal rights for NGOs while at the same time denying the possibility
96 A. Hurrell, Power, Principles and Prudence: Protecting Human Rights in a
Deeply Divided World, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL POLITICS, supra note 11, at
289.
97 Noortmann, supra note 6, at 71.
98 European Commission, The European Commission and Non-Governmental Organisations: Building a Stronger Partnership, 52 TRANSNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
132 (2000) (originally published in French), reprinted in English at http://europa.
eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/sgc/ong/docs/communication_en.pdf, last visited
December 21, 2004 [hereinafter “Building a Stronger Partnership”].
99 Noortmann, supra note 6, at 72.
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that an expectation of NGO accountability might legitimately precede the
acquisition of such rights. Simply put, Noortmann attempts to condition
NGO accountability on the need for first securing legal rights at international law, which essentially places the proverbial cart in front of the
horse.100
Noortmann is not alone in advocating this line of reasoning. Peter
Spiro similarly argues that the question of accountability may be “best answered by formally and fully recognizing NGO power in international institutional architectures.” Spiro contends that formalizing NGO participation
in international decision-making would concretize NGO power, serve a
transparency objective and also bind NGOs to institutional bargains.101
While this proposal may seem both reasonable and logical, it signals a
much larger, long-term undertaking whose outcome is at best uncertain.
The structure of international law is slow in changing, abstract in nature,
and not prone to dramatic overhaul along the lines put forward by
Noortmann and Spiro. Moreover, arguing in favor of the inclusion of NGOs
as a player at international law may risk overstating their function within
the international system and open the floodgates to a host of additional demands from truly peripheral “wannabe” non-state actors. Rather than advocating in favor of uprooting the traditional foundations of international law
in the name of attaining accountability for NGOs, this paper reasons instead
that formal constraints to enhance NGO accountability can be implemented
without having to account for the mystique enshrouding the sources of their
informal power. In this respect, the arguments advanced here reflect a less
presumptuous approach that is infinitely more practical and imminently
more doable in actual implementation.
In sum, where a vacuum exists in terms of defining a concrete legal
source of authority for NGOs, we are left with the very fleeting and ephemeral sources of authority identified by the political scientists. To be certain,
it is these sources of authority—weaved from the vague and informal cloth
of moral fervor, rational voluntarism, impartiality and transparency—rather
than any legal rights that have facilitated the propulsion of HROs into the
international system as a pervasive and persuasive player. Yet, as will be
demonstrated, it is also these same self-created sources of authority that
100

The issue of NGO accountability is addressed at length in Part IV(A)(ii), below.
P.J. Spiro, The Democratic Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 161, 162. Isabelle Gunning also argues along these lines,
reasoning that NGOs representative of a larger group ought to be given a legal role
in the creation of international law. Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary
International Law: The Challenge of Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT’L. LAW 211.
101
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continue to facilitate the manipulation of human rights and may ultimately
threaten the future viability of the entire HRO industry.102
iii) The What and How of Human Rights Organizations (HROs): A
Brief Survey of HRO Activities and Methodologies
As an outgrowth of the informal sources of authority described
above, and specifically to the extent that NGOs ostensibly do not “represent
the interests or official positions of governments,” they remain free of the
constraints associated with diplomatic protocol or other policy considerations. Accordingly, HROs enjoy the ability to focus directly on human
rights issues for their own sake, and consequently, can “be much more vocal, outspoken and fiercely critical of violations that occur.”103 This freedom has enabled human rights NGOs to pursue activities that converge
around the following areas:
• information gathering, evaluation and dissemination
(documentation and education);
• monitoring and advocacy (enforcement);104
• developing human rights norms (empowerment);105 and
• legal and humanitarian assistance (democratization and
development).106
102

The notion of self-created authority is borrowed from David Weissbrodt, who
confines use of the term to his study of NGO fact-finding missions: “The authority
for NGO fact-finding . . . is usually self-created. NGOs define the scope of their
study and legitimize it after the fact by the reliability of their findings.” D. Wiessbrodt & J. McCarthy, Fact-Finding by Nongovernmental Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 186, 193 (B.G.
Ramcharan ed., 1982).
103 LAUREN, supra note 52, at 287-88.
104 M.E. Winston, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Human Rights
NGOs: Amnesty International, in NGOS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 43.
Darren Hawkins explains that monitoring “is one of the most powerful tools . . .
because the information can be used simultaneously to delegitimize the targeted
regime and encourage international action against it. Impartial and verifiable monitoring promises moral authority, and explains how NGOs might influence public
opinion, and the targeted regime.” D. Hawkins, Human Rights Norms and Networks in Authoritarian Chile, in RESTRUCTURING WORLD POLITICS, supra note 93,
at 68.
105 Hurrell, supra note 96, at 288-89.
106 C.E. Welch Jr., Introduction to NGOS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 9.
This essay is more concerned with the repercussions stemming from the first three
NGO activities outlined above.
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Stated differently, human rights organizations typically “identify
their primary goals as monitoring and reporting of government behaviour
on human rights . . . building pressure and creating international machinery
to end the violations and to hold governments accountable.”107 One identifiable trend within this array of activities indicates that while major human
rights INGOs carry out hundreds of studies each year, “advocacy activities
are increasingly on the rise.”108 That said, within this general overview of
activities, additional grounds for differentiation among HROs may be identified based on “their formal mandates, geographical location and preferred
means of action.”109 It should be noted that most of these areas of activity
only gradually opened themselves to NGO influence and participation. For
example, prior to the establishment of the UN human rights treaty bodies,
NGOs were unable dedicate their efforts to preparing human rights complaints or submitting shadow reports. Similarly, the UN has only recently
begun to correct the initial sharp distinction it drew between international
and national NGOs by taking steps to open new channels of communication
with national NGOs, and particularly those from developing countries.
What remains most important to stress at this stage is that no organization
or individual is barred or hindered in any way from undertaking any of the
NGO activities enumerated above. As Clark innocently remarks, fact-finding, for instance, “is an activity that an NGO or any third party may undertake simply by taking steps to investigate and publish reports on such
departures from principles.”110 In short, no prerequisite or certification is
required for pursuing classic HRO activities, and none is in place to distinguish or legitimize HROs from any other third party.
While the scope of activities undertaken by HROs has evolved into
a truly wide-reaching enterprise that continues to grow, the essential methodology for advancing human rights has remained relatively unchanged. In
a sentence, HRO work can be summed up as “promoting change by reporting facts.” To effectively pursue this goal, human rights NGOs must
• carefully document alleged abuses;
• clearly demonstrate state accountability for those abuses
under international law; and

107

F. Gaer, Reality Check, in NGOS, THE UN, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra
note 14, at 56.
108 Welch Jr., supra note 106, at 10.
109 Gaer, supra note 107, at 57.
110 CLARK, supra note 92, at 130 (emphasis added).
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• develop a mechanism for effectively exposing documented abuse nationally and internationally.111
Documentation of human rights abuses is ideally intended to reflect “the
result of long and sometimes extremely difficult research work” whereby
“researchers receive newspapers and periodicals in a variety of languages,
consult specialists in law and medicine, correspond with other NGOs and
with private individuals . . . [and] undertake official missions to countries
under investigation.”112 Yet, the collection at one central office of information from many disparate sources, including “families and friends of human
rights victims. . .political parties, released prisoners, and other repressed
groups,” means that “sources of raw data [may be] of extremely diverse
reliability.”113 Moreover, smaller HROs without adequate physical and financial resources may find it difficult to undertake large-scale investigative
work such as field missions. Inevitably, therefore, these twin factors may
operate to adversely impact the depth and quality of the research work put
forward by a given HRO. Perhaps more problematically, while the actual
collection and documentation of human rights data is a central HRO technique, it is “the interpretation of facts so that they elucidate normative concepts” which plays an even greater part in the emergence of human rights
norms.114 In other words, beyond the constraints detracting from reliable
fact-finding, the process of documentation may be further compromised by
poor interpretation methods.
Keck and Sikkink also address the issue of how NGOs pursue their
objectives, employing their own unique jargon to represent four models of
NGO political action:
1. information politics: the rapid and credible production
of politically usable information;
2. symbolic politics: the invocation of readily understandable symbols or terms to make more immediate sense of
distant situations;
3. accountability politics: holding government accountable
to stated policies; and
111

D.Q. Thomas, Holding Governments Accountable by Public Pressure, in OURS
BY RIGHT: WOMEN’S RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 83 (J. Kerr, ed., 1993).
112 JOYCE, supra note 3, at 81.
113 Weissbrodt & McCarthy, supra note 102, at 187. As Weissbrodt remarks, the
veracity of these data may be enhanced by isolating bias, ensuring consistency and
careful questioning and corroboration.
114 CLARK, supra note 92, at 16.
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4. leverage politics: affecting a situation through either material or moral leverage.115

Aside from the addition of more descriptive labels, the Keck and Sikkink
models are simply a reformulation of the classic NGO methodologies outlined above. Whereas the notions of information, accountability and leverage are implicit in those broader methodologies, “symbolic politics” may be
viewed as a corollary to or elaboration of “information politics” insofar as it
serves to facilitate the conveyance of information by using analogies or
symbols. Overlap aside, the notion of “leverage politics” as an HRO methodology merits further exploration here, since it relates directly to one of
the central powers ascribed to NGOs and also represents the linchpin for
entrenching any settled interpretation of facts within the public domain.
The effective use of leverage politics, particularly moral leverage,
hinges on the ability of HROs to use the media for disseminating its
messages and exploiting the moral authority inherent in human rights rhetoric. As Keck and Sikkink add, while “NGO influence often depends on
securing powerful allies, their credibility still depends in part on their ability to mobilize their own members and affect public opinion via the media.”116 Indeed, if NGOs are operating outside of any formal framework,
harnessing the influence of public opinion becomes pivotal to introducing
standards that governments, institutions, and corporations will be compelled
to follow.117 Leverage politics is thus the trigger for what is commonly referred to as “mobilizing shame” against human rights violators. The mobilization of shame seeks to prevent or bring about a cessation of abuse and
induce compliance with human rights norms118 by exposing the behavior of
target states or individuals “to the light of international scrutiny.”119 In this
way, HROs seek to modify behavior not with logic, but “by isolating or
embarrassing the target,”120 essentially turning either the state or individual
into a pariah warranting the scorn of the civilized international commu115

ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS 18-25 (M.E. Keck & K. Sikkink, eds., 1998).
Id. at 23.
117 Simmons, supra note 13, at 87.
118 L. Henkin, Human Rights: Ideology and Aspiration, Reality and Prospect, in
REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING FROM INSPIRATION TO IMPACT 24 (S. Power
& G. Allison, eds., 2000).
119 ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS, supra note 115, at 22.
120 T. Risse & K. Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms
into Domestic Practices: Introduction to THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 14 (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, &
Kathryn Sikkink, eds., 1999).
116
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nity.121 Many observers believe that the mobilization of shame is more effective for protecting against human rights abuses than any “bland
expressions of concern over generic standards.”122 This methodology is
considered so persuasive that Peter Baehr cites it as a key source of NGO
power, reasoning that “all governments like to be known as civilised and as
observing the international human rights standards which they themselves
have helped to devise.”123
To be certain, the mobilization of shame has led to numerous breakthroughs in human rights policies both on the international and national
level. However, this practice has also been the target of much criticism
given its reliance on the power of persuasion. For example, Human Rights
Watch (HRW) has decried “the limitations of the public shaming process”
and has “strenuously . . . urged the need for the international community to
create effective international legal institutions to cope” with human rights
violations.124 Perhaps more immediately—and alarmingly—observers who
argue that the mobilization of shame is the “only real weapon wielded by
nongovernmental actors” have gone so far as to assert that even questionable, unverified allegations ought to be sanctioned as a basis for shaming “in
urgent situations.”125 The disturbing implication of this position is that the
mobilization of shame—and consequently leverage politics generally—can
be disconnected from the elemental need for verifiable evidence, a crucial
prerequisite for any legitimate form of criticism.
—It is not really surprising . . . that it is the non-governmental groups who are steadily forming a global . . . movement of investigation, protest and reform. For it is the

121

Id. at 15.
Gaer, supra note 107, at 53.
123 P.R. Baehr, Mobilization of the Conscience of Mankind: Conditions of Effectiveness of Human Rights NGOs, Address before the UNU Public Forum on
Human Rights and NGOs (Sept. 18, 1996), available at http://www.globalpolicy.
org/ngos/role/globdem/globgov/2000/1117.htm, last visited December 21, 2004.
124 KOREY, supra note 4, at 309. This signals a shift in the operations of HROs and
points to a larger potential impact on the organs of international law.
125 H. Hannum, Implementing Human Rights: An Overview of NGO Strategies and
Procedures, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 36 (Hurst
Hannum, ed., 2d ed. 1992). Hannum qualifies this assertion by conceding that
“maintaining the credibility of an individual NGO and the human rights movement
in general does require competence and professionalism.”
122
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world’s sovereign governments who are now the criminals
in the dock!126
III. THE INFORMAL AND UNFETTERED RISE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

OF

HROS

IN THE

A. Growing Numbers, Budgets and Presence
With an understanding of the limited role initially ascribed to
NGOs in the post-World War II international system, HRO sources of authority and an overview of HRO activities and methodology, it is difficult to
envision how NGOs successfully penetrated the guarded sanctum of international relations and positioned themselves to shape the course of international human rights. Yet, in the span of 60 years—and particularly since the
end of the cold war—HROs specifically, and NGOs more broadly, experienced spectacular growth in terms of number, scope, power and influence,127 their activities increasingly resonating with the collective
conscience of international society. What makes a review of this growth all
the more impressive is the fact that it continues without any formal checks
or balances to regulate the quality or reliability of NGO work. Remarkably,
some observers have concluded that these organizations are now capable of
undertaking “political work once reserved for representatives of states”128
and can no longer be relegated “to simple advisory or advocacy roles,” but
rather must be “part of the way decisions have to be made.”129 Indeed,
others go so far as to reason that given failures of states and intergovernmental human rights mechanisms, “NGOs and social movements are the
126

JOYCE, supra note 3, at 79. According to Joyce, this is because: 1) the state is
no longer sufficient for ensuring the life and liberty of its citizens; 2) human rights
is shifting from rhetoric to “an essential part of some tangible form of world authority”; and 3) there is a powerful linkage between peace and human rights. Id. at
80.
127 This trend is confirmed across the literature. See, e.g., D. Spar & J. Dail, Of
Measurement and Mission: Accounting for Performance in Non-Governmental Organizations 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 171 (2002) (noting that in “the last decades of the
twentieth century, the world witnessed an unprecedented surge in the number and
scope of non-governmental organizations”). See also P. Wapner, Defending Accountability In NGOs 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197 (2002) (reasoning that the number of
NGOs “has skyrocketed” and their “financial and territorial reach and capability. . .has grown so much that states. . .and other actors must take them seriously”).
128 Gordenker & Weiss, supra note 14, at 17.
129 Simmons, supra note 13, at 91 (quoting former Canadian Foreign Minister
Lloyd Axworthy).
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most appropriate vehicle for fostering a transnational moral community,” as
they represent the “only way of driving states towards radical reform of
human rights procedures.”130
The explosive growth of NGOs is made manifest simply by looking
at the numbers. In 1948, the UN listed 41 NGOs with consultative status.
By 1998, there were “more than 1,500 with varying degrees of participation
and access,”131 and by 2004, the number of NGOs enjoying ECOSOC consultative status had skyrocketed to 2,531 (see chart below).132
ECOSOC CONSULTATIVE STATUS MEMBERSHIP: 1946-2002
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The growth in NGO numbers without ECOSOC status is even more
staggering. A UN report estimates the number of international NGOs to be
closing in on 40,000, a figure that represents a growth rate of nearly 20% in
the short period of 10 years between 1990-2000 (see table below).133 Similarly, NGOs registered in OECD countries rose from 1,600 in 1980 to 2,970

130

R

131

R

Hurrell, supra note 96, at 289.
Simmons, supra note 13, at 83-84.
132 Non-Governmental Organizations Section, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, NGO Related Frequently Asked Questions, available at http://www.un.org/
esa/coordination/ngo/faq.htm, last visited December 21, 2003.
133 UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2002: DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD 103 (2002), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en, last visited December 22, 2004. For the
purpose of comparison, this report estimates that there were only 1,083 international NGOs in existence in 1914. Id. at 5.
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in 1993, while spending by these groups more than doubled from $2.8 billion to $5.7 billion.134
INTERNATIONAL NGO GROWTH, 1990-2000
Purpose
Culture and recreation

1990

2000

Growth (percent)

2,169

2,733

26.0

Education

1,485

1,839

23.8

Research

7,675

8,467

10.3

Health

1,357

2,036

50.0

Social services

2,361

4,215

78.5
19.5

Environment

979

1,170

Economic development, infrastructure

9,582

9,614

0.3

Law, policy and advocacy

2,712

3,864

42.5

Religion

1,407

1,869

32.8

Defence
Politics
Total

244

234

−4.1

1,275

1,240

−2.7

31,246

37,281

19.3

This trend is reproduced even more dramatically on the local level,
with most developing countries witnessing “an even sharper increase in the
number of domestic NGOs and non-profits.”135 In 1996, the largest-ever
survey of non-profits identified more than one million NGOs in India and
over 200,000 in Brazil. In Nepal for example, the number of registered
NGOs grew from 220 in 1990 to 1,210 in 1993, while in Tunisia the number jumped from 1,886 in 1988 to 5,186 in 1991. Significantly, this growth
in numbers has been facilitated by a flow of resources which has increased
more than sevenfold in the past three decades.136 Moreover, it appears that
even the elusive definition of NGO itself underwent an expansive overhaul
during this period. By 1994, the UN defined NGOs as any “non-profit entity whose members are citizens or associations of citizens of one or more
countries and whose activities are determined by the collective will of its
members in response to the needs of the members of one or more communities with which the NGO cooperates.”137 Events within the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) revealed an identical trend. In
considering the status to be granted to NGOs in its own proceedings, the
134

R

135
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Spar & Dail, supra note 127, at 171.
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002, supra note 133, at 5.
136 Id. at 102.
137 Simmons, supra note 13, at 83. See also supra Part II(C)(i) for a discussion
surrounding the evolution of the term NGO.
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CSCE discarded any constraining definitions as initially adopted by
ECOSOC, and instead recognized NGOs as any group “who declare themselves as such according to existing national procedures,” provided they do
not condone violence or terrorism.138
Three factors are central to understanding the parallel growth experienced by HROs during this period.139 First, the implosion of the Soviet
Union meant that high-pressure cold war politics receded from the international stage and facilitated the consideration of less existential issues unrelated to the formerly dominant US-USSR confrontation. Thus, state interest
in and support for human rights increased dramatically, resulting for example in a significant jump in the number of countries ratifying the six key UN
human rights treaties.140 As an outgrowth of this shift in priority, NGOs that
had previously languished in the background were quick to promote themselves by emphasizing their capacity and “advanced knowledge on issues
including human rights,” which had previously been relegated to the policy
backburner.141 Second, in tandem with revolutionary political changes
within the international system, the 1990s also heralded a revolution in
communication and information technology. This technology, “literally
made it possible to ignore borders and to create the kinds of communities
based on common values and objectives that were once almost the exclusive prerogative of nationalism.”142 Finally, a significant shift occurred in
the financial support extended to the general NGO community. By 1994
“over 10% of public development aid ($8 billion) was channeled through
138

Document from the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Moscow, at para. 43 (Sept. 10 – Oct. 15, 1991), available at
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/hd/mosc91e.htm, last visited December 21, 2004. The CSCE is most recently known as the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
139 Kenneth Roth, executive director of HRW, incorporates some of these factors
in his own historically compressed explanation for HRO growth, including: the
human rights ideal, better communications technology, the press, the policies of
influential governments, the development of international standards, the partnership
between local and international human rights groups, and the growing professionalism of the human rights movement itself.” K. Roth, Human Rights Organizations:
A New Force for Social Change, in REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 118, at
230.
140 Specifically, ratifications of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) grew from around 90 to nearly 150. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2002, supra note 133, at 10.
141 Gordenker & Weiss, supra note 14, at 24.
142 Id. at 25.
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NGOs, surpassing the volume of the combined UN system ($6 billion)
without the Washington-based financial institutions.”143
The exponential growth in the financial support of NGOs repeated
itself within the human rights NGO community, leading Ibrahima Fall, head
of the UN Center for Human Rights, to bemoan as “clearly ridiculous” the
fact that the Center had “less money and fewer resources than Amnesty
International,” yet represented the UN’s arm for human rights.144 Significantly, between 1973-1993 a single foundation—the Ford Foundation—
provided nearly “half of international human rights funding provided by
U.S. foundations,”145 estimated at some $100 million.146 As a direct outgrowth of this financial backing, NGOs “once largely relegated to the hallways,”147 soon became “able to push around even the largest
governments.”148
B. Expanding NGO Influence Within the UN System
i) NGOs Within ECOSOC, the Vienna World Conference on Human
Rights and the Secretary General’s Panel of Eminent Persons on United
Nations-Civil Society Relations
Many of the seeds of growth within the HRO community were already planted prior to the political and technological changes of the1990s.
A clear and concrete example of the growing influence these interest groups
began exerting on the international level may be illustrated by returning to
the United Nations. Although arguably the midwife of modern NGO power,
as demonstrated in Part II above, the original intent of this intergovernmental body sought to provide NGOs with only a limited, albeit formalized,
role. Yet, even in the face of a narrowly defined scope of operation, NGO
influence quickly evolved and grew in a variety of informal ways. Almost
immediately following the establishment of the UN, NGOs with consultative status created the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in
Consultative Status (CONGO). While CONGO’s mandate does provide for
taking positions on substantive matters, its work “to ensure that NGO
143

Id.
J.T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 50, 53 (1997).
145 Sikkink, supra note 93, at 307.
146 Welch Jr., supra note 106, at 19.
147 Mathews, supra note 144, at 55. Matthews credits negotiation of the 1992
global climate treaty at the Rio Earth Summit with promoting the shift in NGO
perception and power.
148 Id. at 53.
144
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voices are heard throughout the international arena”149 underscores the “almost unprecedented establishment of formal relations between interest
groups and an intergovernmental body.”150 More directly, in 1968 CONGO
played a central role in “mobilizing NGOs to form the first worldwide NGO
forum on human rights,” thus deepening the participation of HROs in
United Nations debates and decisions.151
As former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has noted,
even “a cursory examination of the participation of NGOs in the decisionmaking systems and operational activities of the United Nations shows
without any doubt that NGO involvement. . .has far exceeded the original
scope of” the legal provisions under Article 71of the UN charter.152 Moving
beyond the limits of the Charter has meant the creation of informal arrangements for incorporating NGO influence into UN affairs, resulting in much
of the NGO input being made behind the scenes.153 Consequently, it would
be “altogether wrong . . . to measure the NGO contribution in terms of its
formal volume just as it would be misleading to think that the most vocal
NGOs are necessarily the most influential.”154 Viewed from this perspective, it is evident that HROs have the proverbial ear of the UN, yet the full
extent of this influence remains unclear and moreover, not formalized. Nevertheless, this influence has become pervasive enough to enable some to
argue that the entire UN human rights system “would quite simply cease to
function without the NGOs.”155
To gain a more complete understanding of the extent of current
NGO involvement at the UN, it is useful to consider several specific examples. First, a brief tracking of the events since Resolution 1296 reveals a
steady increase in informal NGO influence. As noted in Part II above, the
UN Charter mandates ECOSOC with the discretion to grant NGOs with
consultative status. Even with the granting of such status, however,
ECOSOC rules were designed to constrain NGO participation in the intergovernmental body. Despite these apparent limitations, the UN Commis149

CONGO, Who We Are, available at http://www.ngocongo.org/ngowhow/index.
htm, last visited December 21, 2004.
150 Gordenker & Weiss, supra note 14, at 23.
151 CONGO, supra note 149.
152 General Review of Arrangements for Consultations With Non-Governmental
Organizations: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. E/AC.70/1994/5, para.
40 (May 26, 1994).
153 The role of NGOs in drafting the Convention on the Rights of the Child has
been described as without parallel in history. Brett, supra note 60, at 101.
154 Id. at 100.
155 Ibid.
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sion on Human Rights soon “made exceptions in the issuance and
circulation of documents containing communications from NGOs in consultative status,” thus turning the issuance of such documents from what
was designed to be a confidential procedure into a public and established
practice.156 The Commission further facilitated public circulation of NGO
communications by drawing a distinction between documents that simply
presented information rather than issued “a complaint of alleged violations,
specifically directed against a state.”157 Similarly, by seizing upon a loose
interpretation of Article 14 of ECOSOC Resolution 1296,158 the Commission boosted the ability of NGOs to make oral statements alleging human
rights violations, including even the most subjective and unsubstantiated
“views” that arguably did not represent public opinion in a large number of
countries. In this respect, the Commission retained the right “to decide
whether to accept or to act on such information,” without any formal means
for ascertaining the accuracy, veracity, or representativeness of these NGO
views.159 In practice therefore, exceptions to—and loose interpretations
156

Circulation of Written Statements: Opinion Dated 28 April, 1977 from the Office of Legal Affairs to the Under-Secretary-General for Political and General Assembly Affairs, in THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTITUTIONS 341 para. 16 (B.G. Ramcharan, ed., 1997). The Commission on
Human Rights is composed of 53 States and meets annually for six weeks in Geneva. The Commission exercises country and thematic mechanisms to monitor and
publicly report on specific human rights situations. These procedures and mechanisms are collectively referred to as the Special Procedures of the Commission on
Human Rights. See Commission on Human Rights, available at http://www.unhchr.
ch/html/menu2/2/chr.htm, last visited December 8, 2003. In contrast to the UN
human rights treaty bodies, the Commission is political in nature, and its members
are elected by ECOSOC without regard to expertise in the field of human rights.
See infra Part IV(B)(ii).
157 Principles for the Issuance and Circulation of Written Statements by NGOs:
Legal Analysis Dated May, 1977, in THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS, supra note 156, at 343 para. 1. According to
the ECOSOC Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations sitting in 1946, restricting NGOs “would constitute a form of censorship more objectionable than the
ill which it sought to cure.”
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Article 14 enables NGOs “which represent important elements of public opinion in a large number of countries to express their views” to the Council and its
affiliated bodies (emphasis added). See supra Part II(B).
159

Oral Statements in the Commission on Human Rights: Legal Analysis, in THE
PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS, supra
note 156, at 350 para. 3.
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of—ECOSOC rules quickly emerged at the Commission, raising the voice
and centrality of HROs on the international stage.160
With time, practical application continued to dilute the original intent of other articles contained in Resolution 1296. For example, Article
36(b) calls upon NGOs with consultative status to avoid “systematically
engaging in unsubstantiated or politically-motivated acts against Member
States of the United Nations contrary and incompatible with the principles
of the Charter.”161 While this article specifically outlines certain types of
acts which would amount to abuse and result in revocation of an NGO’s
consultative status, ECOSOC’s legal department concluded that the clause
was inapplicable to NGOs which submitted “in good faith” written allegations of rights violations against specific countries, “since it is for the Commission to determine whether a statement is substantiated or not.”162 Thus,
through practice, HROs continually overcame restrictions on the use of
written and oral statements, ultimately heightening their status and role
within the Commission.163 Indeed, HROs are now responsible for bringing
forward the majority of cases addressed by the Commission and its associated bodies. For example, in 1994, international NGOs filed 74% of the
cases taken up by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. National
NGOs communicated an additional 23% of cases, with the remaining 3%
coming directly from families.164
Another clear signal that NGOs had become central to international
human rights developments came with the UN’s first World Conference on
Human Rights, in Vienna from 14-25 June 1993.165 Initially, a key proposal
circulated within the Preparatory Committee for this conference sought to
160

Principles for the Issuance and Circulation of Written Statements by NGOs,
supra note 157, at para. 2.
161 E.S.C. Res. 1296, supra note 62, at art. 36(b). For several recent examples of
invocation of this article, see infra note 192.
162 Oral Statements in the Commission on Human Rights, supra note 159, at para.
4.
163 The Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations in Meetings of the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: Legal Analysis Dated 2 September, 1982, in THE
PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS, supra
note 156, at 353.
164 Gaer, supra note 107, at 55.
165 Michael Posner cites the Vienna Conference as the second distinct stage in the
international human rights movement, characterized by “the rapid development and
growth of local human rights groups and advocates in every region of the world.”
Posner, supra note 66, at 405.
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limit NGO presence to public sessions, where they might attend as ‘observers.’ The NGO community responded in a “vigorous and uncompromising”
manner, producing a joint letter emphasizing the need for full NGO participation in conference deliberations and warning that without such participation, “the Conference risks becoming cut-off from reality and an empty
exercise.”166 This firm NGO stance produced an “unprecedented extension
of the rules of procedure of the Preparatory Committee,” paving the way for
significantly broadened participation in the Vienna Conference itself.167As
Korey describes the Conference, “NGOs were everywhere lobbying government delegations, holding press conferences, coordinating their efforts
and refusing to give up or abdicate even when the possibility of a significant advance was dim.”168 Undoubtedly, with some “7,000 participants, including academics, treaty bodies, national institutions and representatives of
more than 800 [NGOs]—two thirds of them at the grass-roots level—gathered in Vienna,”169 admission criteria for this groundbreaking conference
had been loosened beyond any recognizable limit. Indeed, as an outgrowth
of expanded rules for participation, organizations in attendance at the Vienna Conference included “representatives of Kurdish, Palestinian, Basque,
Sendero Luminoso and other armed opposition groups, all of whom clearly
aim for political power,” and neither represent human rights NGOs, nor for
that matter legitimate NGOs.170
The World Conference concluded with representatives of 171 states
adopting a Declaration and Program of Action by consensus.171 This official
document confirmed “the promotion and protection of human rights” as “a
matter of priority for the international community,”172 and further called
upon “States and international organizations, in cooperation with non-governmental organizations, to create favourable conditions at the national, re166

R

167
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KOREY, supra note 4, at 278-79.
Schoener, supra note 83, at 551. See also KOREY, supra note 4, at 279.
168 KOREY, supra note 4, at 293.
169 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, World Conference on
Human Rights, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu5/wchr.htm, last visited September 20, 2004, excerpted from UN Doc. DPI/1394/Rev.1/HR-95-93241.
170 Baehr, supra note 123. Other groups attending under the guise of NGO status
included “representatives of the Christian Democratic and Liberal International
groups, both of which have close ties with political parties of the same name.”
171 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23
(July 12, 1993), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.CONF.157.23.En?OpenDocument, last visited March 10, 2004. See also
OHCHR World Conference, supra note 169.
172 Vienna Declaration, supra note 171, at pmbl.
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gional and international levels to ensure the full and effective enjoyment of
human rights.”173 In addition, the Vienna Declaration recognized “the important role of non-governmental organizations in the promotion of all
human rights . . . at national, regional and international levels . . . and to the
. . . protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms,” and further
acknowledged the contribution of NGOs to the process of standard setting.174 Thus, through this Declaration, the UN effectively ended the formal
spurning of national NGOs and linked success in the struggle for human
rights to cooperation with NGOs at all levels.
Significantly, the Vienna Conference also provided the international human rights treaty bodies with an opportunity to praise HROs and
their invaluable assistance in the campaign for international human
rights.175 Accordingly, in a separate statement issued at Vienna, the international treaty bodies asserted that:
The active cooperation of non-governmental organizations
is essential to enable the treaty bodies to function in an informed and effective manner. [Human rights NGOs] have
important roles to play in: scrutinizing States party’s reports at the national level; providing information to treaty
bodies; assisting in the dissemination of information; and
contributing to the implementation of recommendations by
the treaty bodies.176
This endorsement of HRO activities is particularly significant insofar as it
came from the leading expert bodies concerned with the legal ramifications
of international human rights.

173

Id. at art. 13 (emphasis added).
Id. at art. 38.
175 The international human rights treaty bodies include: The Human Rights Committee, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Committee Against Torture, the Committee on the
Rights of the Child, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the
European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights, the European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture, the Inter-American Commission and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the ILO Committee on the Application
of Conventions and Recommendations. See Vienna Statement of the International
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/TBB/4, June 16, 1993, n.1.
176 Recommendations For Enhancing the Effectiveness of United Nations Activities and Mechanisms, Vienna Statement, supra note 175.
174
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With these remarkable gains in place, two footnotes stemming from
the Vienna Conference are worth adding here. First, governments in attendance openly recognized the potential for abuse of human rights principles
for political purposes. Consequently, they qualified their endorsement of
HROs by declaring that only those NGOs “genuinely involved in the field of
human rights should enjoy the rights and freedoms recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the protection of the national
law.”177 This “highly problematic” reference remains a point of contention
for many human rights activists,178 especially those who believe that NGOs
represent “the engine for virtually every advance made by the United Nations in the field of human rights since its founding.”179 Nevertheless, the
governmental action made manifest the reality that a growing number of
non-state actors, hoping “to gain respectability . . . choose the theme of
human rights to carry out international activities.”180 Second, in the wake of
divergent interests, NGOs “formally disbanded” the nascent NGO Liaison
Committee (NLC) a mere two years after its creation at the Vienna Conference.181 This body, elected on the last day of the Vienna Conference’s NGO
forum, was intended to become a permanent coordinative committee for
NGO activities. Instead, its short lifespan serves as a testament to the fierce
independence that characterizes HROs and their steadfast refusal to submit
to any kind of oversight.
Perhaps the clearest signal that NGOs had attained a greater level of
respect within the UN came with the revision of ECOSOC Resolution 1296,
nearly 30 years after its initial enactment. Resolution 1996/31, the product
of three years of “intensive, and sometimes acrimonious, debate” within an
Open-Ended Working Group,182 updated the terms of the UN’s consultative
relationship with NGOs. This new resolution deepened the formal role extended to NGOs—and particularly HROs—within the UN system. Most
significantly, the resolution did away with the previous prohibition against
bestowing consultative status upon HROs having only a national or regional
177

Vienna Declaration, supra note 171, at art. 38 (emphasis added).
L.S. Wiseberg, Resolution 1296 Revised: A Done Deal on Consultative Status—
Not Ideal But a Major Improvement, 3 HUM. RTS. TRIBUNE 4, Aug-Sept 1996,
available at http://www.hri.ca/tribune/viewArticle.asp?ID=2306, last visited November 19, 2004.
179 Gaer, supra note 107, at 51.
180 A. Colonomos, Non-State Actors as Moral Entrepreneurs: A Transnational
Perspective on Ethics Networks, in NON-STATE ACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS 79 (D.
Josselin & W. Wallace, eds., 2001).
181 Baehr, supra note 123.
182 Wiseberg, supra note 178.
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focus,183 thus extending UN access to thousands of smaller, issue-specific
organizations and particularly to NGOs from less developed countries and
countries in economic transition.184 Rather than continue to require “a general international concern” with human rights “not restricted to the interests
of a particular group of persons, a single nationality of [sic] the situation in
a single State or restricted group [of] States,”185 ECOSOC Resolution 1996
opened “special consultative status” (the revised equivalent of Category II
status)186 to any HRO that pursued:
[T]he goals of promotion and protection of human rights in
accordance with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.187
This dramatic shift in position resonates throughout the new resolution.
Most notably, whereas Resolution 1296 only enabled “organizations which
represent important elements of public opinion in a large number of countries to express their views,”188 Resolution 1996/31 now allowed “international, regional, subregional and national organizations that represent
important elements of public opinion to express their views.”189 Similarly,
under article 36 of the old resolution, suspension or withdrawal of an
NGO’s consultative status was left to the sole discretion of the Council.190
However, with the revised resolution, NGOs “shall now be given written
reasons for that decision and shall have an opportunity to present its response for appropriate consideration” by ECOSOC’s NGO committee.191
Although there are several recent cases of NGOs having their status sus183

E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 76, at art. 5.
Id. arts. 6-7. For example, “African-based NGOs now make up 11 per cent of
the total—up from 4 per cent in 1996.” “Report of the Secretary-General in Response to the Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil
Society Relations,” UN Doc. A/59/354, 13 Sept. 2004, at 6, available at http://
www.un.org/reform/, last visited November 18, 2004.
185 E.S.C. Res. 1296, supra note 62, at art. 17.
186 With Resolution 1996, ECOSOC also approved cosmetic alterations to the consultative status labels. Accordingly, general consultative status replaced Category I
status and special consultative status replaced Category II. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31,
supra note 76, at arts. 22-23.
187 Id. at art 25.
188 E.S.C. Res. 1296, supra note 62, at art. 14 (emphasis added).
189 E.S.C. Res. 1996/31 supra note 76, at art. 20.
190 See supra Part II(B).
191 E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 76, at art. 56.
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pended,192 these incidents point more to the politicized nature of the Commission than to any objective assessment of clear abuse based on “a pattern
of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations.”193 In any event, NGOs now have a formal voice in any proceedings that threaten the suspension or withdrawal of their consultative status.
Further reinforcing the trend towards the expansion of NGO influence within the UN system, it should be noted that NGOs enhanced their
access in two secondary, but still significant, ways. First, the number of
NGOs having “association” status with the Department of Public Information (DPI) grew “from 200 in 1968 to about 1,400 in 2002.” This accreditation provides NGOs access to the UN, although it does not permit active
participation in proceedings.194 Second, the UN designed a new ad hoc process for accrediting NGOs to conferences and other one-time events. While
this form of participation can permit considerable opportunities for interac192

On 26 October 1999, ECOSOC revoked the consultative status of Christian
Solidarity International (CSI) by a 26 to 14 vote in response to a complaint by the
government of Sudan, which had charged that the NGO’s actions constituted both a
threat to the sovereignty and national security of Sudan. CSI had invited the Southern Sudanese rebel chief John Garang to speak out in front of the Commission
against the Sudanese government’s drive to enslave non-Muslims in the Sudan. See
B. Franceschi, Lobbyists’ Role at UN Human Rights Talks Prompts Heated Debate,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 23 2001, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/
ngos/access/2001/hrights.htm, last visited November 20, 2004. See also J.C.
Buhrer, NGOs Are Upsetting Things at the UN, LE MONDE, Aug. 17, 2000, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/access/2000/1206.htm, last visited November 20, 2004 (A. Baillat & J. Garred, trans.). In another case, ECOSOC decided, by
a 25 to 18 vote, “to suspend, for a period of three years, the special consultative
status of the International Council of the Associations for Peace in the Continents
(ASOPAZCO).” According to the American delegate, although the International
Council for the Association of Peace in the Continents had made statements critical
of Cuba, it had not challenged the sovereignty of Member States nor gone beyond
established norms. E.S.C., News Release, Doc. ECOSOC/5934, 46th mtg. (Oct. 18
2000), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001018.ecosoc
5934.doc.html, last visited November 20, 2004. and http://www.globalpolicy.org/
ngos/00deb/asopazco/pr5934.htm, last visited November 20, 2004. See also T.R.
Eddlem, Conservatives Deceived by NGOs, 15 NEW AMERICAN 17 (July 16, 2001),
available at http://thenewamerican.com/tna/2001/07-16-2001/vo17no15_ngo.htm,
last visited November 18, 2004.
193

E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 76, at art. 57(a).
United Nations, News Release, UN-Civil Society Relations Panel Established
by Secretary-General, (Feb. 13, 2003), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/
ngos/ngo-un/rest-un/2003/0213panel.htm, last visited November 20, 2004.
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tion and lobbying in informal sessions, it “does not allow a continuing relationship with the UN.”195
With all these newly created or enlarged points of entry for NGO
participation, it is no surprise that Secretary General Kofi Anan would conclude that as a result of “explosive growth in [NGO] participation, the system that has evolved over several years . . . is showing signs of strain.” In
the main, Anan drew attention to several issues: First, the UN’s inability to
physically accommodate all NGOs requesting participation in United Nations conferences and meetings; second, inconsistencies in standards and
procedures surrounding accreditation processes; third, rising wariness on
the part of Member States concerning “the constant pressure to make more
room” for NGOs in their deliberations; and finally, the continuing and
“great imbalance” in numbers between NGOs from industrialized and developing countries, “with very few of the latter taking part in United Nations activities.”196 As a consequence of these realities, the Secretary
General appointed 12 individuals “affiliated with governments, non-governmental organizations, academia and/or the private sector” to a Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, and tasked the
group with examining “the modes of participation in UN processes of nongovernmental organizations, as well as of other non-governmental actors
such as the private sector and parliamentarians.”197 The Panel’s final report
(also referred to as the “Cardoso Report”), presented to the Secretary General on 7 June 2004, advanced 30 specific reform proposals, including:
• Enlarging the role of civil society organizations within
General Assembly affairs, “since it no longer makes
sense to restrict their involvement in the intergovernmental process to the Economic and Social council”;
• Creating a single accreditation mechanism “under the authority of the General Assembly”;
195

A. Baillat, NGO Status at the UN, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/
ngos/ngo-un/info/status.htm, last visited December 3, 2004. “The formal statuses
accord very different rights to NGOs, but in practice active NGOs with lower status
can gain greater access than less active NGOs with higher status.” For example,
more than 3,500 NGOs were given formal accreditation to the World Summit on
Sustainable Development. See Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for
Further Change: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/57/387, at para.
138 (Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter, An Agenda for Further Change].
196 An Agenda for Further Change, supra note 195, at para. 139.
197 Former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso is chair of this blueribbon panel. See UN-Civil Society Relations Panel, supra note 194.
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• Lessening the prominence of intergovernmental review,
“which tends to overpoliticize the accreditation process”;
and
• Leveling “the playing field between Northern and Southern civil society. . .to enable Southern civil society capacity to engage United Nations deliberative processes,
operations and partnerships.”198

In response to the Panel’s findings, the UN Secretariat agreed that increased
involvement of NGOs should “become a regular component of the General
Assembly’s work”, and that the Security Council should “find ways to
strengthen further its relationship with civil society.”199 The Secretary General also agreed to create a single trust fund to underwrite travel and accommodation expenses for NGO representatives from developing countries to
attend intergovernmental meetings, and endorsed the idea of a single system
for NGO accreditation.200 Not surprisingly however, NGO reaction to the
Cardoso Report has bordered on hostile. According to Global Policy Forum, “the NGO community must oppose the report’s many negative ideas”,
inter alia, because:
[T]he Cardoso Report does not fundamentally reflect what
NGOs told panel members nor does it address many critical
NGO concerns. The report says nothing about additional
UN funds for NGO liaison and support. . . [or] about efforts
by governments, North and South, to weaken, subordinate
and control NGOs. Rather the report promotes problematic
ideas about governance that most NGOs categorically reject. Indeed, the core ideas of the report are damaging to
NGOs and to the future of the multilateral system.201
Likewise, HROs including Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch, together with the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations
198

“We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance:
Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations,” UN Doc. A/58/817, June 11, 2004, at pp. 9-11. For detailed coverage of the
Panel’s activities. See http://www.un.org/reform/panel.htm, last visited Sept. 18,
2004.
199 “Report of the Secretary-General in Response to the Report of the Panel of
Eminent Persons,” supra note 184, at p. 4.
200 Id. at pp. 6-7.
201 J. Martens and J. Paul, “Comments by Global Policy Forum on the Cardoso
Panel Report,” August 2004, at pp. 1-2, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/
reform/initiatives/panels/cardoso/08gpf.pdf, last visited November 15, 2004.
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in Consultative Relationship with the United Nations (CONGO), expressed
their displeasure with the Cardoso Report’s conclusions in letters addressed
to the Secretary General. Ironically, one of the primary complaints contained in these letters expressed frustration at the potential that business
entities might be encompassed in the term ‘civil society’, “not least because
of their frequent lack of accountability to society at large.”202
Ultimately, as this and the following sections demonstrate, the Secretary General’s effort to improve NGO modes of participation in UN
processes—and the NGO reaction to that effort—confirm the increasingly
assertive voice of NGOs and the undeniable trend towards a growing role
for these organizations beyond the strict confines of ECOSOC.
ii) HROs & The UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies
Moving from developments specific to ECOSOC and the political
arm of the United Nations, it is equally instructive to track the growing role
of human rights NGOs within the UN human rights treaty body system.
This system, consisting in the main of six major international human rights
treaties, is more reflective of a legalistic approach to human rights. Indeed,
the treaty bodies are envisioned to be made up of nonpartisan experts selected to serve based on their expertise rather than state affiliations.203 Generally speaking, the UN’s international human rights treaties envisaged “no
formal role . . . for NGOs in connection with the interpretation, implementation or monitoring” of the treaties. Rather, the treaties explicitly reserved
these tasks for committees of experts set up in accordance with specific and
predetermined terms.204 Indeed, the role of NGOs as the provider of alterna202

Letter from Renate Bloem, President of CONGO, to Secretary General Kofi
Anan, dated 27 August 2004, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/initiatives/panels/cardoso/0827congo.pdf, last visited November 18, 2004. This issue
also is raised in a separate letter signed by Human Rights Watch and others, dated 1
September 2004, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/initiatives/
panels/cardoso/0901joint.pdf, last visited Oct. 3, 2004. See also “Amnesty International’s Letter on the Cardoso Panel’s Report,” August 31, 2004, available at http://
www.globalpolicy.org/reform/initiatives/panels/cardoso/0831amnesty.htm, last visited November 10, 2004.
203 For example, the ICCPR calls for Committee members to be “persons of high
moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights, consideration being given to the usefulness of the participation of some persons having legal
experience.” ICCPR, supra note 23, at art. 28.
204 H. Cook, Amnesty International at the United Nations, in THE CONSCIENCE OF
THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 204. It should be acknowledged that the Convention
on the Rights of the Child is the only UN convention to formally and explicitly
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tive, independent information is not sanctioned by the text of International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) nor addressed under the
Human Rights Committee’s rules of procedure. In fact, the term non-governmental organization simply does not appear in either of these instruments.205 Despite this apparently clear delineation of tasks and exclusion of
NGO participation, the Secretary General of the UN recently declared that
many “United Nations treaty bodies now routinely consider alternate reports from non-governmental organizations alongside the official reports
from Governments.” Moreover, in some cases, NGOS “have addressed plenary sessions of conferences and participated in formal, round-table discussions with governmental delegates.”206 How then did HROs come to assert
such a role?
During the drafting stage of the ICCPR and ICESR, “it was assumed that the Committee would base itself exclusively on the reports submitted by States parties.”207 Observers differed on what role, if any,
unofficial information should play in shaping the Human Rights Committee’s (HRC) opinions. Egon Schwelb asserted that the Committee “was
clearly not authorized to use such information.” In contrast, Francesco
Capotorti “pointed out that the nature of the examination would vary according to the elements of evaluation and comparison which the controlling
body was permitted to use.”208 Capotorti further reasoned that information
other than the State party’s official report was crucial for the Committee to
extend a function for NGOs within the text of the Convention itself. Under article
22, states are encouraged to cooperate “in any efforts by. . .non-governmental organizations. . .to protect and assist” children seeking refugee status. Furthermore, article 45 of the Convention enables the Committee on the Rights of the Child to
“invite. . .other competent bodies as it may consider appropriate to provide expert
advice on the implementation of the Convention.” According to the Committee’s
interpretation, NGOs fall within this definition. Convention on the Rights of the
Child, G.A. Res. 44/25 (1989) (entered into force Sept. 2 1990). See M. Longford,
NGOs and the Rights of the Child, in THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD, supra note
1, at 235. See also Posner, supra note 66, at 417.
205 See ICCPR, supra note 23; Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev. 6 (Apr. 24, 2001) [hereinafter HRC Rules of Procedure]. The current version of the rules was adopted at the Committee’s 1924th
meeting during its seventy-first session.
206 An Agenda for Further Change, supra note 195, at para. 136.
207 I. Boerefijn, Towards a Strong System of Supervision: The Human Rights Committee’s Role in Reforming the Reporting Procedure Under Article 40 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 766, 782 (1995).
208 Id.
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fully verify information provided by governments. However, he also concluded that:
[T]he only source of information for the Committee would
be the reports submitted by governments; the control organs had no direct investigative powers. With regard to [the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights]. . .NGOs with consultative status could be allowed
to intervene; but there was no ground for such an intervention in the relevant clauses of the CCPR.209
In spite of these views, the Human Rights Committee eventually went on to
infer a point of entry for NGOs through Rule 67(2) of its own rules of
procedure, which provides that:
The Committee may invite the specialized agencies to
which the Secretary-General has transmitted parts of the reports to submit comments on those parts within such
time limits as it may specify.210
This move represented an intellectual leap and expansive reading of Rule
67(2) on the part of the Committee, especially given that the UN Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies explicitly
limits the definition of “specialized agencies” to a narrowly tailored list.211
In addition to these specific specialized agencies, the Convention extends
the same status to “any other agency in relationship with the United Nations”212 provided it is “established by intergovernmental agreement,” has
“wide international responsibilities. . .in economic, social, cultural, educa-

209

Id. at 783 (emphasis added).
Rule 67(2), HRC Rules of Procedure, supra note 205.
211 According to the Convention, “The words ‘specialized agencies’ is limited to:
(a) The International Labour Organization; (b) The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; (c) The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; (d) The International Civil Aviation Organization; (e) The
International Monetary Fund; (f) The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development; (g) The World Health Organization; (h) The Universal Postal Union;
[and] (i) The International Telecommunication Union.” Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, G.A. Res. 179 (II), at art. I(ii)
(1947), available at http://www.icann.org/tlds/health1/annexes/convention.htm and
http://www.ifrance.com/cambodialaw/treaties/un/chap03/tr0304_text.htm, last visited November 10, 2004.
212 Id. at art. I(ii)(j).
210
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tional, health, and related fields,”213 and such an agency enters into a cooperative agreement with the Economic and Social Council.214 Clearly, many
human rights NGOs, especially those operating uniquely on the national
level, do not meet these strict criteria.
Notwithstanding this apparent constraint mitigating against active
HRO participation in the proceedings of the Human Rights Committee,
Committee members began incorporating from an early point in their deliberations, “information from the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, and other private human rights organizations,” to
bolster their understanding of state party reports.215 Some state parties
openly opposed this practice, arguing that referral to unofficial information
fell outside the Committee’s mandate.216 In fact, opposition to the use of
such information from Eastern European members of the HRC forced other
Committee members to “surreptitiously glance at documents submitted to
them by NGOs, hiding them under their desks.”217
The “unofficial and rather mild breakthrough” for human rights
NGOs operating within the treaty body system may be traced to the mid
1980s. At this point, several NGOs began providing the HRC “with background information on individual countries prior to or during the time their
human rights reports came up for review.”218 The circumstances and exchanges were “totally informal and the experts, even when they used the
NGO information, meticulously avoided any reference to an NGO.”219 Even
as late as 1988, “it was rare for committee members to acknowledge that
they based questions on NGO information.”220 Yet, as the HRC continued
its work into the 1990s, HRO information became “extremely welcome,” to
the extent that materials were actively “solicited” without any hesitation or
covertness.221 Arguably, Committee members sought out NGO material
213

U.N. CHARTER art. 57 (emphasis added).
U.N. CHARTER art. 63. See also THE INTERNATIONAL LAW DICTIONARY available at http://august1.com/pubs/dict/s.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2003). See also
IOM’s Relationship with the United Nations System—Q & A, available at http://
www.iom.int/en/PDF_Files/Other/IOM_UN_QA.pdf, last visited November 15,
2004.
215 Boerefijn, supra note 207, at 784.
216 Id. at 785.
217 Baehr, supra note 123.
218 KOREY, supra note 4, at 268.
219 Id.
220 S. Colliver, International Reporting Procedures, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, supra note 125, at 176.
221 KOREY, supra note 4, at 268.
214
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prior to a given country review, because it served to “make their questioning more precise, factual, and less abstract.”222 However, this shift in protocol evolved without any formal changes to the ICCPR or the Committee’s
rules of procedure. Indeed, even the mere “possibility of involving nongovernmental information” germinated “without any explicit foundation on
any rules of procedure.”223 Nevertheless, the Human Rights Committee
gradually adopted the use of HRO information as an acceptable practice,
and consequently blessed these organizations with the status of “unofficial
researchers to committee members.”224
The growing—yet always informal—trend in favor of incorporating human rights NGO information is readily confirmed across all of the
UN’s human rights treaty bodies. Even while lacking formal provisions accounting for NGO participation, these bodies quickly “established functioning informal arrangements for meeting with, and using information”
provided by NGOs.225 And while these arrangements continue to expand
and deepen to the point where NGO information is openly solicited, the
bodies have remained reluctant to formalize any kind of procedure for this
exchange:
It is generally left to the committee to ‘invite’ input rather
than giving NGOs and others any right of initiative. Over
time . . . informal practices established by NGOs themselves in regularly transmitting information to the committees have become a more accepted and regular aspect of
their work.226
Indeed, over time, committee members have also “become increasingly inclined to refer specifically to their reliance upon NGOs.”227 Perhaps
most indicative of this shift, a 1994 meeting of persons chairing the UN
human rights treaty bodies recommended that each treaty body “examine
the possibility of changing its working methods or amending its rules of

222

Gaer, supra note 107, at 56.
CHRIS INGELSE, THE UN COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE: AN ASSESSMENT 142
(2001).
224 Gaer, supra note 107, at 56.
225 M. Lempinen, Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations and NonGovernmental Organizations, at 34 (1999), available at http://www.abo.fi/instut/
imr/norfa/miko_ngo.pdf, last visited November 5, 2004.
226 Cook, supra note 204, at 204-205.
227 KOREY, supra note 4, at 269.
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procedure” to allow NGOs to participate more fully in its activities.228 In
particular, suggestions for enhanced participation included allowing NGOs:
[T]o make oral interventions and to transmit information
relevant to the monitoring of human rights provisions
through formally established and well-structured
procedures.229
Significantly, none of these formal arrangements have emerged.
Members of the HRC have confirmed that interaction with HROs continues
on an informal level with no documented formal guidelines governing the
limits or nature of that interaction.230 In the meantime, the role of HROs at
the UN has become so pervasive—and so integral to the operation of UN
human rights mechanisms—that “UN treaty bodies, committee chairs, and
the General Assembly have all affirmed that none of the actions involved in
official human rights monitoring could work well without NGOs.”231
Human rights organizations are relied upon especially for fact-finding operations, given their omnipresence and exclusive dedication to the cause of
human rights. And it is the product of these operations that finds its way
into the HRO briefings and documentation that is “extremely effective in
guiding,” for example, the work of the Human Rights Committee.232 With
228

Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, Including Reporting Obligations Under International Instruments On Human Rights:
Note By the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/49/537, Oct. 19, 1994, para. 41 [hereinafter Effective Implementation of International Instruments].
229 Id. The report also provided that attention should be given by treaty bodies and
NGOs “to securing a stronger, more effective and coordinated participation of national non-governmental organizations in the consideration of States parties’
reports.”
230 Interviews with Martin Scheinin, UN Human Rights Committee member, Toronto, Can. (Jan. 8, 2003), and Cecilia Medina Quiroga, former UN Human Rights
Committee Chairperson, Toronto, Can. (Jan. 29, 2003). Both these individuals also
noted that it fell to the discretion of the Committee members to make determinations as to the veracity of human rights violations alleged by HROs against a given
state party. Interestingly, discussions regarding the introduction of guidelines for
NGO reports to the treaty bodies was met with concern on the part of HRO representatives, who noted “that it was up to the NGOs to decide what to submit to the
committees.” Report of the First Inter-Committee Meeting of the Human Rights
Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/ICM/2002/3, at para. 33 (2002), available at http://
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/HRI.ICM.2002.3.En?OpenDocument, last
visited November 20, 2004.
231 CLARK, supra note 92, at 16.
232 KOREY, supra note 4, at 271.
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these dramatic developments in the open, many observers have concluded
that without the input provided by human rights NGOs, UN treaty bodies
today would find themselves “operating in a vacuum.”233
iii) HROs & The UN’s General Assembly and Security Council
Impressively, despite the constricted role established by UN Charter Article 71 and the narrow provisions of ECOSOC Resolution 1296,
HROs have asserted themselves to become “by far the main providers of
information to the UN human rights system,” to the extent that without their
contribution of fieldwork, reports and lobbying, the system “would have
ground to a halt long ago.”234 The centrality of HROs to the UN human
rights system has been described as “the fuel and the lubricant which allow
the machine to function and speed the working up.”235 According to Theo
Van Boven, former director of the UN Center for Human Rights, HROs
were responsible for 85 percent of the information provided to the Center:
“We did not have the resources or staff to collect information ourselves, so
we were dependent. They did a lot of work which we should do at the
UN.”236 Yet, assuming that the viability of the entire UN human rights edifice rests upon the work of HROs, little serves to regulate their role in generating critical human rights reports, developing human rights norms or
expanding human rights definitions. Every input is undertaken in an informal and unofficial capacity, where accountability is minimized and flexibility unfettered.
As a result of this flexibility and informality, the growth in power
of HROs has not restricted itself to the confines of ECOSOC operations or
even to the UN’s human rights treaty bodies. In fact, the expansion of influence has extended:
[T]o the point that many NGOs that have representatives in
New York are now more active in the General Assembly
than in the Economic and Social Council. In addition, several subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly have devised informal arrangements allowing NGOs to take the
floor or circulate documentation. Similarly, NGOs have

233
234
235
236

INGELSE, supra note 223, at 112.
Cook, supra note 204, at 198.
Id.
ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS, supra note 115, at 96.
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participated actively in hearings of special committees. . .or
in special sessions of the General Assembly.237

Human Rights NGOs have also spurred the creation of new human rights
mechanisms through the Commission on Human Rights, including “Working Groups on Disappearances and on Detention and Special Rapporteurs
on such other themes as violence against women and race hatred.”238 Perhaps most revealingly, a coalition of NGOs including Amnesty International239 recently launched a campaign to secure passage of a General
Assembly resolution that would extend NGO consultative status to that
body. The draft resolution decides:
[I]n light of the experience gained through the arrangements for consultation between non-governmental organizations and the Economic and Social Council, to invite
non-governmental organizations to participate in [the work
of the General Assembly] and in the work of its Main Committees, Special Sessions and, as appropriate, subsidiary
and ad hoc bodies.240
237

A. Donini, The Bureaucracy and the Free Spirits: Stagnation and Innovation in
the Relationship Between the UN and NGOs, in NGOS, THE UN, AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE, supra note 14 at 85. The recommendations submitted by the Secretary-General’s Panel of Eminent Persons on Civil Society and UN Relationships
signals an official recognition of this expansionary trend. Supra, note 198.
238 KOREY, supra note 4, at 9.
239 Amnesty International circulated the letter internationally, endorsing the proposed resolution “as a practical first step in enhancing further collaboration between governments and NGOs.” Pierre Sané, Open Letter From the SecretaryGeneral of Amnesty International to All Ministers of Foreign Affairs, available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/ngo-un/ga/2001/amnesty.htm, last visited November 18, 2004.
240 International NGO Task Group on Legal and Institutional Matters (INTGLIM),
General Assembly NGO Resolution (2000) on NGO participation in the United
Nations General Assembly (May 2000), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/
ngos/ngo-un/ga/prop-res.htm#organisation and http://www.worldfederalist.org/
NGO/ngo_gareso.html, last visited November 18, 2004. In January 2001, INTGLIM circulated a memo to all UN member state ministers and UN officials, as
well as NGOs working with the General Assembly, “calling upon all UN Member
States to consider endorsing the proposed General Assembly NGO Resolution” and
expressing hope that “governments will consider submitting the proposed resolution for adoption by the UNGA.” INTGLIM, General Assembly NGO Resolution
(Jan. 2001), available at http://www.worldfederalist.org/NGO/action_ngo2001.
html, last visited November 18, 2004.
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In tandem with these developments, HROs have actively sought to
have their voice heard within the Security Council as well. One “innovative
and creative” method employed to this end is the Arria formula. This practice allows NGOs “to give testimony to Security Council members in relation to specific crises, as well as on such issues as children in armed
conflict,” outside of official Security Council meetings.241 Arria meetings
occur “virtually every month,” and attendance “is typically at a very high
level.”242 It is under this process that HRW presented the Council with a
briefing on the human rights situation in Angola243 and Médecins sans
Frontières more recently appealed to the Council concerning the situation in
Darfur, Sudan.244 Significantly, meetings under the Arria formula “take
place in conference halls or other places of public access, away from the
Security Council’s suite of formal and informal meeting rooms.” Moreover,
these meetings “are not listed in the daily United Nations Journal, and the
organization keeps no official record of them.”245 It should be noted that
given the potential of the Arria process to “frequently air information and
opinions that nations have managed to keep out of the Security Council’s
241

An Agenda for Further Change, supra note 195, at para. 137. The Arria formula
is named after Ambassador Diego Arria of Venezuela. In 1993, the ambassador
invited Council members to an out-of-council briefing by a Bosnian priest from
Yugoslavia who shared his personal testimony of the crisis there. Arria chose this
informal venue since “it was impossible to get the Council to agree to hear this
testimony in its official sessions.” In this manner, the Arria formula filled an important gap in procedure since “under long standing Council practice, only delegations,
high government officials . . . and United Nations officials could speak at regular
Council meetings and consultations.” Although the practice remained closed to
NGOs for some time, ad hoc events were staged in 1997 and, as of 2000, the
Council has effectively opened the process to NGOs, as well as to other member
states. J. Paul, The Arria Formula (Feb. 2001), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/mtgsetc/arria.htm, last visited November 18, 2004.
242 Paul, supra note 241.
243 Human Rights Watch Angola Briefing Under the Arria Formula to the United
Nations Security Council (Mar. 5, 2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/back
grounder/africa/angola/2002/angola060302.pdf, last visited November 18, 2004.
244 Médecins Sans Frontières, “Statement by Ton Koene, Emergency Coordinator:
The Humanitarian Situation in Darfur, Sudan”, United Nations Security Council
“Arria Formula” Meeting, May 24, 2004, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/
security/mtgsetc/0424darfur_msf.pdf, last visited Sept. 20, 2004.
245 B. Crossette, Keeping The Security Council Door Ajar (Feb. 3, 2003), available
at http://www.unfoundation.org/unwire/util/display_stories.asp?objid=31805 and
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/mtgsetc/arriafuture.htm, last visited November 18, 2004.
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purview, countries are now using diplomatic pressure to block or undermine
Arria formula sessions.”246 Still, the Secretary General’s Panel of Eminent
Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations recently encouraged this
type of contact with NGOs by proposing that the Security Council improve
“the planning and effectiveness of the Arria formula meetings by lengthening lead times and covering travel costs to increase the participation of actors from the field.”247
In addition to the Arria formula, NGOs also retain the ability to
“actively lobby the Council and meet with individual missions on a continuous basis.”248 For example, the Working Group on the Security Council
(WGSC), a coalition established in 1995, represents nearly 30 major NGOs
and is dedicated to organizing “off-the-record briefings almost every week
with one of the delegates on the Security Council.”249 In 2003, WGSC held
close to fifty “private and off-the-record” meetings,250 prompting one observer to remark that:
[In] a relatively short time, the [WGSC] has become an influential forum at the United Nations. When it was founded
in 1995, no one imagined that an NGO body could have an
influential voice on Council-related issues.251
The ability to operate informally at higher levels of the UN, coupled with maintaining an influential role within lower-level working
groups, provides HROs with the best of both worlds. As one observer has
remarked, “NGOs often act as full participants and sometimes as principal
246

Id.
“We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance:
Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations,” UN Doc. A/58/817, June 11, 2004, supra note 198, at p. 18.
248 Global Policy Forum, Special Meetings Between NGOs and Security Council
Members, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/mtgsetc/brieindx.htm,
last visited Sept. 21, 2004.
249 As of November 2003, HRO members of the WGSC include Médecins Sans
Frontières, International Service for Human Rights, Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch. Global Policy Forum, NGO Working Group on the Security
Council List of Members, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/
ngowkgrp/members.htm, last visited November 15, 2004.
250 Global Policy Forum, “NGO Working Group on the Security Council Meeting
Calendar 2003”, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/ngowkgrp/meetings/mtgcal03.htm, last visited September 15, 2004.
251 J. Paul, A Short History of the NGO Working Group on the Security Council,
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/ngowkgrp/history.htm, last visited November 10, 2004.
247
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actors” at the crucial working group level, which, while “low in the hierarchy of the UN machinery,” is “important in terms of legal expertise and
technical skills.”252 In this way, NGOs—and HROs in particular—have entrenched their presence throughout the UN system at all levels of operation.
This presence is so pervasive, and backed by an assertiveness so unbound,
that a number of NGO advocates are now lobbying to secure an NGO role
at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).253 Yet even without access to the
ICJ chamber, NGOs remain able to exert an impressive amount of influence
and coordinate lobbying pressure across virtually all of the UN decisionmaking processes.
C. Growing HRO Mandates
In tandem with their numerical and financial growth, and increased
influence within the UN system, HROs have sought to expand the scope of
their activities. “Relative to the 1970’s, NGO’s mandates and agendas have
become more diverse and diffuse. . . [mirroring] the expansion of the
human rights movement as a whole to cover more state activities.”254 For
example, consider the work of Amnesty International (AI). Originally conceived as an organization dedicated to the release of prisoners of conscience, Amnesty’s current mandate has expanded to include promoting fair
trials, monitoring the international arms trade, and abolishing torture, extrajudicial executions and capital punishment.255 In 1991, AI undertook one of
its “most important policy shifts,” determining to monitor human rights
abuses committed by armed political opposition groups in addition to those

252

Cook, supra note 204, at 192. See also Schoener, supra note 83, at 550.

R

253

Dinah Shelton reasons that the ICJ could allow NGO input in contentious cases
by amending the rule defining public international organizations to include NGOs.
Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT’L. L. 611 (1994). Similarly, Richard
Bilder reasons that the ICJ should be opened to human rights actions brought by
individuals and NGOs since “individuals and groups are those most directly affected by human rights violations, and consequently those most likely to diligently
and effectively pursue them.” Richard B. Bilder, Possibilities for Development of
New International Judicial Mechanisms, in Henkin & Hargrove, supra note 66, at
334.
254

H.J. STEINER, DIVERSE PARTNERS: NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT 8 (1991).
Id. at 11. See also POWER, supra note 34, at 41-42.
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committed by states.256 Amnesty’s aspiration to omnipresence is neatly
summed up in the simple, if sweeping, mandate broadcast over the AI website: “working to protect human rights worldwide.”257 In essence, Amnesty
has become the one-stop Seven-Eleven of the HRO world, open 24/7 and
protecting every right imaginable under the sun.258
This type of organizational evolution again underscores the growing scope of actors and actions that have fallen under the scrutiny of HROs.
As one commentator has observed, while Amnesty “was not founded to
work for general economic, social, and political justice—however much its
individual members may wish to do so,” this “above the fray” position
“does not ring quite true in practice. . .Amnesty does seem to be preoccupied with the general state of injustice.”259 Certainly, AI’s work surrounding
the question of refugees and repatriation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa or in the former Yugoslavia testifies to this fact.260 One inevitable byproduct of such mission sprawl is the tendency among HROs to seek out
“sexier” spotlight issues rather than traditional prisoner of conscience style
work. As Morton Winston notes, among Amnesty’s rank and file, “frankly,
the thrill is gone. It is not much fun to work for months or years on a
disappearance case only to learn in the end that one’s fears were correct and
that the person in question is dead.”261 Instead, the ascendant tendency favors issues that attract greater media attention and greater financial support,
even when these issues may not be backed by sufficient supporting evidence, corroboration or institutional expertise.
256

R. Thakur, Human Rights: Amnesty International and the United Nations, in
THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN AN
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 373 (P.F. Diehl, ed., 2001).
257 See http://www.amnesty.org, last visited Sept. 13, 2004.
258 Not to be outdone, effective January 2004, the Lawyer’s Committee for Human
Rights metamorphosed into Human Rights First “to undertake more public forms
of engagement that mobilize a broader and more active group of supporters.” See
Human Rights First, “Human Rights First is the new name of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights”, available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/about_us/
name_change/name_change.htm, last visited November 18, 2004.
259 POWER, supra note 34, at 14. Consider also that in 1989, Amnesty’s “rather
desultory approach to violations of women’s rights” shifted with a newfound recognition of the importance of human rights violations against women, and a decision
“to give this work a higher profile within its campaigns.” J. Connors, NGOs and the
Human Rights of Women at the UN, in THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD, supra
note 1, at 168.
260 D. Stubbings, The Challenge of Protection and Monitoring: An NGO Perspective, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS? 217 (R.G. Patman, ed., 2000).
261 Winston, supra note 104, at 39.
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Amnesty’s historical evolution is indicative of the larger story.
While ECOSOC lately has made efforts to enhance the participation of
NGOs within the UN, HROs have continually sought to fiercely protect
their independence and avoid any pigeonholing or narrow operational conceptualization for their work. As Steiner observes, HRO activists find even
the newly-expanded ECOSOC criteria for consultative status overly constraining.262 These activists reason that qualifying as a human rights NGO
ought not to require that an organization’s criticism of human rights abuses
be founded on international human rights law. Rather, the “nature of the
claims made and the goals advanced by a group” should count for more
than “the formal source of norms that [the NGO invokes] to criticize state
conduct.”263 Ironically, this translates into HROs identifying not only the
violations, but also defining the norms against which these violations are
judged. This pattern of activity dangerously treads away from not only established international human rights norms, but also from any touchstone of
legitimacy.
According to some human rights activists, objective definitions and
neutral mandates have no role in defining HROs. Instead, self-perception
and self-definition represent the “only sensible method of identifying
human rights organizations.” These activists argue that any “attempt at an
authoritative definition [of a human rights NGO] could block a natural and
important growth of the human rights movement.”264 Clearly, if this amorphous conception of a “human rights organization” is accepted, the end result risks a total and utter disconnect from the touchstone of international
human rights law. More alarmingly still, hitching superfluous demands
couched as “human rights” to the legitimate rights enumerated within the
international system risks undermining the very authority of the norms they
aspire to expand. As human rights NGOs have enjoyed an unfettered development, they have come to expect no limits or boundaries to the scope of
their work or the demands they formulate. Without some kind of regulation,
any group of people—or for that matter any individual—can “self-define”
themselves as advocating in favor of what they identify to be a human right;
it is this direction and expectation within the human rights NGO community
which poses a grave risk to the inroads international human rights law has
secured during the past 60 years. As Andrew Hurrell observes, this expansionist viewpoint argues “that we should keep pushing out the normative
boat and keep asserting important sets of rights even if the chances of effective or consistent implementation remain slim,” and even though “it is evi262
263
264

See supra Part III(B)(i).
STEINER, supra note 254, at 5.
Id. at 7.
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dent that this expansion of the human rights agenda and the concurrent
attempt to promote other liberal goals raises very serious difficulties.”265
Indeed, Steiner himself concedes that the more limited the role of HROs,
“the more distinctive will be its contributions to the larger task, and the
greater its credibility and legitimacy within this defined field of activity.”266
And yet, the mandates—and expectations—continue to expand unabated.
Perhaps ironically—or perhaps as a testament to their strong-willed
commitment to what they identify as human rights issues—HROs have expanded their mandates to include not only states and private corporations,
but also intergovernmental bodies, including the United Nations. For example, Amnesty International will rebuke the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) if it believes the agency has “failed in its
mandated duty to protect refugees.”267 By increasingly taking up “cases
where the abusers are non-state actors,” HROs are now applying their version of human rights “to protect and monitor in situations where businesses—especially multinationals—are employing private security
companies, whose operatives behave in a manner which falls far short of
the standards that would be expected from a police force or military
unit.”268 Although human rights NGOs may exercise various techniques,
including “relatively dull reports, or lively street protests,” by “creating new
issues and placing them on the international and national agendas, providing crucial information to actors, and most importantly by creating and publicizing new norms and discourses,” these organizations are restructuring
world politics on a broad scale.269 If this is indeed occurring, and all evidence points to the fact that it is, Steiner is right to ask what, if any, restraints exist to limit the causes being brought under the human rights
umbrella. Furthermore, is it legitimate or reasonable to expect that the justification for these expanded mandates and definitions of human rights violations can be found within the corpus of human rights law?270 Underlining
these questions remains the glaring reality that human rights NGOs continue to grow and increase their influence without addressing the dearth of
formal standards or controls within the industry itself.271
265

R

266

R

Hurrell, supra note 96, at 280.
STEINER, supra note 254, at 38.
267 Stubbings, supra note 260, at 217.
268 Id. at 223.
269 Sikkink, supra note 93, at 306.
270 STEINER, supra note 254, at 36.
271 The problem of unregulated expansion of HRO mandates is addressed in further
detail in Part IV(A)(i), below.
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—Wherever power is exercised, questions of accountability are appropriately posed.272
IV. RELYING ON INFORMAL CONTROLS TO REGULATE INCREASED HRO
INFLUENCE AND POWER: A RECIPE FOR DISASTER
An examination of NGO research, fact-finding, reporting and fundraising techniques underscores the divergences in HRO objectivity and reliability levels. While it is true that no formal mechanisms are in place to
regulate the output of human rights NGOs, activists will point to a number
of informal controls to defend the accountability and reliability of industry
agents. These informal restraints can be divided into two broad types: the
first is internal to the NGO and thus subject to direct NGO control. In contrast, the second level of checks is external to the NGO and consequently
outside its capacity to directly influence. This section will address the characteristics of each of these levels of control and demonstrate their inadequacy for ensuring responsible development of standard HRO practices
within a growing industry. Ultimately, it is this lack of standards that threatens to downgrade the authority of the human rights NGO community and
further risks undermining the legitimacy of recognized international human
rights norms.
Remarkably, most of the academic writing addressing human rights
NGOs remains largely favorable, or, as P.J. Simmons observes, filled with
“breathless accounts about the growing power of NGOs.”273 Even the critical literature falls short of offering any meaningful assessment of the power
currently wielded by a disparate group of organizations self-labeling themselves as “human rights organizations.” Moreover, most observers tend to
accept the premise and reliability of informal accountability methods. It is
this premise—and the reliability of these informal measures—that I intend
to challenge here.
A. Internal Standards
Human rights organizations are typically viewed as grassroots organizations that represent their constituencies in a democratic fashion. Yet
some of these organizations may be “decidedly undemocratic and unaccountable to the people they claim to represent.”274 This reality hints at the
larger picture whereby a lack of concrete operating standards, coupled with
a laissez-faire approach, leaves fulfillment of informal regulatory principles
272
273
274

Spiro, supra note 101, at 162.
Simmons, supra note 13, at 82.
Id. at 83.
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to the NGOs themselves. The result is uneven at best, and at worst, points to
a severe, looming crisis with respect to credibility and authority.
i) Flexible Operating Practices and Limitless Mandates
Some HROs employ internal standards to delineate limits regarding
activities which fall within the purview of the organization. Typically, no
independent body is charged with overseeing the implementation of these
standards, and oftentimes, these standards are neglected or sidestepped for
various reasons. The end result is that HROs are ultimately able to do what
they want, regardless of principles expressed within operational guidelines
or founding mandates. Interestingly, this practice can be traced back to the
early days of the modern HRO revolution. For example, as early as 1977,
Amnesty opted to violate its own self-imposed policy that members not
investigate cases in their own country by dispatching “two leading members
of the West German section of Amnesty” to visit Red Army Faction prisoners and prison officials in West Germany.275 Although touted as one of Amnesty’s core principles, the organization, even early on, felt comfortable
enough—or compelled enough—to violate its own self-imposed operational principles to get the “scoop,” even at the expense of undermining the
sacrosanct impartiality of its local West German chapter.276
Human rights NGOs are not only prone to violating their own selfproclaimed principles, but also have no timidity in departing from the
objectives they set for themselves in their self-proclaimed mandates. As
noted above, Amnesty has experienced significant mission creep over the
years.277 However, other cases demonstrate that HROs are capable of completely disregarding their core functions as objective investigator and educator. For example, B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human
Rights in the Occupied Territories—often identified as the leading and most
reliable Israeli human rights group—claims that its mandate is:
[T]o document and educate the Israeli public and policymakers about human rights violations in the Occupied Territories, combat the phenomenon of denial prevalent among
275

POWER, supra note 34, at 74.
This principle of local chapters abstaining from local human rights issues remains a core AI tenet in effect until today. For example, the website of AI’s Israel
chapter declares that “following Amnesty International’s guidelines, the Israel Section does not act on cases of human rights violations within Israel, the Palestinian
Authority or other neighboring countries in the Middle East.” See http://www.amnesty.org.il/data/english.html, last accessed November 20, 2004.
277 See supra Part III(C).
276
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the Israeli public, and help create a human rights culture in
Israel.278
With this mandate in mind, in April 2002 the organization exercised a giant leap away from its stated mission, electing to act as a
facilitator in surrender negotiations between Islamic Jihad fighters and the
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). As B’Tselem reports, the organization “received a call from a. . .group of armed Palestinians. . .in Jenin refugee
camp” who requested that a B’Tselem representative be “present when they
turn themselves in.” According to B’Tselem, the Palestinian fighters requested “mediation in order to ensure that no harm would come to them if
they surrendered.” Pursuant to this request, B’Tselem, an HRO dedicated to
education, brokered “lengthy overnight negotiations”279 and “conducted
protracted mediation efforts,” leading to the surrender and arrest of the 29
Palestinian combatants holed up in the refugee camp.280
To be certain, B’Tselem’s foray into the uncharted world of protracted negotiations and nighttime surrenders did not reflect an isolated incident or exceptional one-time expansion of mission statement. Instead, it
appears that B’Tselem has incorporated mediation as a new plank in its
human rights work. Since the April 2002 mediation, other Palestinians have
taken to contacting B’Tselem for assistance when trapped in uncomfortable
standoffs with the IDF. In November 2002, B’Tselem again responded to a
request, this time from “Fatah officials asking for help” to ensure that Mohammed Naefe, a suspect wanted in connection with an earlier attack on
Kibbutz Metzer that killed five including two children, would not be
harmed if he surrendered. In this case, a B’Tselem spokesperson conveyed
assurances that “the army agreed not to harm Naefe if he [came] out . . .
unarmed.”281
278

See B’Tselem, About B’Tselem, available at http://www.btselem.org/English/
About_Btselem/Index.asp, last visited October 21, 2004.
279 B’Tselem, B’Tselem Daily Update (Apr. 11, 2002), available at http://www.
btselem.org/english/press_releases/2002/updates/20020411.asp, last visited November 10, 2004.
280 B’Tselem, B’Tselem Mediates Between the IDF and 29 Armed Palestinians in
the Jenin Refugee Camp Requesting to Surrender (Apr. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.btselem.org/English/Press_Releases/2002/020411.asp, last visited November 10, 2004.
281 WTOP News, http://wtop.com/index.php?nid=105&sid=364, last visited November 10, 2004. Print media also covered this story, but omitted B’Tselem’s
name, referring instead to an “Israeli human rights group.” See G. Myre, Israelis
Capture Suspect in Kibbutz Attack, GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 15, 2002, at A-14. Joel
Greenberg writes that Naefe “tried to negotiate the terms of his surrender through
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Undertaking the task of negotiation and mediation between the Israeli army and other Palestinian forces—be they paramilitary or terrorist—
raises disturbing questions, not only about B’Tselem’s expertise in highpressure negotiation situations, but more urgently, about B’Tselem’s professed objectivity. To be certain, permitting a human rights organization to
place itself at the center of a military standoff compromises not only the
organization’s credibility, but also its legitimacy as an HRO. As Steiner
notes, the broader HRO goals become, and the more these organizations
move from specificity to sweepingly defined mandates, the greater the risk
that the distinctive position of the HRO as objective observer will be undermined or replaced by political objectives.282 In Steiner’s words, once an
HRO “departs from the traditional work of monitoring and reporting violations, what special claim does it have to inspire among government officials
or the public a confidence in its work or message?”283
A stark example of the linkage between broadened organizational
goals and the infiltration of political objectives may be seen in the activities
of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR). This national
HRO recently communicated a press release welcoming the establishment
of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The body of the text goes on to
assert that the ICC sends:
[A] clear message to war criminals and those who commit
crimes against humanity such as the Israeli occupation
army [sic] who commit these crimes against the unarmed
Palestinians civilians. This message is that the Israeli occuan Israeli human rights group.” Joel Greenberg, Israelis Say They Capture Man
Behind Kibbutz Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002.
282 STEINER, supra note 254, at 39.
283 Id. at 36. Another example of bendable mandates is reflected in the Palestinian
Human Rights Monitoring Group’s (PHRMG) interest in a criminal trial concerning the alleged assault of a foreign peace activist. According to a PHRMG electronic press release (on file with author), the HRO “succeeded in reopening the
case of British citizen and peacemaker Angie Zelter who was attacked” in Hebron
on 29 August 2001. PHRMG further declared that its lawyers would observe “the
trial closely and [monitor] the performance of the [Israeli] prosecutor to ensure she
represents Ms. Zelter zealously.” According to its mission statement, PHRMG
“documents human rights violations committed against Palestinians in the West
Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, regardless of who is responsible” (emphasis
added). Ms. Zelter, as stated in PHRMG’s e-mail alert, is a British citizen and in all
likelihood not a Palestinian. In any event, it is difficult to discern a pressing
“human rights” issue surrounding this case that would merit lawyer-observers in
the courtroom to ensure a “zealous” state prosecution of the defendant.
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pation army headed by the Israeli Prime Minister Areal
[sic] Sharon will not escape punishment from war crimes
and crimes against humanity after forming the court body
when it is proved that they had committed [sic] these
crimes and they will be referred to the ICC without the protection of USA which is used to using the right of VETO
to prevent the Security Council from the hearings of the
war crimes [sic] committed by the Prime Ministers of Israeli [sic] and its army against the unarmed Palestinians.284
Given the rambling nature of this passage, one might simply brush off the
EOHR as a fringe group or political puppet. However, within the human
rights community, EOHR holds sufficient credibility to secure Michael Posner’s support in the organization’s campaign to gain official permission to
operate in Egypt.285 Notably, EOHR describes itself as “a non-governmental
organization working for the protection and promotion of human rights in
Egypt.”286
ii) Ineffective Accountability
Accountability may be defined as “being answerable to authority
that can mandate desirable conduct and sanction conduct that breaches
identified obligations.”287 Although recognized as “a desirable organizational characteristic, empirical studies commonly indicate that both leaders
and subordinates in public and private organizations seek to avoid accountability.” Consequently, in the absence of accountability, the “likelihood of
ineffective or illegitimate actions by an organization” is heightened.288 With
specific regard to NGOs, a study by Edwards and Hulme has identified the
existence of “multiple accountabilities” which characterize the industry:
284

Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, News Release, “EOHR Welcomes
Establishment of ICC” (11 April 2002). This press release was distributed over the
Derechos listserv (on file with the author).
285 Posner, supra note 66, at 409.
286 Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, The Egyptian Organization for
Human Rights, available at http://www.eohr.org.eg/ (emphasis added), last visited
November 10, 2004. See also infra note 473.
287 M. Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1260 (2003).
288 M. Edwards & D. Hulme, Introduction to BEYOND THE MAGIC BULLET: NGO
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 8 (M. Edwards & D. Hulme, eds., 1996).
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“‘downward’ to [NGO] partners, beneficiaries, staff, and supporters; and
‘upward’ to their trustees, donors, and host governments.”289
Accordingly, observers like Paul Wapner point to the fact that
HROs are beholden to their membership and consequently, must continually ensure that their conduct remains within acceptable boundaries.290 This
type of internal accountability is ineffective for a number of reasons. First,
some human rights NGOs do not operate on a membership-based structure.
For example, while Amnesty International members arguably have a direct
say in the operation of the organization and can potentially threaten the
NGO by “voting with their feet,” or ending their financial and moral support for the organization, Human Rights Watch (HRW) is immune from the
effects of such a potential sanction since they are not a membership-based
organization. Second, even if an organization is membership-based, in
many cases, the failure “to democratize their own [internal] structures
makes them less effective . . . and . . . poses a particular problem for ‘downward’ accountability to members and beneficiaries.”291
With regard to democratic structures and accountability to staff
members, many smaller HROs tend to be founded and driven by dominant
individuals:
No study of NGOs can fail to note the importance of individuals with vision, or dedication to an ideal, or dogged
determination, or all three, who identify with an objective,
who refuse to accept discouragement and who have the
charisma to inspire followers to continue the fight until the
goal is achieved.292
However crucial this type of leadership may be to success in the
world of NGOs, it comes at a steep price. The ensuing “cult of personality,”
has resulted in a playing field where “few NGOs, despite the democratic
aspirations in their work, are [being] run in a participatory way.”293 Sikkink
labels this dearth of internal democracy an “internal asymmetry” and Brett
observes that such personality cults, coupled with reluctance to cooperate
with other NGOs, may frequently exacerbate other financial and personnel
289

Id. The editors of this study conclude that that they “can find no evidence that
the contemporary accountability of NGOs is satisfactory.” Id. at 9
290 Wapner, supra note 127, at 201.
291 Edwards & Hulme, supra note 288, at 6.
292 J. Sankey, Conclusions, in The CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at
274.
293 STEINER, supra note 254, at 77.
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limitations.294 Ironically—and perhaps alarmingly too—“the least participatory local movements may experience the greatest ease in winning
foreign backing,” since charismatic leadership resonates with donors. Ultimately, this external support “will often strengthen a local leader’s position,
reshaping the movement’s internal dynamics as well as its relations with
opponents.”295
The ‘upwards accountability’ observed by Edwards and Hulme is
also prone to criticism that diminishes the informal accountability effect of
groups such as trustees, donors, and host governments.296 In the first instance, while Wapner also cites the use of a board of directors as a classic
control for protecting the NGO’s long-term well-being,297 the reality is that
many HROs choose either to avoid such independent controls altogether, or
install individuals with kindred interests that may dilute the objective essence of the board.298 Consider for example the case of the Palestinian Soci294

Brett, supra note 60, at 105.
Clifford Bob, Merchants of Morality, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 44.
For a more sanguine view, consider Boli: “Almost all INGOs originate and persist
via voluntary action by individual actors. They have explicit, rationalized goals.
They operate under strong norms of open membership and democratic decisionmaking. They seek, in a general sense, to spread ‘progress’ throughout the world.”
Boli & Thomas, supra note 87, at 34. The contrast here may be that Boli speaks to
INGOs generally, rather than human rights NGOs specifically. In any case, Boli’s
view fails to take into account the HRW model, which sidesteps the issue of open
membership, as well as the smaller national HRO that disregards democratic decision-making.
296 Although ‘upwards accountability’ arguably spills over into the category of external controls addressed below, for the purpose of continuity, it is presented here
instead.
297 Wapner, supra note 127, at 204.
298 For example, consider the makeup of PHRMG’s founders. PHRMG boasts that
the “political composition of its founders” includes members from the Palestinian
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement). The U.S.
government recognizes the PFLP and Hamas as designated foreign terrorist organizations responsible for or endorsing attacks against civilians. See PHRMG, About
the PHRMG, available at http://www.phrmg.org/profile.htm, and Department of
State, “Fact Sheet: Foreign Terrorist Organizations” Oct. 19, 2004, available at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2004/37191.htm, last visited Nov. 23, 2004. The
“Foreign Terrorist Organizations” list is compiled every two years by the Office of
the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and is subject to judicial review. It should be
emphasized again that in certain instances, an HRO may not even be required to set
up a board of directors.
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ety for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment (LAW).299
According to the findings of an Ernst & Young audit ordered by a group of
LAW’s institutional donors, LAW’s founder, Khader Shkirat300 “orchestrated a system of false financial reports, including loans to family members
and fictitious expenses” over a period of five years, embezzling a total of
approximately $4 million of $10 million in donations earmarked for the
HRO. The Ernst & Young report found that funds were diverted from the
organization in collusion with LAW’s auditors, with the knowledge of all
project coordinators, and the sanctioning of erroneous reports by LAW’s
own board of directors.301 In an attempt at crisis management in the wake of
this scandal, LAW announced plans to propose “significant structural
changes to avoid such mismanagement taking place in the future.”302 How299

LAW was regarded as the largest HRO operating out of the Palestinian Authority, with established activities in the West Bank and Gaza since 1990. A. Regular,
Veteran Palestinian NGO Suspected of Defrauding Donors, HA’ARETZ, Mar. 25,
2003.
300 It should be noted that Shkirat was an invited participant at a recent retreat/
conference for Arab human rights activists organized by Henry Steiner. See infra
note 449.
301 A. Regular, Veteran Palestinian NGO Suspected of Defrauding Donors,
HA’ARETZ, Mar. 25, 2003. supra note 299. See also Edwin Black, “Audit of Palestinian Group Suggests Lax Funding Controls”, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 15 October 2003, available at http://www.jta.org/page_view_story.asp?intarticleid=13
333&intcategoryid=6, last visited October 10, 2004.
302 LAW News Release, LAW Responds to Difficulties Caused by Previous Mismanagement (Mar. 25, 2003) (on file with the author). Further to this, Jihad Sarhan,
Khader Shkirat’s replacement, also apologized for LAW’s former management and
stated “LAW would not engage in future agitation or name-calling, simply human
rights advocacy.” Black, supra note 301. Whatever promises were made, as this
paper goes to press, emails to LAW—or the newly rebranded “Palestinian Law
Association for Human Rights” are being bounced back to the sender and LAW’s
website (http://www.lawsociety.org) is no longer operational. Although a mirror or
archive of LAW’s site remains in place available at http://www.law-society.org, a
brief review of the organization’s most recent “Weekly Roundup”, published
months after Sarhan’s October 2003 interview, falls far short of the promised pure
human rights advocacy. The “Roundup” includes descriptions of Israeli soldiers
“armed-to-the-teeth” and “shower[ing] schoolchildren with teargas grenades.”
LAW, “Law Society’s Weekly Roundup,” February 19-25, 2004, available at http:/
/www.law-society.org/new-docs/english/2004/Feb/26.2.04w.htm, last visited November 10, 2004. In the wake of this scandal, European governmental aid agencies
“filed a criminal complaint [with the Palestinian Authority] against Shkirat and
some 27 other individuals” associated with the alleged misappropriation of LAW’s
funds. The Ford Foundation, also a LAW funder, pledged to “immediately. . .stop
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ever noble an attempt at damage control, the overarching reality remains
that without some recognized tool to ensure transparent and standardized
behavior across the board, ad hoc Band-Aid solutions will continue to be
applied only following the discovery of violations of already lax
regulations.
The accountability effect of host governments on NGOs is also
flawed insofar as many HROs today conduct their operations on an international level, and are thus often based outside of the countries that are being
criticized for human rights violations. The notion that an NGO might owe
something to the government that is being criticized is thus diminished.
Admittedly, national NGOs may be more beholden to their local governments, and there have been numerous attempts across the globe to curtail
the freedom of such NGOs through domestic legislation.303 Nevertheless, on
the whole, the accountability effect of host governments is insufficient for
ensuring reliability and indeed points to a public need to know the precise
conditions under which a local NGO may be operating. Moreover, this particular accountability effect is increasingly specious as governments progressively increase their funding of NGOs, national and international alike.
Consequently, the more urgent inquiry appears to be whether the NGO, by
way of government funding, is at risk of becoming a de facto mouthpiece of
the government. As James Paul, Executive Director of Global Policy Forum
has observed: “I don’t believe in NGOs getting money from governments. . .I know that many of my colleagues do not have a problem with
that. . .But frankly, when they do that, the capacity of NGOs to be monitors
and to be independent is compromised.”304
With respect to accountability via donors, the case of LAW discussed above underscores the inadequacy of existing informal financial
funding” the group. Edwin Black, “Ford Takes Steps to Reverse Funding for AntiIsrael Groups,” Dec. 18, 2003, available at http://www.jta.org/page_view_story.
asp?intarticleid=13589&intcategoryid=4, last visited November 10, 2004.
303 For example, consider India’s move to blacklist over 800 NGOs for alleged
links with separatist groups. S. Bhaumik, India Blacklists 800 NGOs, BBC NEWS,
June 13, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/3001
458.stm, last visited December 19, 2004. See also infra Part V(B).
304 T. Deen, “U.N. Plans to Boost NGOs Come Under Scrutiny,” IPS-Inter Press
Service, June 21, 2004, available at http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=24304
and http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/initiatives/panels/cardoso/0622boost.htm,
last visited November 20, 2004. Global Policy Forum’s mission “is to monitor policy making at the United Nations, promote accountability of global decisions, educate and mobilize for global citizen participation, and advocate on vital issues of
international peace and justice.” See “About GPF,” available at http://www.global
policy.org/visitctr/about.htm, last visited November 20, 2004.
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controls. However, the flaws intrinsic to informal upward accountability to
donors multiply far beyond simply “cooking the books.” As noted above,
governments are increasingly a leading source of financing for those NGOs
willing to accept state funding.305 Consequently, some “formerly independent NGOs may become more beholden to national governments,”306 retaining their NGO status while potentially exposing to doubt their objectivity
and credibility. Government sponsored funding arrangements represent a
significant trend across the NGO industry and “now accounts for around 40
percent of NGO budgets versus only 1.5 percent in 1970.”307 Today, NGOs
that obtain the bulk of their funding from government sources are sometimes designated as QUANGOs, or quasi-nongovernmental organizations.
These groups include many Canadian NGOs as well as the International
Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC).308 With regard to human rights
NGOs specifically, Jackie G. Smith’s detailed statistical study points to
over 50% of HROs relying in some manner on government or intergovernmental financial support.309
As a consequence of growing governmental and intergovernmental
resources “being channeled through international NGOs, the issue of independence—or a willingness to bite the hand that feeds in order to make
autonomous programmatic decisions in spite of donor pressures—assumes
305

This association is not a new one. NGOs have a checkered history of being used
as a veil for advancing government interests. During the cold war, for example,
government-organized NGOs, or GONGOs, were supported entirely by governments for political purposes. Gordenker & Weiss, supra note 14, at 21. More recently, AI has identified several other types of NGOs, including MANGOs (man
controlled NGOs), BINGOs (business controlled), RINGO (reactionary controlled),
TINGOs (tribal controlled) and DONGOs (donor-organized NGO). F. Halliday,
The Romance of Non-State Actors, in NON-STATE ACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS,
supra note 180, at 23. To be certain, these sub-categories only underscore the need
for better tools to ensure greater public awareness of what influence or control may
lurk behind the seeming neutrality of a given NGO.
306 Simmons, supra note 13, at 94.
307 Id.
308 In actuality, the ICRC identifies itself not as an NGO, but rather as an “intergovernmental institution established under Swiss law.” Halliday, supra note 305, at
26.
309 J.G. Smith & R. Pagnucco, Globalizing Human Rights: The Work of Transnational Human Rights NGOs in the 1990s (1998) 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 379 (1998). For
example, the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group’s (PHRMG) publicized
list of 10 donors includes at least five governmental sources of funding. See
PHRMG, Our Sponsors, at http://www.phrmg.org/profile.htm#Our%20Sponsors,
last visited November 20, 2004.
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greater saliency.”310 In the same manner, “the willingness of NGOs to speak
out on issues that are unpopular with governments will be diluted by their
growing dependence on official aid.”311 If NGOs are increasingly subject to
even the appearance of potential government influence, the public has little
ability to discern the extent of that influence, since this would typically
require seeking out financial disclosure documents, which may or may not
be readily available. Furthermore, this type of financial support may just as
easily reach the NGO via a third party, thus cloaking direct government
influence. In any case, government influence is only the tip of the iceberg,
since other donors—foundational or private—may also be tainted by specific political objectives that can adversely sway an NGO’s purported objectivity. As Brett notes:
[Not all] the organizations which address UN human rights
bodies are ‘human rights NGOs’ thus defined. . .some of
the allegations of bias, political motivation and covert funding by hostile governments are credible, which unfortunately detracts from the perceived impartiality and standing
of all the NGOs.312
Therefore, while the potential for upward accountability may exist in theory, several disturbing flaws obstruct its effectiveness. Increased reliance on
government funding may operate to limit the independence of NGOs or,
conversely, cause them to neglect their primary interests in reliability and
objectivity. This dilemma is only exacerbated when one considers that donors not affiliated with the government may likewise seek to advance their
political objectives via seemingly innocuous NGOs. In these cases too, an
NGO potentially may constrain its scope of activities or tone down its outspokenness in the name of fiscal survival (and in accordance with the
wishes of their financial backers), or simply discard the twin tenets of reliability and objectivity in the name of pure politics. Given these scenarios,
systematic and standardized disclosure of financial support—including
background information on donors—is key.
To be sure, the need for full disclosure—and the reality that donors
may fail to operate as an effective agent of accountability—runs even
deeper. Since many NGOs compete for “limited resources from a handful of
310
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Gordenker &Weiss, supra note 14, at 21.
Edwards & Hulme, supra note 288, at 7.
312 Brett, supra note 60, at 98. Brett attributes this phenomenon to the subjectivity
of ECOSOC consultative status criteria, “compounded by the political nature of the
decision-making on NGO status and the tendency of the governmental committee
responsible not to give reasons for its decisions.”
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foundations, the priorities of a few key individuals within large foundations
can shape the programmatic priorities of many NGOs.” This competition is
potentially harmful to NGOs since each “must profile itself as exercising
leadership and producing innovative new programs and solid results in order to position itself for future funding.”313 In other words, each NGO must
try to outdo the other, thus laying the foundation for an environment in
which NGOs are constantly competing against one another to be the first to
break a human right abuse story, focus on a particular region or issue at the
expense of another more urgent case, or outdo one another by employing
sensationalistic or loose reporting tactics that document “grave” abuses,
“abhorrent” violations of human rights, “war crimes” and “crimes against
humanity.”
Finally, while Edwards and Hulme call attention to ‘downward’ and
‘upward’ accountability, I would also add in the context of human rights
NGOs that a third level of ‘outward’ accountability is owed to the public at
large and to human rights norms already in place. By this I mean that
human rights NGOs shoulder a virtual duty of care to the general public,
which is derived from their packaging of ‘human rights’ issues as the common values of humankind, to act responsibly and take steps to ensure credibility within their industry.314 This outward accountability is arguably
absent in much of the work undertaken by HROs.
Yet such a duty of care is critical if these organizations hope to
maintain any staying power or preserve credibility in the eyes of the public
and at international law. Along this line of reasoning, it may be further
argued that, given the damaging implications of a faulty human rights allegation, this HRO duty of care is equally owed to the very actors that HROs
313

Sikkink, supra note 93, at 308. The damage from competition for grant money
also “seems unlikely to foster the collaborative relationships on which effective
policy alliances are built.” Edwards & Hulme, supra note 288, at 7. Moreover, this
type of competition feeds into the emergence of “cult of personality” figures discussed in Part IV(A)(ii), above.
314 Roth argues that HROs are accountable insofar as they “cannot stray far from
the basic values of the human rights cause without. . .subjecting themselves to
public criticism.” He further contends that this “highly public form of accountability is arguably stronger than the theoretical accountability exerted on a classic NGO
by its members, many of whom may not have the time, inclination, or knowledge to
scrutinize lower-profile activities.” Roth, supra note 139, at 237. It is perhaps even
more difficult to imagine that the general public provided for in Roth’s formula is
better equipped than HRO members themselves to understand the scope and limitations of the human rights cause. Indeed, it is as a consequence of the lack of human
rights-specific knowledge held by the general public that the HRO duty of care
discussed here arguably springs forth.
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criticize.315 As Ignatieff points out, “every time a state is denounced for its
human rights record, it becomes harder for it to secure international loans or
political and military help when it is in danger. Naming and shaming for
human rights abuses now have real consequences.”316 Similarly, Risse declares that in today’s international environment, “words matter!” even “if
they are only rhetoric. . .involving and entangling norm violating governments in an argumentative process which then becomes self-sustained, constitutes an externally powerful socializing tool.”317 Consequently, HROs
ought to be operating with an eye to developing their own real standards
and an understanding that rhetoric-based self-sustaining arguments only endanger the viability of fact-based, objective arguments.318 Without these realizations, HROs will remain, as Wapner concedes, “largely unelected,
unmonitored, and thus. . .unanswerable to the so-called people of the
world.”319
iii) Inconsistent Fact-finding Standards
The act of fact-finding serves “as a means of producing an authoritative account and evaluation of a situation which almost invariably involves issues of major public interest.”320 Given that human rights NGOs
are considered “unofficial ombudsmen safeguarding human rights against
governmental infringement,”321 for many HROs, fact-finding represents a
central component of work upon which other activities, including press releases, diplomatic initiatives and testimony before the UN organs,322 are
reliant. Indeed, as Ramcharan confirms, fact-finding “is at the heart of
human rights activity.” The uniqueness of fact-finding stems from its application “to specific circumstances and situations,” rather than in abstracto.323
Consequently, claims that human rights are being violated hinge on con315

This trend may already be emerging, apparent in actions such as reports critical
of suicide bombings, or acknowledging unique or specific situations which may
cause human rights abuses to arise.
316 IGNATIEFF, supra note 19, at 11-12.
317 T. Risse & S. C. Ropp, International Human Rights Norms and Domestic
Change: Conclusions, in POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 120, at 276.
318 Risse and Ropp fail to consider any potential negative fallout that may result
from grounding human rights claims in rhetorical argument alone.
319 Wapner, supra note 127, at 204.
320 B.G. Ramcharan, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING,
supra note 102, at 1.
321 Weissbrodt & McCarthy, supra note 102, at 186.
322 Id. at 188.
323 Ramcharan, supra note 320, at 1.
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crete questions of fact. According to Steiner, it is these facts that serve as
“the point of departure, the essential primary information, for any serious
human rights work.”324 From this perspective, NGO fact-finding resembles
investigative journalism with one significant difference: given the nature of
human rights violations, HRO fact-finding exudes a “quasi-adjudicative”
aura,325 as the human rights organizations seek to ascertain conclusions
based on what are ostensibly factually demonstrable violations of recognized human rights norms.
Ideally, HRO fact-finding should retain a clear understanding that:
[Since the] truth or falsity of any given statement may be
very difficult to know, human rights organizations. . .must
pursue reliability by using well-accepted procedures and by
establishing general confidence in the fairness, impartiality,
and wisdom of the organization.326
Implementation of this clear understanding, however, is another matter.
Human rights fact-finding has “been undertaken by various organizations
and bodies in different contexts, and the methods used have not always
been similar.”327 To be certain, not only HROs undertake fact-finding missions. The United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations (IGO)
have also exercised fact-finding roles within the international system. However, IGO missions typically are authorized within an extensive procedural
framework, whereas “[n]othing of the sort is true for fact-finding by
NGOs.”328 Indeed, while the number, influence and scope of activity of
HROs have consistently grown, no HRO effort to implement well-established procedures has been made. This pattern may be traced back to the
early 1980s, when Thoolen and Verstappen’s pioneering study of NGO
fact-finding identified that the growth of HRO fact-finding activities failed
to be “accompanied by [the] due procedural accounting,” which had been
either introduced or elaborated in IGO fact-finding missions.329 Twenty
years later, NGO fact-finding missions remain ad hoc affairs that tend to
operate fast and loose as far as procedural standards are concerned.
324
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325
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STEINER, supra note 254, at 35.
Weissbrodt & McCarthy, supra note 102, at 186.
326 Id. at 187.
327 N. Valticos, Forward to INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING, supra note
102, at viii.
328 H. THOOLEN & B. VERSTAPPEN, HUMAN RIGHTS MISSIONS: A STUDY OF THE
FACT-FINDING PRACTICE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 1 (1986).
329 Id. at 24.
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Thoolen and Verstappen’s study is comprehensive, insightful and
merits revisiting here. Their findings underscore the extreme difficulty in
pinpointing “what a particular [NGO] mission to a particular country
wanted to achieve.”330 In the face of divergent NGO practices, Thoolen and
Verstappen quickly discarded any hope of discerning “a set of
rules. . .which could be made into a kind of manual for future missions.”331
Instead, they found that a majority of NGO reports lacked any statement
“which could reasonably be called ‘terms of reference,’”332 and that few
NGOs included any detailed description of a program or agenda for the
mission, or any mention of “general selection procedures” used to pick
members of the fact-finding mission.333 These shortcomings are alarming
insofar as “fact-finding and the decision to establish fact-finding bodies and
to decide upon the terms of reference of such bodies are in itself an important political action of international character.”334 Thoolen and Verstappen
also found that few reports contained “clear descriptions of the methods
used for checking the information collected during on-site investigation.”335
Typically, NGO fact-finders “often need to rely upon hearsay statements,
documents which are not fully authenticated, and justifiable inference from
indirect evidence.”336 While the “advantage of a strict rule is clear—the
facts can be stated with authority,” an NGO mission consisting of a handful
of staff and lasting a few days “cannot realistically acquire direct evidence
concerning each charge.”337 According to Weissbrodt, the “problem is not
so much reliance on indirect evidence, as failure to distinguish in fact-finding reports between facts based on direct evidence and factual inferences
from indirect evidence.” To address this problem, he reasons that “NGOs
330

Id. at 2.
Id.
332 Id. at 129.
333 Id. at 130. Where criteria for selecting members actually is set forth, they “are
usually not made public, and therefore are not subject to public scrutiny.”
334 F. Ermacora, The Competence and Functions of Fact-Finding Bodies, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING, supra note 102, at 93.
335 THOOLEN & VERSTAPPEN, supra note 328, at 134. Even Weissbrodt concedes
that “it is impossible to tell to what extent [procedures governing the collection of
evidence] are followed by NGO fact-finding commissions since details of this procedure are not spelled out either in reports or in organization handbooks. NGOs can
be expected to be somewhat more informal than IGO commissions.” Weissbrodt &
McCarthy, supra note 102, at 201.
336 Weissbrodt & McCarthy, supra note 102, at 203.
337 Id. at 207.
331

R
R

R
R

\\server05\productn\B\BFH\10-1\BFH107.txt

336

unknown

Seq: 76

8-FEB-05

13:58

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 10

should clearly indicate that the basis of their conclusions lies in direct testimony or in other sorts of evidence.”338
A brief survey of current human rights fact-finding reports illustrates that few HROs take care to specify terms of reference, the basis for
conclusions, or how testimony or evidence was collected. Yet, even if undertaken with an eye to informally ensuring the veracity and reliability of
the evidence, or specifying upon what basis a given conclusion rests, these
fact-finding practices point to a sweeping and overly broad approach to the
fundamental question of admissibility. The reality remains that NGO factfinding missions “rarely take sworn testimony from those whom they interview,” out of fear that the formality “might chill testimony from human
rights victims.” Instead, they “generally rely upon polite probing, questioning, and cross-checking to assure the reliability of oral testimony.”339 For
example, an Amnesty International mission dispatched to interview prisoners of war balked at the use of “sharp examination” techniques, since “it
would not have been very reasonable. . .to conduct the kind of cross-examination in which the truthfulness of statements was seriously challenged.”340
To be certain, this approach reflects a coddling one whereby HROs willingly discard formal tools for evaluating the veracity of testimony and
await—or worse, even encourage—tales of horror and abuse.341
While Weissbrodt reasons that the burden of proof regarding evidence culled from fact-finding ultimately rests with NGOs—and they
should be entitled to determine whether the burden should be measured
against a reasonable doubt or less342—Thoolen and Verstappen point out
that many NGOs apply normative standards for measuring mission findings
and fail to cite “any explicit reference to the internationally recognized
norms on which missions after all base their ‘legitimacy.’”343 Thoolen and
Verstappen correctly reason that references to legal standards, particularly
international human-rights norms:
[S]hould in fact be the basic normative framework for any
human-rights mission. These should be stated in correct

338

Id.
Id. at 204.
340 From the findings of a 1975 Amnesty International mission to Israel and Syria
investigating allegations of ill treatment and torture. Id. at 205-06.
341 D. Kennedy, Spring Break 63 TEX. L. REV. 1377 (1985).
342 Weissbrodt & McCarthy, supra note 102, at 210.
343 THOOLEN &VERSTAPPEN, supra note 328, at 134.
339
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and unequivocal language, and, where possible, refer to
specific human-rights instruments.344
Finally, the Thoolen and Verstappen study found that less than half
of the HRO reports examined offered conclusions and recommendations
“clearly set apart from the rest of the text,” and that references “to dissenting opinions were but seldom found.”345 As the authors posit, “a clear distinction between the findings and conclusions of a mission . . . increases the
credibility of the report considerably, and good reasons for not doing so are
hard to find.” Moreover, they justly conclude that the “almost total absence
of differences of opinion. . .contributes equally to a loss of credibility,”
particularly “in cases where large and varied delegations visit a number of
countries.”346
The blurring between findings and conclusions, coupled with the
lack of differences of opinion, reveals how susceptible fact-finding missions may be to political agendas. While Weissbrodt explains this away by
arguing that HRO missions tend to be smaller than IGO missions, and thus
less prone to sharp disagreements,347 Hannum correctly reasons that objective and thorough fact-finding cannot proceed where HROs fail to “distinguish between facts relevant to human rights and broader political
concerns.”348 In any event, the existence of these problems is only exacerbated when considered in light of the “cult of personality” that dominates
smaller NGOs and the procedural allowance made within IGO fact-finding
reports for the inclusion of minority opinions.349 The potential for subjectivity is further heightened by the vicissitudes of public attention paid to a
given human rights crisis and by pressures from NGO membership to react
to fluid situations. As Thoolen and Verstappen note, these pressures “may
lead to quick decisions to engage in fact-finding missions without regard to
existing reports and the impact of yet another mission on the overall balance.” In turn:
[Whatever] the explicit or hidden elements in the decisionmaking process may be, the overall impression remains that
in quite a few instances the sending of a mission is determined not so much by the objectively assessed need of the
344

Id. at 135.
Id.
346 Id. at 136.
347 Weissbrodt &McCarthy, supra note 102, at 213.
348 Hannum, supra note 125, at 36.
349 For a discussion surrounding the impact of the “cult of personality,” see supra
Part IV(A)(ii).
345

R
R

\\server05\productn\B\BFH\10-1\BFH107.txt

338

unknown

Seq: 78

8-FEB-05

13:58

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 10
human rights situation elsewhere as by home-generated
considerations.350

The potential that political motives might infiltrate legitimate NGO
fact-finding missions is brought into sharper focus when one examines the
practice of ad hoc IGO fact-finding missions. As Ermacora notes, when the
UN itself strikes ad hoc investigative committees, it is “quite clear that the
mandate and the terms of reference of [such] committees . . . often respond
to political needs” of the relevant principal organ of the United Nations.351
In other words, whereas conventional IGO fact-finding bodies tend to be
“independent of direct political interest,” non-conventional ones derive
from a parliamentary style “right of enquête.”352 The inherent problems associated with such ad hoc IGO fact-finding run deep, and their parallel with
standard-less HRO practices is both manifest and worrisome:
[T]he evaluation of facts done by ad hoc bodies is
poor. . .Ad hoc fact-finding bodies in general take note of
the information submitted to them without really judging
the veracity of the information and therefore the value of
the information. Only statements of fact which are obviously inacurate [sic] are not incorporated into reports of ad
hoc fact-finding bodies.353
Still, other facts, “including those which seem to have political relevance,
are generally incorporated in the report of fact-finding bodies.” Finally,
while “it should be up to the parent body to evaluate the facts presented” in
light of all the arguments made, “usually impartial evaluation of the facts
never takes place.”354 In light of these realities, Ermacora concludes that
“the function of ad hoc fact-finding bodies based on non-conventional
norms has, so far, been mainly a political one.”355
With its formal, thorough and earnest analysis, the Thoolen and
Verstappen study should have provided a wake up call for HROs to minimize the discretion—and consequently, the alarming amount of room for
bias—inherent in their ad hoc approach to fact-finding. Yet, 20 years following the release of this landmark research, no comprehensive effort has
succeeded in introducing meaningful standards to regulate the responsible
350
351
352
353
354
355

THOOLEN & VERSTAPPEN, supra note 328, at 138-39.
Ermacora, supra note 334, at 88-89 (emphasis added).
Id. at 89.
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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planning, execution, reporting and publicizing of NGO fact-finding missions. To be certain, this continuing situation remains the product of a persistent “diversity of practices and differences of opinion,” identified by
Thoolen and Verstappen.356 However, this pattern also points to a deeper
unwillingness among NGOs to introduce concrete rules and practices that
may risk curtailing the independence they so fiercely covet. As Steiner
notes, as an outgrowth of “egotistical struggles for power and for public
recognition,” individual NGOs loathe coordination and prize their autonomy to the point that they refuse to be accountable “to others for their decisions, including decisions about what and where to investigate.”357
Although Steiner, with some romanticism, justifies this behavior as a feature of the decentralized, dynamic and evolving character of HROs, “and
their influence on human rights thinking as a whole,”358 the rejection of
generally accepted procedures necessarily detracts from each HRO’s ability
to authoritatively ascertain truth or falsity with any degree of legitimacy,
and moreover, from the industry as a whole.
The desire or need for HRO independence ought not to trump the
need for recognized standards, since these standards provide the clarity and
objectivity necessary for formulating legitimate allegations of human rights
abuses. Without these standards, human rights allegations risk being compromised by rhetoric that varies from mission to mission, report to report,
and political necessity to political necessity. It is this rhetoric that has introduced a bewildering collection of self-styled standards upon which tenuous
conclusions are grounded. Thus, HROs are able to invoke the language of
human rights violations in conclusions based on an array of half-standards
such as ‘strong evidence,’ ‘received reports,’ a ‘belief that,’ or it being
‘clear’ or ‘apparent’ or ‘without doubt.’359 While Weissbrodt may applaud
these terms of art as formulating a principled distinction between “facts
356

THOOLEN &VERSTAPPEN, supra note 328, at 1. It is significant to note that the
findings of Thoolen and Verstappen demonstrate a clear lack of fact-finding standards within the HRO industry even while excluding smaller, inherently more
problematic national NGOs from the scope of their study.
357 STEINER, supra note 254, at 67.
358 Id.
359 Weissbrodt & McCarthy, supra note 102, at 210. Weissbrodt points out that this
descriptive language used in an Amnesty International report may or may not signal merely stylistic considerations. In any case, he concludes that “it is not imperative that any single standard be used in NGO fact-finding, but it is important that
the standard for significant conclusions be clearly defined.” Id. The randomly generated “standards” of proof introduced by Amnesty remain in use today across the
industry, and are even more rampant in daily HRO reporting—as distinguished
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based on direct evidence and factual inferences from indirect evidence,”360
these distinctions are surely lost on the general public. In any case, such
sophistic exercises only serve to erase the line that separates the reporting
of precise allegations grounded in international human rights law and based
on a preponderance of evidence from inaccurate or overstated allegations
having political or other impetus.
Beyond the intense independence of HROs, proponents of unregulated HRO fact-finding activities also advance the equally simplistic argument that NGO missions are distinct from those undertaken by IGOs. For
example, Weissbrodt rightly notes that “governments and NGOs may have
quite different objectives which might undermine the application of government-created rules to NGOs.”361 However, this argument against standards
presumes that the rules would emanate from governments—a “perverse”
option to be sure, but also a convenient assumption that effectively
preempts the necessity for introducing standards and denies the possibility
that meaningful standards might be advanced by the NGO community
itself.362
In addition, Weissbrodt seems to reason that HROs should be held
less accountable than IGOs insofar as they “have generally less prestige and
less visibility than intergovernmental organizations and thus proportionately
more difficulty getting press comment on their human rights findings.”363
Although this may have been a persuasive argument against standards in the
1980s, it is evident from the analysis above that NGO shortcomings in prestige and visibility are no longer relevant factors for lowering the accountability bar against which their performance ought to be measured. Today,
HRO findings serve as the bedrock for human rights investigations, including those undertaken by IGOs like the UN.364 Bodies such as the UN
from more elaborate fact-finding mission—methodologies. See infra Part
IV(A)(iv).
360 Weissbrodt & McCarthy, supra note 102, at 207.
361 Id. at 191.
362 Weissbrodt claims that “it would be perverse to permit governments to establish, even indirectly, the ground rules upon which NGOs may purse their factfinding work.” However, he fails to consider the simple proposition that these
ground rules might emerge from within the human rights NGO community itself, as
proposed herein. Id.
363 Id. at 215.
364 In assessing the influence of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines,
Clark notes that the movement “depended on the. . .tactics that Amnesty. . .helped
to develop.” She then lists publicity and marshaling citizen support from around the
world as the leading elements of that strategy. CLARK, supra note 92, at 9.
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Human Rights Commission “often rely on NGO reports as the best source
of information about states being investigated for violations.”365 Furthermore, HROs—from large INGOs to small national groups—are now easily
able to free themselves from reliance on media attention by harnessing advances in communications technology. For example, HRW researchers
“working in the refugee camps in Albania and Macedonia were able to send
the results of their interviews with the refugees fleeing Kosovo directly to
the Human Rights Watch staff in New York,” who in turn disseminated the
information via listserv and the HRW website, which is viewable in a number of different languages.366
Another factor hampering the introduction of standards to regulate
fact-finding missions stems from the reality that some HROs are simply “so
devoid of expertise, time and resources, that they lack the ability to develop
any regular procedures. Instead they live from press release to hastily drawn
report, without time for methodology.”367 This phenomenon is especially
problematic today, given that the global community has increasingly come
to rely on HROs for monitoring and reporting human rights violations.
While it may be argued that lack of expertise is a problem affecting only the
smaller, national HROs, it is these very organizations—which ostensibly
benefit from greater access to local facts and documentation—that are fast
becoming so crucial to the fact-finding process and to the relaying of information to the international human rights community and the international
community at large.368 As Steiner claims, international NGOs “are not
365

STEINER, supra note 254, at 35.
W. Brown, Human Rights Watch: An Overview, in NGOS AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 13, at 80. Similarly, in September 1998, HRW released a report on the
political crackdown in Malaysia, “including information that was not widely available in the Malaysian press. In the next two weeks 28,000 people visited the page,
mostly from Malaysia itself.” Roth, supra note 139, at 231. This again testifies to
the immediate and direct connection human rights organizations are increasingly
able to have with the public at large. Of course, the ability to communicate instantaneously, directly and independently with the public also raises other shortcomings
linked to informal methods of external regulation, which are addressed in Part
IV(B)(i), below.
367 Weissbrodt & McCarthy, supra note 102, at 189.
368 Consider that the fifth meeting of persons chairing the human rights treaty bodies remarked that attention “should be given by treaty bodies and non-governmental organizations to securing a stronger, more effective and coordinated
participation of national non-governmental organizations.” Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, supra note 228, at para. 41
(emphasis added). CONGO similarly “believes that there is general agreement on
the desirability of further enhancing the participation of national non-governmental
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nearly as effective as [national] NGOs in investigating and reporting
facts.”369 Yet, this mounting reliance on national HROs places INGOs in a
position that risks discrediting their own established professionalism and
legitimacy.
Ideally, the willingness of an INGO to rely on national HRO factfinding ought to be supplemented by independent corroboration, or at a
minimum, based on making an expert assessment of “the fact-finding methods used . . . and . . . the apparent objectivity of the [national] NGOs compiling the information.”370 However, even this latter criterion is not always
applied. In these cases, INGOs simply parrot allegations on the basis of the
national HROs past performance or some other indeterminate factor, such
as membership in a human rights network. Without meaningful guidelines
for obtaining corroborative evidence or approving fact-finding methodologies employed by the national HRO, INGOs risk bringing themselves, as
well as the entire HRO edifice, into disrepute from below. But rather than
address this grave dilemma, INGOs have instead invoked the notion of
“early warning” as a trump card.371
The “early warning” function associated with HROs enables them
to easily mitigate exposure to the risks associated with reporting overstatements, inaccuracies and outright errors. Simply stated, the “early warning”
justification reasons that exaggerated or inflated claims are acceptable if
they serve to sound an alarm bell within the international community and
call attention to a particular human rights problem. Even if the initial allegations are subsequently disproved or deemed inaccurate, the HRO has, in its
view, fulfilled a legitimate task as an early warning system against potential
human rights abuses. Yet “early warning” walks a fine line since it tempts
HROs “to come up with hard conclusions from what is too often a shallow
organizations from all regions of the world in the activities of the United Nations.”
CONGO, General Review of Arrangements For Consultations With Non-Governmental Organizations 1995, U.N. Doc. E/AC.70/1995/NGO/2, para. 11 (1995).
This sentiment is reinforced by the recent recommendations of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Eminent Persons on Civil Society. However, it is interesting to note
that CONGO expressed a critical view of the Panel’s final report. See discussion
beginning at supra note 198 and see especially supra note 202.
369 STEINER, supra note 254, at 35.
370 Ibid. at 66.
371 According to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “In the field of preventative diplomacy
and because of their familiarity with the situation on the ground, nongovernmental
organizations are well placed to play a part in early warning by drawing the attention of governments to nascent crises and emerging conflicts.” Boutros BoutrosGhali, Forward to NGOS, THE UN AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 14, at 9.
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research base.”372 Consequently, an early warning paradox emerges: “is it
better to keep quiet and wait until absolutely incontrovertible evidence arrives. . .or is not the more responsible course to come out with the reasonably watertight, but not perfect, case one has, and take the risk?”373 Willetts
argues that HROs “cannot afford to make mistakes because thereafter their
statements will not so readily be given credibility and references to mistakes will be continually thrown back at them.”374 However, invocation of
the “early warning” function essentially enables HROs to fend off the potential fallout surrounding misleading or false reports and thus retain their
credibility.
One example of early warning gone awry occurred in the spring of
2002. According to some HRO reports, a “massacre” had occurred in the
Jenin refugee camp. As one Palestinian NGO fervently but erroneously
avowed:
Slowly but surely, the extent of the Israeli army’s crimes in
Jenin refugee camp are coming to light. Despite all the efforts to hide the size of the massacre, the whole world is
beginning to learn about the true face of the occupation.
Gunshots, rockets, bombs, or simply bulldozers burying
people alive killed hundreds of civilians.375
372

POWER, supra note 34, at 121.
Ibid.
374 P. Willetts, The Impact of Promotional Pressure Groups in Global Politics, in
PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM: THE TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS OF
ISSUE-ORIENTED NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 187 (P. Willetts, ed.,
1982).
375 Dr. Eyad El-Sarraj, Don’t Take Part in War Crimes: Boycott Israel Now, available at http://www.gcmhp.net/File_files/PressApr222k2.html, last visited April 22,
2002 (emphasis added). “The Gaza Community Mental Health Programme
(GCMHP) is a Palestinian, non-governmental, non-profit organization established
in 1990 to provide comprehensive community mental health services to the population of the Gaza Strip including therapy, training and research.” The GCMHP statement also demonstrates how NGOs are prone to overstretch or ignore their own
self-imposed mandates. For a discussion of this issue, see Part III(c) and Part
IV(a)(i), above. Gaza Community Mental Health Programme, About GCMHP,
available at http://www.gcmhp.net/File_files/GCMHPABOUT.html, last visited
November 20, 2004. Defence for Children International/Palestine Section (DCI/PS)
also called for an “immediate, independent investigation into the massacre in Jenin
camp,” thus declaring it a fait accompli. DCI/PS News Release, Misleading Claims
of Israeli Withdrawal: Siege Continues Unabated Throughout the West Bank,
available at http://www.dci-pal.org/press/19apr02.html (Apr. 19, 2002). DCI-Pal373
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In a bizarre twist on the commonly held belief that national HROs
have the inside track on local human rights violations, the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment (LAW), itself a
national HRO, initially reported that other third party “human rights organizations believe that Israeli forces have committed a massacre in Jenin.”
Inexplicably and without further justification, LAW then upgraded the “belief” of these unnamed third party HROs into hard fact by announcing in the
headline for their weekly update of 11 April 2002 that “Israeli Troops Continue to Conceal Jenin Refugee Camp Massacre.”376 Thus, in one fell
swoop, LAW transformed the unattributed “belief” of anonymous HROs
into a confirmed fait accompli and then doubled the stakes by further alleging that the Israelis were now trying to cover up the “massacre.” Acting in
its capacity as an “early warning” beacon, LAW also relayed Palestinian
eyewitness accounts of Israeli troops allegedly digging large pits inside
Jenin refugee camp and in surrounding areas to bury those killed. To its
credit, LAW conceded that it had no photographic evidence or documents
proving the allegations because it was “too dangerous to enter the camp.”377
Unsubstantiated reports like those provided by LAW were widely circulated
in the international media and lent unfounded credibility to the Palestinian
leadership’s account that hundreds in the Jenin camp had been massacred.378 In fact, the reality on the ground proved far less deadly, and decidedly less about massacring civilians than about confronting armed
estine “is affiliated with the Geneva-based Defence for Children International” and
“is dedicated to promoting and protecting the rights of Palestinian children in the
West Bank and Gaza.” DCI/PS, About DCI-Palestine Section, available at http://
www.dci-pal.org/about/about.html, last visited December 10, 2004.
376 LAW,
Weekly Roundup, available at http://www.lawsociety.org/Press/
Preleases/2002/April/aprw3.html (Apr. 11-17, 2002). Alarmingly, LAW’s allegations were rebroadcast verbatim on http://www.reliefweb.int, a project of the
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and
remain posted there until today under the heading “Israeli Forces Commit Massacre
in Jenin Refugee Camp.” See http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/460cf9d61138
639585256b950067a901?OpenDocument, last visited April 10, 2004. As discussed
above, this case also serves as a classic example of INGOs parroting the statements
of national HROs verbatim without seeking out any kind of independent
corroboration.
377 Israeli Army Denies Digging Mass Graves in Jenin, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Apr. 11, 2002. AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE also carried the LAW report on its
April 11, 2002 wire. See Claire Snegaroff, After Battle in Jenin, Media War Begins,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 11, 2002.
378 G. Myre, New Battle Over Jenin, on Television, NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 15,
2003, at A-8.
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combatants.379 More discouraging still, some observers have concluded that
false reports of a massacre resulted in tempered outrage over other less
dramatic, but no less real human rights abuses that allegedly transpired during the siege of the refugee camp.380
Anxious and overstated reports of a massacre in the Jenin refugee
camp were not limited to Palestinian HROs. Amnesty treaded a thin line by
implying a massacre, citing unattributed “reports” that the “Israeli armed
forces have. . .killed scores of Palestinian civilians, and injured hundreds
more.” Amnesty further ventured that “Many more will die unless the Israeli forces stop the attack and withdraw immediately.”381 In addition, during the midst of the crisis, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI)
ran a large ad in Ha’aretz, a leading Israeli daily newspaper, the headline of
which read: “Operation to Liquidate Human Rights.”382
Clearly, invocation of the “early warning” mechanism demands
profound consideration of the issues and the devising of clear standards
that will assist HROs in assuming the responsibility for navigating such
379

According to the UN Secretary General’s investigation into the confrontation,
“Fifty-two Palestinian deaths [were] confirmed by the hospital in Jenin by the end
of May 2002,” thus corroborating the figure estimated by the IDF. Report of the
Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution ES-10/10,
U.N. GAOR 10th Emergency Special Sess., U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/186, 2002, at para.
56. Twenty-three Israeli soldiers also died in the fighting.
380 For example, one observer reasons that rapid loss of interest in events surrounding Jenin stemmed from “hasty claims that hundreds of Jenin’s inhabitants had
been killed. Given the world’s inflated expectations, the talk of a massacre seemed
grossly disproportionate once the camp was opened to scrutiny.” Arguably, therefore, misuse of the “early warning” function, may actually undermine reporting and
follow up on less dramatic, but no less real violations of human rights. Jonathan
Cook, Massacre By Israelis at Jenin So Quickly Forgotten, DAWN GROUP OF
NEWSPAPERS, June 4, 2002, available at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/
51a/040.html, last visited November 20, 2004.
381 Amnesty International, Urgent Action: Fear for Safety, available at http://web.
amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE150382002 (Apr. 8, 2002). In response to AI’s
final report on Operation Defensive Shield, former Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon
Peres asserted that “Amnesty is an organization that tries to create. . .a better world,
but they are not a court and not judges.” J. Algazy, Peres Plays Down Amnesty
Report Accusing Israel of War Crimes, HA’ARETZ, Nov. 4, 2002. While this observation may be technically accurate, it impulsively downplays the rising significance
of HRO reports and the very real impact these reports have on shaping international
public opinion and perception as to which states violate human rights.
382 The text of the ad asserted that dozens “of bodies are piled in houses and in the
streets.” A. Lavie, Uncivil Society, HA’ARETZ, Jan. 19, 2003.
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sensitive and urgent situations. However, scanning the HRO landscape
reveals no evidence of such an effort being made. Instead, the trend appears
to be leaning towards preferring imperfect allegations over incontrovertible
evidence.383 More worrisome is that across the literature, many observers
continue to support the “early warning” function of HROs. Steiner reasons
that the overriding necessity of stopping atrocities should cause NGOs to
balk at social analysis and reform efforts: “Which groups would perform
this function if NGOs deserted their missions and reports for deep think?”384
Similarly, Weissbrodt argues that in certain cases, “a quasi-judicial model
of fact-finding should not hamstring NGO activity,” and that strict rules
may “impede the NGO from acting as an early warning system” for human
rights problems where the NGO “knows human rights violations are occurring, but cannot ‘prove’ them.”385 Furthermore, Weissbrodt asserts that any
requisite imposition of procedural guidelines “might also establish a maximum scope of action” inappropriate for detecting potential rights
violations.386
A less urgent and more studied approach to the issue reveals that
Steiner’s dichotomy, however snappy, is at best an over-simplification of a
genuinely nuanced, problematic dilemma. Clearly, a middle ground between over-standardization and no-standardization of the fact-finding process must exist. Similarly, Weissbrodt’s vision is a slippery one that
conjures up scenarios and cases where neither general nor specific allegations can be proven with any precision but are put forward nonetheless. It is
precisely in these murky situations—where a “quasi-judicial” approach
might break down—that unambiguous operating procedures and standards
are needed most to guide human rights activists. As Dermont Groome
rightly points out, HROs “should be careful not to leave themselves open to
charges of exaggeration or embellishment. [Reports] must be patently objective and devoid of any bias or unfounded opinions regarding the case.”387
383

As noted below, Amnesty has tried to generally “speed up and enliven its documents” and has reoriented its emphasis from “get it right” to “get it out and fast.”
Disturbingly, this decision appears to have little to do with the necessity justification inherent in “early warning.” See infra note 422.
384 STEINER, supra note 254, at 35.
385 Weissbrodt & McCarthy, supra note 102, at 189.
386 Id. at 190.
387 D. GROOME, THE HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE INVESTIGATION AND DOCUMENTATION OF VIOLENT HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES 255 (2001). For example, Groome suggests that references to the
“victim” in any investigative report ought to use the word “complainant” instead, as
it recognizes the fact or possibility that “some ‘victims’ file false complaints. Using
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Ultimately, a Jenin-type scenario effectively exposes the overarching flaw
in Weissbrodt’s paradigm, which posits that when the consequences are
serious:
[A]n NGO should more closely follow the quasi-adjudicative procedures that ensure more accuracy and more respect. In descending the scale of the seriousness of the
consequences of its actions, an NGO may effectively rely
on less direct evidence and less rigorous procedures.388
The bottom line is that this operating principle leaves HROs as the
sole arbiter of what evidentiary standard is to be applied. As witnessed by
the Jenin case, even when the allegations are as serious as mass murder,
some HROs choose to ignore the “seriousness of the consequences” and
attendant need for “quasi-adjudicative procedures” in favor of political expediency and sensationalism. From this vantage point, it is unreasonable to
rely on an NGO to make an objective determination without more concrete
reporting obligations in place. Simply put, when confronted by situations
like Jenin, the opportunity for political gain is too great and the cost too
cheap for many HROs to turn down.389 As Groome comments, “speculation,
exaggeration, claims unsupported by the evidence, or the failure to document all investigative actions taken,” should never be excused regardless of
the severity of the alleged abuses or exigent circumstances.390 To that end,
HROs should be expected to reserve ultimate decisions “regarding whether
or not the evidence is sufficient to prove a violation of local or international
law” for a court rather than for its own investigators.391
Enthusiastic endorsement of an “early warning” function for HROs
notwithstanding, it appears that during the early 1980s, academic writing
converged around a consensus that HRO fact-finding missions needed to
abide by some basic principles, however informal. In his seminal article,
Thomas Franck concluded that “if fact-finding is to become more than another chimera, the sponsoring institutions must develop universally applicable minimal standards of due process to control both the ways the facts are
the word ‘complainant’ indicates the investigator is aware of this and has remained
objective throughout the investigation process.” Id. at 257.
388 Weissbrodt & McCarthy, supra note 102, at 192.
389 As noted above, there was little fallout from LAW’s false allegations concerning the Jenin refugee camp and no shortage of media attention or INGO rebroadcasting. See discussion beginning at supra note 375.
390 GROOME, supra note 387, at 35.
391 Id. at 41.

R

R
R

\\server05\productn\B\BFH\10-1\BFH107.txt

348

unknown

Seq: 88

8-FEB-05

13:58

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 10

established and what is done with them afterwards.”392 To this end, he proposed five key areas where procedures could be introduced, “not merely
[as] desirable but [as] a functional prerequisite.” These procedures revolved
around regulating five core issues essential for ensuring impartiality: 1)
choice of subject matter to be investigated; 2) choice of fact-finding mission
members; 3) comprehensive terms of reference; 4) investigation procedures; and 5) utilization of the finished mission report.393
In a similar vein, the International Law Association promoted its
own Belgrade Minimal Rules of Procedure for International Human Rights
Fact-finding Missions (The Belgrade Rules), which were designed to respond to “serious departures from fundamental principles of due process by
some fact-finding missions.”394 These rules sought to “encourage the cooperation of states in the investigative process and to lend greater credibility
to the conclusions of such fact-finding missions.”395 Notably, Thoolen and
Verstappen’s approach criticized these schemes as being “completely based
on IGO fact-finding rules and experiences,” and thus unworkable.396 Instead, they opted to endorse Weissbrodt’s approach, which proposed that
procedural concerns related to a given HRO fact-finding mission simply be
disclosed in the final report while retaining ultimate flexibility in the investigative and reporting methods critiqued above.397
Support for Weissbrodt’s informal approach is misguided for a
number of reasons. First, the proposal fails to introduce any meaningful
yardstick for ensuring HRO reliability. Rather than provide any kind of
standard, Weissbrodt concludes that HROs can boost their reliability simply
by applying “a few useful lessons” to their work.398 Although he does attribute value to HRO disclosure of methodologies and techniques used,
Weissbrodt’s “useful lessons” fail to provide any authoritative measure of
responsible fact-finding techniques or set any baseline against which performance can be measured.399 Second, even while backing Weissbrodt’s
392

T. M. Franck and H. Scott Fairley, Procedural Due Process in Human Rights
Fact-Finding By International Agencies 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 308, 309 (1980).
393 Id. at 310.
394 GROOME, supra note 387, at 35.
395 Id.
396 THOOLEN & VERSTAPPEN, supra note 328, at 29.
397 Id. at 30.
398 Weissbrodt & McCarthy, supra note 102, at 215.
399 Id. at 216-17. Weissbrodt proposes that HROs disclose information including:
methodology and procedures used; terms of reference; identity of mission members; whether any evidence was rejected; methods used for ensuring reliability of
information; and legal norms applied to assess facts.
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model, Thoolen and Verstappen concede that procedural rules and guidelines “strengthen the probability that the fact-finding process will enjoy the
confidence of the international community as well as that of the state concerned.”400 Finally, with the advantage of 20 years of hindsight, it becomes
self-evident that Weissbrodt’s “useful lessons” have failed to take root
within the HRO community as an effective means for improving the reliability of fact-finding missions.
In light of the problems and conclusions outlined above, it is clear
that HROs need concrete rules beyond the informal “lessons” advocated by
Weissbrodt to ensure a reasonable level of credibility. At the same time, it
is equally clear that any envisioned standards ought not to reflect a simple
mirroring of IGO procedures or be handed down by government. Rather,
this paper reasons that formal fact-finding standards be generated and monitored by the HRO community itself, or failing that, by an independent
agency established for that purpose. In this manner, a baseline of minimum
standards can be created, against which all missions can be judged. As
Groome notes, while “it is true that human rights investigation does present
a number of unique obstacles to the investigator . . . this does not preclude a
set of standards to which investigators should aspire.”401 This set of standards should incorporate elements such as a “narrowly defined role for the
human rights investigator” to ensure “the investigator’s objectivity and [enable] the investigator to more effectively accomplish his or her mission.”402
In addition, reports should be required to list investigative teams, methodology applied, and mandate, including how witnesses were located and interviewed.403 Testimony from witnesses “should also contain the investigator’s
assessment of the witness’s credibility and reliability,” as well as other facts
“relevant to the witness’s credibility and reliability so that anyone reviewing the report can weigh the statements accordingly.”404 Finally, any report
published should cover everything illuminated by an investigation, especially balancing factors that may exist or arise during the course of the
400

R

401

R

Thoolen and Verstappen, supra note 328, at 19.
GROOME, supra note 387, at 35.
402 Id. at 40.
403 With regard to interviews, Groome raises several key questions: Did the investigator undertake preliminary and/or comprehensive interviews; what steps were
taken to ascertain the credibility and reliability of witnesses; did the investigator
ensure separate interviews and maintain a “healthy suspicion” of witnesses; and
finally, did the investigator not divulge specific facts about the case to the witness?
Id. at 175. Most of these basic questions are absent from the sort of interviews
Amnesty undertook in the case discussed at supra note 340.
404 GROOME, supra note 387, at 263.
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mission.405 Barring the introduction of such standards, methodologies will
continue to wane, the institution of fact-finding will degenerate into the
chimera predicted by Franck, and most damaging, respect for HRO allegations will be devalued among governments and the broader international
community.
iv) Daily Human Rights Reporting
Quotidian reporting by human rights NGOs is prone to many of the
same problems endemic to unregulated fact-finding missions. However,
these difficulties are further exacerbated given that this type of reporting—
which encompasses press releases and real-time updates “from the field”—
lacks two moderating traits associated with genuine fact-finding missions.
First, given the high volume and frequency of typical HRO reporting, the
level of thoroughness associated with legitimate fact-finding missions is
necessarily lost. Second, and perhaps more significantly, HRO daily reporting is free from the elaborate logistical planning and long-term vision of
human rights associated with fact-finding missions. Moreover, the instantaneous and unfettered nature of communications in the Internet era means
that HROs are now capable of disseminating a constant flow of reports
instantaneously and directly, without moderation by third parties such as the
media. This means that virtually any HRO can “report” on human rights
situations while minimizing their investment in basic tools such as personnel, research, and media outreach.
The damage generated by false or misleading spontaneous HRO
reporting can have far-reaching repercussions. For example, a false report
publicized in the media can tarnish a government’s human rights record and
even go so far as to provide ammunition for other states hostile to the impugned regime. Ultimately, erroneous HRO reports may take on a life of
their own. Consider the case of Amnesty’s 1990 report accusing Iraqi
soldiers of murdering Kuwaiti babies by removing them from their hospital
incubators following the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.406 In fact, this
report was based on a story fabricated by an American PR firm, acting on
behalf of the Kuwaiti regime, which sought to “influence world opinion as
congressional decisions were being made” regarding the Gulf crisis. With
the unquestioning assistance of Amnesty International—and as an immediate consequence of Amnesty’s failure to secure corroborating evidence of

405
406

Ibid. at 41.
KOREY, supra note 4, at 347.
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the allegations—this story quickly gained legitimacy and “became fodder
for a rallying cry for swift action against Iraq.”407
This incident reveals the difficulty in ensuring NGO independence
and credibility, particularly in fluid situations where HROs are relying
solely on unconfirmed evidence and elect to act immediately without independent corroboration of allegations. Furthermore, this incident underscores
the powerful moral influence intrinsic to HROs such as AI and the consequent responsibility they must shoulder to guard against manipulation of
that influence. As Clark remarks, whether or not the ‘facts’ are correct,
“once in public domain they will be employed by interested parties for their
own purposes.”408 Indeed, as Clark further points out, five years after Amnesty disavowed the Kuwait report, former president George Bush continued to invoke the murders reported by Amnesty as justification for pursuing
war against Iraq.409 An important corollary that must be added to Clark’s
conclusion is that ‘facts,’ once in the public domain, tend to linger in the
public domain—their impact resonates, forms opinions, and has a residual
effect that even disavowals, no matter how sincere or timely, may not effectively correct. Thus, it behooves HROs to adopt a meaningful evidentiary
baseline according to which daily reporting may be properly formulated.
Moreover, NGOs should be required to step forward quickly and publicly
retract erroneous statements when they occur, correct subsequent referrals
to those statements, and also take action to prevent similar future recurrences by tracing the root of the error and modifying procedures
accordingly.410
The unfolding reality, however, stands in sharp contrast to HROs
assuming greater responsibility for the quality and implications of their
work. Instead, the rising tide of rapid-fire HRO reports is increasingly characterized by knee-jerk legal conclusions, political tirades, and even the
wholesale rebroadcasting of unsubstantiated reports filed by dubious organizations claiming the title of national HRO. The implication of all these
practices is an overall degradation in the meaning and authoritativeness at407

CLARK, supra note 92, at 132.
Id.
409 In the case of the Kuwaiti babies, the true story did not emerge until three
months after Amnesty’s initial report, when The Nation revealed the allegation to
be false. KOREY, supra note 4, at 575.
410 This already may be happening, albeit informally. For example, according to
Robert Bernstein, Founding Chair of HRW, as a direct result of AI’s erroneous
reporting and failure to accept responsibility, HRW has positioned itself as willing
to acknowledge errors, “to immediately admit it and change it and not try to defend
it.” Id. at 346-47.
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tributed to genuine human rights principles recognized at international law.
For example, writing in Human Rights Quarterly, Manfred Wiegandt observed that HRW’s over-dramatization of the situation with reference to
immigrants in Germany was “so out of proportion,” it “cast doubt on the
lack of bias in the whole. . .Report.”411 In evaluating HRW’s flawed report,
Wiegandt was especially critical of the fact that HRW failed to “take into
account the negative impact” of its faulty charges,412 and further drew attention to the fact that while HROs retain the ability to “speak out and arouse
immediate international attention to a specific problem,” that power should
“not be compromised for cheap showmanship.”413
A less subtle form of reporting bias—or a more blatant example of
showmanship—may be seen in a recent HRO report which asserted the following legal conclusions:
Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) [sic] murdered eleven civilians in the Gaza Strip. Rachel Corey [sic], a 24-year-old
peace activist from Washington US, was murdered.414
This report disseminated by the Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, makes
further findings of fact. For example, it asserts that Rachel Corrie “was
clearly visible to the bulldozer driver as well as to the soldiers in the tank,”
although this account appears to stem from second-hand sources rather than
any interview with the bulldozer operator or soldiers in the tank. Notably,
this report was distributed over the Internet, thus conveying the message to
thousands that premature legal findings are part and parcel of legitimate
human rights work.415 Ironically, one of Al Mezan’s objectives is to “pro411 M. H. Wiegandt, The Pitfalls of International Human Rights Monitoring: Some
Critical Remarks on the 1995 Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Report on Xenophobia
In Germany, 18 HUM. RTS Q. 833, 835. Some of the specific problems Wiegandt
cites include: HRW’s failure to grasp the importance of Germany’s federal structure for law enforcement, its advocacy of the enlargement of a federal intelligence
service, and its use of a short-term fact-finding mission “which leaves no time for
becoming familiar with all of the legal and political aspects of the subject.” Id. at
837.
412 Id. at 837.
413 Id. at 834.
414 Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, New Israeli Crimes in Gaza—IOF Kill
Eleven People Including an American Peace Activist, available at http://www.
mezan.org/2003.14.htm, last visited March 17, 2003 (emphasis added).
415 As of December 16, 2003, the Al Mezan Center for Human Rights website
alone registered over 34,000 visits. See http://www.mezan.org. In addition, the report was also relayed via the Derechos Middle East human rights listserv, which
has over 400 subscribers. As the list coordinator remarks, this number “is quite
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mote . . . the rule of law, transperancy [sic], accountability and the role of
NGO’s [sic] in the Palestinian society.” Al Mezan receives financial support from a number of leading international donors, including the Swiss
Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), the Ford Foundation, the
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights.416
The failure of some HROs—and their donors—to take effective
measures to ensure accurate daily reporting techniques is further aggravated
by the tendency to slip into political diatribes or invoke the use of myriad
invented “standards” for reporting.417 By using these tactics, HROs seek to
avert accusations of reporting unsubstantiated allegations as fact. However,
the end product reflects an abuse of the shared values inherent in human
rights. For example, consider a recent press release by LAW, the Palestinian
Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment, wherein
the HRO finds “strong evidence” of ill treatment and “believes that” certain
measures amount to forced displacement.418 Less subtle still, the Egyptian
Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) recently asserted in one feverish
press release that it:
[T]hinks that the Israeli crimes against humanity prove the
sufferings of the Palestinians and the violations of the Humanitarian International Law by Israel. How many victims
shall be killed to lead the Great Powers to stop having priorities for the political interests over the pains of the
victims!!!419
meaningless” given “the ease of re-distribution of the internet and other media.”
For example, the list coordinator cites three accounts of emails being printed and
redistributed on academic bulletin boards in Colombia, in group meetings in Sweden, and even read over the radio in Argentina. “These are, of course, just a few
examples and ones we heard about . . . often times you don’t know what happens
with your information.” Email correspondence with author, Apr. 10, 2003.
416 Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, About Mezan, available at http://www.
mezan.org/aboutmezan.htm and http://web.archive.org/web/20040215002708/http:/
/www.mezan.org/aboutmezan.htm, last visited Sept. 20, 2004.
417 See discussion regarding the range of conclusory terminology introduced by
Amnesty, supra note 359.
418 LAW, Jenin Refugee Camp: Mass Arbitrary Arrest and Ill-Treatment, available
at http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/s/5EEB1B3AF871331185256BDE006736
9C, last visited September 20, 2004. LAW’s financial woes are recounted in Part
IV(A)(ii), above.
419 Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, The Egyptian Organization for
Human Rights (EOHR) Calls the International Community to Intervene to Protect
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Finally, and perhaps most dubiously, the World Organization
Against Torture (OMCT), a Geneva-based INGO, employs subtle qualifiers
that effectively distance the organization from the dubious accuracy of the
very HRO reports it rebroadcasts in whole across its 90,000-person network. Typically, OMCT redistributes national HRO reports verbatim without any effort to obtain corroborative evidence. Instead, it simply prefaces
the allegations with stipulations such as: OMCT “has been informed by. . .”
or “according to information received . . .” or “it is reported that . . . .”420
This practice not only underscores the appallingly low standards being employed within the industry for communicating human rights reports, but
also confirms the dangerous pattern of national HROs uplinking their allegations to the mothership—the INGO—which proceeds to disseminate the
data widely, freely and without any form of corroboration.421
Alarmingly, increasing competition across the industry and the continued drive for public attention may further exacerbate the dearth of corroborating evidence in daily HRO reporting. Amnesty International, long
the standard-bearer of credibility within the HRO community, has recently
been exposed to mounting competition from upstart national NGOs and its
ascendant international rival, Human Rights Watch. As a result, AI has tried
to “speed up and enliven its documents,” thus dramatically reorienting its
emphasis from “get it right” to “get it out and fast.”422 This trend accentuates the problems associated with unregulated human rights reporting,
where sensationalistic press releases may attract public attention and
funders, but in the long run discredit international human rights norms and
the HRO industry as a whole. As Groome notes, while “a reputation for
accuracy, fairness and integrity can do much to bring human rights abuses
the attention they deserve, a reputation for exaggerated, biased or inaccurate
findings can result in serious, legitimate human rights complaints being ig-

the Palestinians and to Carry on Investigations in the Israeli War Crimes in Jenin
and Gaza, available at http://www.eohr.org/press/2002/07-23.htm (July 23, 2002)
(emphasis added). The use of the term “victim” here also underscores Groome’s
point concerning HRO objectivity discussed at supra note 387.

R

420

See e.g., OMCT, Egypt: Hunger Strikes Launched to Protest Against the Detention and Torture of Demonstrators, available at http://www.omct.org (Apr. 23,
2003), and OMCT, Israel: Nine Extra-Judicial Executions of Palestinians, Including 2 Children, available at http://www.omct.org (Feb. 19, 2002).
421

See discussion in text and footnotes beginning at supra note 367.

R

422

C.E. Welch Jr., Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, in Welch Jr.,
supra note 13, at 117 n.109. See also KOREY, supra note 4, at 304.
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nored.”423 Disturbingly, defense of Amnesty’s new operating practice is
heard even at the apex of its governing structure. Former AI secretary general Pierre Sané declared that while he would prefer “a nice piece of research where everything is verified to death . . . if that corners us into
inaction . . . then what’s the point?”424 Yet, it is precisely this “retooled”
approach to human rights reporting, designed to make Amnesty “compete
more effectively with the media and campaign successes of Human Right’s
[sic] Watch,” that former top Amnesty staffers claim “has weakened the
research review process.”425 According to former Director of Research Malcolm Smart, the “old values” of the organization, “including quality and
accuracy of research,” were being “radically altered” as early as 1994.426
As Boli observes, the effectiveness of many of the most prominent
HROs “depends on maintaining a high public profile,” which is typically
achieved by courting controversy and conflict with states “for not conforming to world-cultural principles.”427 However, it is increasingly difficult for HROs to build awareness of their activities against the backdrop of
a jaded press, already too familiar with reports of torture and other human
rights violations. Arguably, “human rights reporting has become so common that some press outlets no longer consider many accounts of human
rights abuse to be ‘newsworthy’ in themselves.”428 Typically, journalists
now are confronted by editors who say “So? What else is new?”429 Consequently, HROs feel the pinch to break the reporting stalemate by devising
dramatic new angles, uncovering even greater atrocities or simply seizing
“on issues that seem designed more to promote their own image and fundraising efforts than to advance the public interest.”430
Yet, this drive to inspire—or force—newsworthiness comes at the
price of potentially overstating or altogether fabricating abuses, in turn undermining the valuable inroads created by the HRO movement and violat423

GROOME, supra note 387, at 42. This may not always be the case. Amnesty
suffered little, if any, negative publicity following the Kuwait debacle recounted at
the beginning of this section.
424 KOREY, supra note 4, at 304.
425 Id.
426 Id. at 305.
427 Boli & Thomas, supra note 87, at 43.
428 Roth, supra note 139, at 232.
429 A. Husarska, ‘Conscience Trigger’: The Press and Human Rights, in REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 118, at 343.
430 Simmons, supra note 13, at 90.
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ing public trust.431 This trend further risks creating a vicious circle whereby
HROs seek to outdo or race against one another for the sake of securing
scarce media coverage, which remains pivotal to continued financial support from funders. Arguably, the Internet has empowered human rights
NGOs “to communicate with and mobilize large numbers of people directly, without the need to operate through formal press channels.”432 However, this evolution is a double-edged sword, since it effectively frees HROs
from an external control that may in fact operate informally to filter tenuous
reports and promote greater credibility in HRO reporting.433
As noted in the previous section, Peter Willetts, always an enthusiastic advocate of HROs, has argued that these organizations “cannot afford
to make mistakes, because thereafter their . . . mistakes will continually be
thrown back at them.”434 Given this presumption, Willetts reasons that
NGOs “should often be regarded as being more reliable in presenting information than either journalists or government officials.”435 This defense of
NGO reliability is faulty for a number of reasons. First, the aforementioned
example relating to Amnesty and the Kuwaiti babies is a testament to the
potential unwillingness of states to throw mistakes “back at them.” Indeed,
some states prefer to see uncorroborated or inaccurate HRO reports stand
where contentions contained therein are advantageous to their own political
agendas. Second, given the identified HRO practice of “reporting” hearsay
allegations rather than hard facts, the bright line delineating mistakes is
blurred beyond recognition. Like the invocation of “early warning” as a
431

This touches upon the notion of an HRO duty of care, as elaborated in Part
IV(A)(ii) above and supra note 314.
432 Roth, supra note 139, at 232.
433 For a discussion of the role of media as an informal external control on HRO
operations, see infra Part IV(B)(i).
434 Willetts, supra note 374, at 187.
435 Id. Willetts contends that the difference between NGOs and the media is that
the latter is generally not required to publicize their own mistakes. This statement is
patently absurd, at least where the media is not government-controlled. All
respected newspapers run story corrections on a daily basis. More specifically,
when egregious reporting errors are detected, the media publicly acknowledges its
failure to offer sufficiently accurate coverage. For example, in May 2004, the editors of the New York Times reviewed in detail that newspaper’s coverage of the
lead up to war in Iraq and concluded that “coverage . . . was not as rigorous as it
should have been.” Editors, The Times and Iraq, NEW YORK TIMES, May 26, 2004,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/26/international/middleeast/26FTE_
NOTE.html?ex=1095566400&en=cf01a372b63ad98f&ei=5070&8dpc, last visited
December 10, 2004. See also http://www.nytimes.com/ref/international/middleeast/
20040526CRITIQUE.html, last visited December 10, 2004.
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catchall defense against charges of misleading fact-finding, without the imposition of formal controls derived from recognized standards, HROs simply have too many ready excuses for failing to report objectively.
Admittedly, HROs may dispute the need for formal reporting standards by arguing that internal policies are in place to ensure accuracy in
documents including daily press releases and research papers. However, experience demonstrates that as HRO size and scope of activities continue to
grow, informal methods for ensuring reliability produce mixed results at
best. For example, HRW’s commitment to “absolute accuracy” served to be
“of central importance in impacting upon the media” especially as the organization got underway.436 Yet, inevitably, “errors would creep into the
most meticulously researched reports.” To minimize the effect of faulty information, HRW instituted an “elaborate review procedure . . . to weed out
the uncertain or speculative.”437 Nevertheless, the organization’s rapid and
exponential growth “exposed grave inadequacies and liabilities that plunged
it into a serious crisis.” As Korey observes, “the very success of the Human
Rights Watch had produced contradictions that threatened its very survival.”438 Faced with an enlarged staff, the expansion of regional divisions
and “the absence of any centralized bureaucratic procedure. . .the exercise
of an effective kind of oversight and review” seriously declined, thus causing the organization’s accuracy and credibility to suffer.439
To prevent the inclusion of speculation, conjecture and bias in HRO
reports, the introduction of standards is crucial. As Groome rightly notes:
[Any] false or exaggerated report casts suspicion not only
on a particular organization but also on human rights reporting in general. The gravity or exigency of a particular
situation can never excuse a false or misleading report and
can do much to set back both the individual case and the
attention paid to other bona fide reports.440
With this in mind, Groome correctly stresses that each individual HRO staff
member must be made to realize that each report, press release and investigation either contributes to the movement or detracts from it.441 From the
evidence presented above, it is evident that this critical message is not getting through.
436
437
438
439
440
441

KOREY, supra note 4, at 346.
Id.
Id. at 347.
Id.
GROOME, supra note 387, at 42-43.
Id. at 42.
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v) Overt Politicization
Without any formal controls to ensure impartiality and professionalism within the NGO community, HROs risk being manipulated as political pawns or co-opting the language and moral value of human rights as a
veil for partisan objectives. Some organizations, undaunted by the need for
the appearance of balance, may advance political agendas in a variety of
forms, ranging from the seemingly innocuous “selection of particular violators for concerted action,” to the blatantly hostile fabrication of rights violations.442 These tendencies pose a grave threat to the stability and reliability
of HROs as a whole, insofar as the infiltration of political bias undermines
the credibility of the industry overall and diminishes its capacity to advance
human rights norms in an authoritative manner.
Overtly political HROs and the use of HROs as a front for political
objectives are not recent developments. In 1967, the New York Times reported that the CIA had secretly funded “several anti-communist NGOs,”
triggering a reappraisal of the role of NGOs at the UN, driven in large part
by the Communist bloc and African and Asia states.443 At the same time,
governments have frequently leveled charges of bias and politicization
against arguably independent HROs. For example, the USSR accused Amnesty International and other human rights NGOs of abusing “their consultative status [at the UN] by engaging in slander and political attacks on
member states.”444 In a similar vein, Arab governments argued that U.S.
based Jewish NGOs were:
[I]dentified with one Government which was hostile to
other Member States and. . .had abused their consultative
status by conducting systematic political campaigns against
those Member States. They have used religion to hide their
intentions.445
The charge of overt politicization can function as a useful catchall
tool for governments seeking to defend themselves against critical HRO
reports which expose human rights violations in their respective countries.
Understandably, therefore, the international community ought to be wary of
any government that actually adopts such a facile defensive posture. At the
442

LIVEZEY, supra note 34, at 27.
P. Willetts, Consultative Status for NGOs at the United Nations, in THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 41.
444 Pei-heng Chiang, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS: IDENTITY, ROLE, AND FUNCTION 189 (1981).
445 Id. at 177.
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same time, however, the potential for politicization is very real, especially
given that the industry is not subject to any formal regulation. Without such
standards, a situation has emerged whereby “unassailable human rights
principles” act as “a kind of shield” for HROs, enabling them to “pursue
independent action regardless of political alignments.”446 In other words,
the fact that human rights NGOs ostensibly premise their actions on the
unimpeachable principles of human rights provides these organizations with
a level of incontrovertibility as to intent and motive that is simply without
parallel. Yet, given the current activities of many HROs, it is quite clear
that this shield may be wielded as a sword as well. As Fred Halliday rightly
notes, “That which is separate from the state may well not be benign and
liberal.”447
Politicization of HROs can transpire in a number of ways, and nothing in the structure of these organizations provides the necessary safeguards
for preventing such an occurrence. In the first case, HROs can be established to advance the politicized objectives held by its founders or its financial backers. At present, the public at large—including the media and other
consumers of HRO information—is ill informed regarding the back-story
behind every HRO and its sources of financial support. Thus, at a Harvard
University-sponsored roundtable that brought together Arab human rights
activists, Ghanim Alnajjar acknowledged the need:
[T]o take seriously the question of whether the [HRO]
movement, or its pioneers, are simply frustrated politicians
who, having failed to forge a niche in their respective political parties, use the new discourse of human rights as a tool
to promote their political visions outside the parties.448
The extent of this reality is confirmed by Khader Shkirat, who observes that
many political party activists sought to establish human rights organizations
outside of the political sphere: “they claimed not to have any political orien-

446

CLARK, supra note 92, at 12. AI aspires to maintain political impartiality by
taking no stand on political questions. Interestingly, earlier on in its history, there
was some suspicion that Amnesty had been infiltrated by British intelligence. An
internal investigation examining the scandal surrounding an Amnesty study on
British rule in Aden has remained closed. Id. at 15.
447 Halliday, supra note 305, at 25.
448 Ghanim Alnajjar, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE ARAB HUMAN RIGHTS
MOVEMENT: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY DISCUSSION HELD IN CAIRO IN MARCH 1998,
18 (H.J. Steiner, ed., 2000).
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tation or affiliation. It was essentially untrue.”449 Yet, even with this recognition of how HROs may be created or manipulated for essentially political
goals, no systematic process has emerged to require HROs to disclose this
vital information in a formal and widespread manner.
The establishment of HROs as an alternative or addition to a political party is endemic particularly among nationally based organizations,
which are often “viewed and behave as opponents to the government.” In
many instances, human rights groups “will consist largely of or be dependent primarily upon, political opponents and exiles from a particular country.”450 Given the ever-expanding definition attributed to human rights,
these organizations are able to represent agendas that encompass everything
from political and civil rights to collective rights and self-determination,
blurring the line between narrow HRO objectives and broader political ambitions. Even larger NGOs with a reputation for objectivity are increasingly
vulnerable to the potential politicization that comes as HROs consider
broadening their mandates. For example, the Association for Civil Rights in
Israel (ACRI), one of Israel’s leading civil rights organizations, has become
plagued by internal divisions indicative of how political ideology may operate to steer an HRO’s course. Essentially, more moderate voices in ACRI
have claimed that opinions which do not “conform to the most radical left”
dogma are being tagged as “fascist and. . .racist,” thus discrediting these
views and stifling internal debate.451 More alarmingly, since this struggle
has occurred internally, far away from the public eye, it may result in ACRI
politicizing its human rights reports while continuing to benefit from its
previously accrued reputation for objectivity.
The desire to continually expand mandates results in many HROs
increasingly venturing into activities and areas that represent a departure
from the touchstone of human rights norms. This pattern signals another
opening for politicization insofar as it results in a blurring of the distinction
between what rightly ought to be labeled as a “human rights NGO” rather
than a think tank or other lobbying or activist organization. As Steiner asks:
To the extent that NGOs base their prescriptions for society
not solely on a body of human rights norms but on broader
social analysis, how are they to be distinguished from other

449

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS, supra note 448, at 19. For more on Shkirat’s illustrious HRO career, see discussion at supra note 300.
450 Gaer, supra note 107, at 57.
451 Lavie, supra note 382.
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institutions in the vast and controverted world of social
analysis?452
From this perspective, HROs would necessarily join the ranks of other partisan organizations and consequently be required to shed the purported objectivity they profess while reporting human rights violations. In this way,
HROs might then “repel or enlist our sympathies” based on our own clear
political choices,453 rather than by manipulating human rights principles and
the shared values they impart.454 Understandably, human rights NGOs are
loath to be tagged as political, since such a label degrades their ability to
invoke objectivity as a basis for their work and deposes them from their
prized pedestal above the fray of other policy groups and activists. To avoid
such a categorization, many HROs which claim to be ‘non-political,’ have
ascribed a “very narrow meaning” to the word. Thus, ‘non-political’ HRO
status is achieved simply by forgoing any formal organizational or financial
linkage “with any one political party within a country or with any one government within the global system.”455 This narrow interpretation enables
HROs to convey a public image of non-partisanship while remaining free to
advance political objectives falling short of explicit affiliation with a given
political party.
Steiner has also reasoned that NGOs “are clearly ‘political’ in the
sense that they are committed to action to vindicate moral and political
principles that determine basic characteristics of a society.”456 However,
this watered-down definition enables HROs to escape the very critical distinction between action grounded in principle and action based on political
interests. As Hannum clearly states, allegations “of human rights violations
must be legitimate in and of themselves and should not be used merely as a
means to achieve larger political objectives.”457 In other words, so long as
this practice is condoned by the industry, political agendas will continue to
452

STEINER, supra note 254, at 36.
Id. at 37.
454 Halliday seconds this view, reasoning that there is “a need for a degree of ethical and democratic distance from the belief in NGOs. . .as a whole as the harbingers of a more liberal and benign world. Some do contribute to this, some do
not.” Halliday, supra note 305, at 36.
455 Willetts, supra note 374, at 191. Even this seemingly simple task is increasingly
difficult to achieve. As previously noted, over 50% of NGOs now rely in some
manner on government or inter-governmental funding for operation. See Smith &
Pagnucco, supra note 309.
456 STEINER, supra note 254, at 70.
457 Hannum, supra note 125, at 36. Hannum goes on to note that “human rights
issues are commonly manipulated by both sides.”
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undermine the persuasive moral force and legitimacy attributed to human
rights.
Nowhere is the problem of overt HRO politicization and expanded
mandates made more evident than in the culmination of the UN’s 2001
Durban World Conference Against Racism. Here, 3,000 NGOs adopted an
NGO Forum Declaration, which branded the State of Israel a “racist,
apartheid state”458 guilty of “systematic perpetration of racist crimes including war crimes, acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing.”459 As U.S. Congressman Tom Lantos observed, perhaps the most disturbing fact about this
action was that “many of America’s top human rights leaders” participated
in the Forum and its declaration while failing to speak out against the
overtly “anti-Semitic atmosphere” of the conference.460 Faced with the controversy generated by Durban, Amnesty International released a disingenuous statement claiming on the one hand that it did not accept or condone
“some of the language used within the NGO Declaration,” but on the other,
that it “accepts the declaration as a largely positive document which gives a
voice to all the victims of racism wherever it occurs.”461 Human Rights
Watch took a similarly sanguine outlook of the Conference and its final
declaration, heralding in a press release that the anti-racism summit ended
on a “hopeful note,” albeit with progress amid controversy.462
What is perhaps most troubling about the “Durban debacle” is the
ease with which generally respected human rights INGOs boasting international recognition and credibility comfortably slid into the blatantly political
fray that was Durban. As Lantos observed, ostensibly reputable HROs
“made no statements protesting the debasement of [UN] human rights
mechanisms and terms taking place in front of their eyes.”463 More alarming
still, the intimation of a “radical [NGO] agenda,” prompted Lantos to ex458

World Conference Against Racism NGO Forum Declaration, Sept. 3, 2001, at
para. 162 [hereinafter WCAR NGO Declaration], available at http://www.hri.ca/
racism/major/ngodeclaration.shtml and http://www.racism.org.za/declaration.htm,
last visited November 10, 2004.
459 Id. at para.160.
460 T. Lantos, The Durban Debacle: An Insider’s View of the UN World Conference Against Racism, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 31, 46 (2002).
461 Amnesty International, World Conference Against Racism Ends: Successes
Must Not Be Overshadowed by Disputes, Sept.7, 2001, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGIOR410222001, last visited October 10, 2004.
462 Human Rights Watch, Anti-Racism Summit Ends on Hopeful Note, Sept. 10,
2001, available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/09/wcar0910.htm, last visited
October 10, 2004.
463 Lantos, supra note 460, at 50.
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press apprehension over nothing less than an irreversible degradation of
critical terms such as genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and the “undercutting [of] progress in the global human rights
struggle.”464
Even in the wake of the Conference, trusted international HROs
continued to voice support for the NGO Declaration. Reed Brody, advocacy
director for HRW, exclaimed that a “great achievement of [Durban] has
been the unprecedented mobilization of victims of racism,” and identified
the conference’s sole flaw to be “the media focus on the dispute over the
Middle East.”465 By scapegoating the media for reporting on activities
within the NGO forum, Brody sought to downplay the very real and very
virulent one-sided fixation with Israel manifested by NGO delegates themselves.466 Six months after the NGO Forum Declaration, HRW continued to
insist that the “real” Durban conference “was completely different from the
one covered in American newspapers” and that HRW “played an important
role in criticizing some of the inappropriate criticisms of Israel at the NGO
Forum.”467 In addition to clashing with Congressman Lantos’ account of the
proceedings, this version of HRW as the objective, levelheaded INGO is
also irreconcilable with Canadian delegate Anne Bayefsky’s account. According to Bayefsky, HRW representatives “watched in silence as Jewish
NGO voices were stilled and ‘Zionism is racism’ became the order of the
day.”468 Interestingly, Bayefsky also calls attention to similar efforts on the
part of Amnesty International to distance itself from the loaded content of
the NGO Final Declaration in the months following the Durban Conference.
But rather than acknowledge any error or failing on its part for endorsing—
however tacitly—the blistering rhetoric and specific political agenda manifest in the NGO Declaration,469 AI’s Durban pledge is enveloped in the
464

Id. at 41.
Anti-Racism Summit, supra note 462. For insight into how INGOs at the Durban Conference “urged the media to move on to other issues,” see D. Matas, Civil
Society Smashes Up, Sept. 2001, available at http://www.hri.ca/racism/analyses/
matas.shtml, last visited December 15, 2004.
466 Anne Bayefsky, Since Durban: An Entrenchment of Hatred, JERUSALEM POST,
Sept. 13, 2002, at A9.
467 Id.
468 Id.
469 The NGO Forum Declaration calls, inter alia, for the “reinstitution of UN resolution 3379 determining the practices of Zionism as racist practices” and the imposition of “a policy of complete and total isolation of Israel as an apartheid state
[including] the imposition of mandatory and comprehensive sanctions and embargoes.” WCAR NGO Declaration, supra note 458, at paras. 418, 424.
465

R

R

\\server05\productn\B\BFH\10-1\BFH107.txt

364

unknown

Seq: 104

8-FEB-05

13:58

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 10

sanitized wrapper of an objective promise only to “continue to campaign to
ensure that governments do not forget their obligations to combat
racism.”470
At Durban, leading international HROs spoke out of both sides of
their mouths. In doing so, they degraded the standing of international
human rights. In the wake of the conference, Leonard Rubenstein, executive
director of Physicians for Human Rights, asserted that the “language of
human rights has to be used precisely” while conceding that the “language
on the Middle East in the NGO [Forum Declaration] is not used that way.”
Similarly, Michael Posner, representing the Lawyer’s Committee for
Human Rights, claimed to reject the ‘Zionist is racism’ language: “That
language doesn’t have a place at this conference . . . But it’s time to move
on.”471 Yet, it is precisely this very language—welcomed with open arms at
Durban—which INGOs failed to reject throughout the course of the Conference, and which ultimately navigated its way into perpetuity in the form of
the NGO Forum Declaration. Therefore, if, in Posner’s words, it truly is
“time to move on,” the cause of international human rights must now do so
bearing the stigma of the Durban Declaration’s loaded political agenda.
In essence, Durban confirmed that the captains of the human rights
industry are prepared to compromise fundamental principles for what they
characterize as “part of an important long term process.”472 More realistically, no amount of obfuscation or hair-splitting disclaimers can successfully reconcile the avowed objectivity and legitimacy of the international
human rights movement with the blatantly political and subjective nature of
the Forum Declaration. Although INGO leaders will argue, as demonstrated
above, that it is possible to salvage the Declaration’s positive elements, one
need look no further than the national NGO level to see how utterly mistaken this assumption is, and moreover, precisely which elements of the
Declaration are being put into play on the ground. Consider, for example,
the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights’ (EOHR) less nuanced, but
infinitely more candid point of view, which heralds:

470

Amnesty International, Introduction to ANNUAL REPORT 2002, 6 (2002), available at http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2002.nsf/intro6/intro6?OpenDocument, last
visited December 10, 2004. See also Entrenchment of Hatred, supra note 466. This
HRO unwillingness to admit fault tracks back to the discussion at Part IV(A)(iv),
above. See also supra note 410.
471 Posner also argued that the “zeal of one group on behalf of victims to make
their point should not infringe on the rights of others.” Matas, supra note 465.
472 Id.
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[The] important role [played by Egyptian NGOs] as an essential partner. . .in defending the rights of nations headed
by the right of the Palestinian nation to self-determination,
affirmed by [the] Durban Conference in South Africa.
These organizations have so far succeeded in mobilizing
the international NGOs to condemn the Israeli policies and
to describe it as a racist country.473
Beyond demonstrating how overt political agendas are readily inserted into the work of individual HROs—and into the international human
rights agenda as a whole—the NGO Forum Declaration serves as a powerful illustration of how the horse-trading so roundly condemned in political
forums like the UN, has taken root within the NGO community. As Lantos
confirms, “Durban demonstrates that we cannot always assume that all
NGOs are focused on advancing universal standards of human rights . . . the
NGO process can become as polluted as the intergovernmental process.”474
Indeed, if the NGO process is on this track, the introduction of standards
against which NGO behavior can be measured becomes even more critical
to the future of international human rights. As Brett rightly asks:
[I]s not the role of human rights NGOs indeed to address
the human rights issues, while recognizing the causes, and
leave other NGOs and pressure groups to address the political, economic and other underlying factors which go far
beyond even the broadest definition of human rights?475
The inaction of presumably objective and professional international
HROs like HRW and Amnesty in Durban may be attributed to a growing
pressure within the NGO community to lend a greater voice to southern and
national NGOs. Indeed, a vocal group of critics has sought to chastise western NGOs for dominating agenda setting and advancing liberalism at the
expense of the needs of the developing world. Perhaps unintentionally, a
leading critic from this school of thought indirectly supports a supplemental
argument in favor of introducing standards as a means of better identifying
politicized origins and behavior among HROs. Makau Mutua posits that a
473

Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, The Egyptian NGOs Calls [sic]
Upon a [sic] Democratic Legislation to Organize the Organizations of Civil Work
in Egypt, June 2, 2002 (on file with the author) (emphasis added). Recall that
EOHR limited its self-defined mandate to “the protection of human rights in
Egypt.” See discussion beginning at Part IV(A)(i) and especially supra note 286.
474 Lantos, supra note 460, at 50.
475 Brett, supra note 60, at 107.
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political bias preferring western, first generation civil and political rights
over economic and social rights has emerged as a result of NGO founders
being western white males. According to Mutua, this bias runs deep into the
financial and political networks that support HRO activities: “This tapestry
of social and business ties, drawn from leading Americans who believe in
liberal values and their internationalization through the human rights regime, underlines the agenda of INGOs.”476
Mutua’s critique is not a new one, and can be traced back to Lowell
Livezey’s study of American NGOs, which identified a ‘universal tendency’ among American HROs to promote world views that go far beyond
the human rights issues themselves and reflect American beliefs regarding
democracy and a broadly liberal political agenda.477 Mutua argues that this
tendency to take cover “behind the international human rights instruments”
enables INGOS “to fight for liberal values without appearing partisan, biased, or ideological.”478 Likewise, Richard Falk argues that western NGOs
have maintained a narrow discourse, the scope of which “will not resonate
with the peoples and representatives of many non-Western countries.”479
Yet, at the same time, Mutua is forced to acknowledge that the struggle
against human rights violations is bound up with the struggle against tyranny. Consequently, he concludes that human rights NGOs should “openly
acknowledge the inescapable and intrinsic linkage between human rights
and democracy” and “immediately abandon” the “façade of neutrality, the
fiction that INGOs do not seek the establishment of a particular political
system.”480
476
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Mutua, supra note 13, at 155.
LIVEZEY, supra note 34, at 130.
478 Mutua, supra note 13, at 157. This notion also reinforces my previous point
about human rights being used as a sword rather than a shield. See discussion at
supra notes 446 and 447.
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R. Falk, Interpreting the Interaction of Global Markets and Human Rights, in
GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 70 (A. Brysk, ed., 2002). Welch Jr., pointing
to the prioritization of civil and political rights over economic and social rights in
INGOs like Amnesty and HRW, also raises the possibility that a façade of neutrality masks a political agenda in favor of western norms. Welch Jr., supra note 106,
at 16.
480

Mutua, supra note 13, at 159. Western hesitancy in addressing social and economic rights arguably stems from the distinction between concerns surrounding
corrective justice (first generation) and distributive justice (second generation). Accordingly, distributive justice is question of policy rather than principle. See id. at
162 n.23.
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With an appreciation of this mounting schism within the HRO community, it may be argued that western INGOs accepted the Forum Declaration at Durban—even while acknowledging that the document was replete
with “language [they did not] agree with”481—simply to stem mounting
criticism against them as agents of western liberalism. Even if this assumption is accurate, the fact remains that all sides, southern and western, developing and developed, are susceptible to falling into the trap of politicizing
HRO goals and objectives for myriad reasons. As mandates expand, competing “human rights” objectives increasingly abut against one another, resulting in divisions that promote the horse-trading intrinsic to
intergovernmental negotiations. If, as Mutua posits, western NGOs should
confess their affinity for democracy and liberalism, disclosure of the political preferences held by other, southern NGOs, also should be required as a
matter of transparency. As Hurrell notes, the diversity of voices within the
NGO movement is characterized by a “lack of apparent means of mediating
between them or evaluating their representational authority . . . [to the extent that] many NGOs [are] little more than self-appointed and self-created
lobbies, despite their pervasive rhetoric of authenticity.”482 Consequently,
the introduction of standards can serve the dual purpose of exposing political biases or agendas while also clarifying the urgent question regarding
what norms and whose norms are being advanced by a given human rights
NGO.483
B. External Controls
As demonstrated above, the informal internal tools for regulating
NGO behavior are ineffective at best. As NGOs have asserted a growing
role in the creation of international norms, no parallel effort has been undertaken to formalize fact-finding, reporting or internal accountability standards, to say nothing of weeding out overtly political actors from the HRO
field. As Peter Spiro notes, HROs today are able to “use the system to
advance their agendas, but are not answerable to the system. They can bring
others to task, but themselves remain immune. NGOs have not been held
481

Irene Kahn, Secretary General of Amnesty International, ultimately conceded
that “there is language in the [NGO Durban Declaration] that AI doesn’t agree
with.” Matas, supra note 465.
482 Hurrell, supra note 96, at 289.
483 For example, in the case of its opposition to the death penalty, Amnesty is
arguably not representative of universalism: “While no civilization or culture proclaims the virtues of torture, many countries have less compunction in defending
the death penalty as an instrument of state policy.” Thakur, supra note 256, at 371.
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responsible for their conduct.”484 NGO activists may argue that even if internal controls are insufficient on their own, they are buttressed by a second
tier of external, informal mechanisms that deter NGOs from acting in an
irresponsible or political manner. A closer look at these external controls,
however, reveals that the arguments marshaled in their support are outdated or no longer relevant on the playing field across which HROs are
deployed today. Accordingly, the analysis set forth in the following section
serves to round out the case in favor of developing a set of concrete, formal
standards that can establish an authoritative baseline for the responsible and
effective development of future human rights activities.
i) New Challenges to Media and Donors As External Watchdogs of
HRO Legitimacy
1. Media
Media interest in human rights has been traced back to the Vietnam
War era. During the course of that conflict, “much of the Western media
transformed its dominant angle from one of communism versus capitalism,
or West versus East, into the more pervasive theme of human rights, which
could be used as a mirror to hold up to all combatants.”485 To be certain,
NGOs played a critical role in enabling the media to uncover an abundance
of these stories, and the ensuing result was a predictably symbiotic relationship between the two. In exchange for providing rich and plentiful access to
a previously untapped angle of reportage, the media furnished HROs with a
previously unprecedented means of broadcasting human rights news, thus
vastly expanding the size of the audience traditionally exposed to such information. But the significance of the media ultimately goes beyond widely
publicizing tales of human rights abuse. Baehr has estimated that:
Human rights NGOs would be hard put to have any impact
if the media would not pay attention to their activities. The
voluminous yearbooks of Amnesty International and other
human rights organizations. . .are rarely read by government officials or the general public in their entirety. Their
message is normally conveyed by accounts in the newspapers, on radio and television.486
484

Spiro, supra note 101, at 166.
R. Callick, Human Rights, The New Universal Media Angle: Is it a Distorting
Lens?, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS?, supra note 260, at 100.
486 Baehr, supra note 123. See also C. Ritchie, “Coordinate? Cooperate? Harmonise? NGO Policy and Operational Coalitions, in NGOS, THE UN, AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE, supra note 14, at 186.
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Therefore, through the act of reporting on human rights, the media
has functioned as a stamp of legitimacy for HROs, lending credibility and
publicity to their allegations. The nexus between media attention and NGO
success has led some observers to remark that the “importance of the mass
media cannot be over-emphasized . . . . All successful human rights NGOs
have developed good personal contacts with journalists, who . . . serve as a
means of making NGO information public.”487 Yet the need for well-cultivated media relations has prompted many HROs to move beyond simply
maintaining personal contacts, to the point where their human rights reports
are being prepared specifically in a “media-friendly format.”488 This format
sacrifices research and objectivity in the name of expediency and sensationalism—two elements favored by a mass media which covets speed and
where “if it bleeds, it leads.”
As an outgrowth of this pattern, it is clear that the media does not
function effectively to engender NGO objectivity, but on the contrary may
cause NGOs to sacrifice their objectivity in the name of securing publicity
and ensuing financial support from backers who view media attention as a
measure of performance. As Clifford Bob has noted, this problem extends
especially to smaller, local NGOs that may, in a bid for international attention, disengage from responsible practices:
In a context where marketing trumps justice, local challengers . . . face long odds. Not only do they jostle for attention among dozens of equally worthy competitors, but
they also confront the pervasive indifference of international audiences . . . . Under pressure to sell their causes to
the rest of the world, local leaders may end up undermining
their original goals or alienating the domestic constituencies they ostensibly represent.489
Stated differently, the evolution of the media-HRO relationship has degraded to a point where the media is no longer adequately responsive or
distanced to satisfactorily operate as an effective external watchdog of NGO
behavior.
487
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Hannum, supra note 125, at 23.
D. Stubbings, supra note 260, at 225. As noted above, this demand for timely
information, coupled with the competition that emerged between NGOs for press
attention, also led to reports being released without adequate fact checking and
corroboration. See Welch Jr., supra note 422.
489 Bob, supra note 295, at 37. To overcome this marketing challenge, causes are
pitched internationally and narrow demands and particularistic identities are universalized to enhance appeal.
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Even if the media still operates to filter out dubious HRO claims,
other, more recent developments in communication technologies have
emerged to enable NGOs to bypass the effectiveness of that filter. As Jessica Matthews has noted, new information technologies have disrupted hierarchies and spread power among more people and groups.490 Indeed, the
advent of the Internet and its associated technologies has triggered a veritable revolution in NGO communication methods, freeing HROs from formal
media outlets which dictated the scope of their audience and the content of
their message. Harnessing the Internet and all its iterations, including email,
listservs, FTP, bulletin boards and websites, has provided HROs with an
unprecedented ability to disseminate their message directly and widely,
without the moderating filter of journalists or editors constrained by concerns for objectivity or audience interest. Rather than being limited by local
or wire service distribution numbers, or challenged by a reporter committed
to securing evidence to corroborate or disprove HRO allegations, the Internet has effectively opened the floodgates to unfettered HRO communications and a virtually limitless international audience.
A closer look at the nature of the emerging information technologies reveals that the technologies themselves are prone to degrading HRO
reliability by compressing time and breeding detrimental competition.
Given the immediacy associated with cell phones, fax machines and the
Internet:
[The] time required for gathering, processing, and distributing information is cut. But the speed ‘arms race’ complicates all organizations’ efforts to avoid overreacting and
making other kinds of errors, while acting fast enough to
stay ahead of what rivals are doing.491
Today, when Amnesty International learns that an individual has
disappeared, it activates a longstanding “Urgent Action” network via the
Internet. This network, which extends globally to over 50,000 activists, is
now able “within hours of information reaching the international secretariat,” to “swing into action with letters, faxes, and telegrams on behalf of
the victim.”492 But the instantaneous nature of this activism may easily occur without allowing for the intervening time necessary to corroborate initial reports. Consequently, erroneous reports may be beamed across the
globe to an unquestioning network which then acts upon them accordingly.
490

Mathews, supra note 144, at 52.
S. Weyker, The Ironies of Information Technology, in GLOBALIZATION
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 479, at 118.
492 Thakur, supra note 256, at 381.
491
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This phenomenon may, to a certain extent, be tolerable where pressures of
speed and competition generate minor omissions or misstatements. However, the expansion and quickening of the NGO communications network
remains problematic insofar as it may be used to intentionally spread misrepresentations or outright fabrications, thus discrediting HROs and diminishing the legitimacy of human rights principles. One environmental activist
has characterized this ability of any group “with a fax machine and a
modem . . . to distort public debate” as the “rise of the global idiots.”493 But
this behavior is not limited to the environmental field. Consider again the
example of Al Mezan’s subjective and conclusory report on the death of
Rachel Corrie in Gaza.494 By activating its Internet network, this small national HRO was able to distribute its message to thousands in an instant.
More disturbingly still, Al Mezan’s ability to distort the public debate—or
more specifically in this case, the principles of human rights and elementary
criminal law—was facilitated by the fact that no controls exist to prevent
erroneous or misleading reports from being forwarded and republished
across the globe via human rights listservs and message boards. Indeed, a
cursory examination of such services reveals posting guidelines so permissive that a disclaimer is appended to each message.495
It may be argued that these two examples fall under the “early
warning” function discussed above.496 However, the newfound capacity of
virtually every HRO to communicate instantaneously only redoubles the
urgent need for these organizations to act responsibly and establish a more
thoughtful and concrete approach to the question of when an “early warning” action ought to be invoked. The necessity of such guidelines is further
underscored when one considers that the primary tactic employed by HROs
to secure change is mobilizing shame against its target. With the pivotal
role of the media as informal external authenticator of human rights allegations increasingly undermined by the Internet, the technique of “shaming”
may be exercised free from independent corroboration or any minimal evidentiary standard. At this point, the damage is done to the government or
other target of HRO advocacy directly via the Internet and associated communication tools. Retractions in the wake of patently false communiqués
are generally not forthcoming, and because the forum is typically an informal one, repercussions to HRO reputations tend to be minimized or quickly
493

R

494

R

Simmons, supra note 13, at 90.
See supra note 414 and accompanying text.
495 For example, messages forwarded over the Derechos listserv system state that
materials “by sources other than Derechos distributed in this mailing list do not
necessarily imply the endorsement of Derechos.”
496 See supra Part IV(A)(iii).
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forgotten as yesterday’s news. Furthermore, while it may be claimed that
suing in tort can stem the tide of erroneous HRO reporting, this proposal
falls short on two grounds: first, given the innovations introduced by Internet technologies, the law in this area is uncertain and still evolving;497
and second—and perhaps more importantly—such a course of action represents only a Band-Aid for what clearly requires a more overarching and
reliable solution.498
2. Donors
Like the media, HRO donors—including governments, political
parties, private foundations and an organization’s individual supporters—
also represent an imperfect instrument for providing informal, external regulation of NGOs. Admittedly, these organizations and individuals, which
provide the lifeblood of HROs in the form of dollars and legitimacy, may
be expected to have some moderating impact on NGOs. However, it is
through this role that foundations and other donors are also capable of influencing the agenda of human rights NGOs. Funding from government
sources raises questions about an HRO’s independence. Similarly, an
HRO’s “reliance on funding from philanthropic organizations also raises
questions of accountability and susceptibility to outside influence.”499 Consequently, the problem remains that financial backers may be able to influence “which human rights issues are salient, and on which countries and
regions” HRO attention will be focused.500 In other words, relying on donors to ensure credibility among HROs generates a dangerous situation
whereby the fox is left to guard the henhouse.
At the same time, the information technology revolution has also
undermined the potentially moderating influence of even the most credible
foundations which extend support to HROs. Foundations have the ability to
monitor HRO performance and then make determinations as to whether
funding will be continued or halted. However, as technologies such as the
Internet make HROs—or at least virtual HROs—increasingly less costly to
497

The Internet’s basic lack of locality suggests the need for formulating new legal
rules. However, it also raises practical problems concerning the global enforceability of any judgment that may be awarded by a national court. See Dow Jones &
Co., Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 CLR 575, 619 (Austl.).
498 It also can be argued here that leaving resolution of this critical issue to the
discretion of the courts may result in arbitrary or unfair restrictions being imposed
on legitimate NGO work in certain jurisdictions.
499 J.S. Ovsiovitch, Feeding the Watchdogs: Philanthropic Support for Human
Rights NGOs, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 341 at 344 (1998).
500 Id. at 341-42.
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operate, the external control furnished by philanthropic foundations may
become irrelevant. Consequently, individuals interested in gaining a political leg up may increasingly turn to the useful cover of an HRO for advancing their agenda while forgoing the formality of securing funding and
legitimacy from a foundational donor.
An examination of the state of Palestinian human rights NGOs provides at least some confirmation of the trend towards “fundless” or “virtual”
HROs. Bassem Eid, director of the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring
Group has asserted that all NGOs should register with the Palestinian Authority (PA) to ensure their authenticity: “I have no problem in sending [the
PA] our financial report and I reject [the allegation] that this campaign is
just to limit the activities of human rights organizations. NGOs that don’t
have a budget shouldn’t exist.”501 In this single statement, Eid effectively
confirms two things: first, the reality that some organizations are self-labeling themselves as HROs in name alone and lack the informal stamp of
legitimacy associated with having external sources of funding; and second,
that HROs remain loathe to submit to any form of oversight, however
slight.
ii) Intergovernmental Organizations and International Tribunals
In arguing against the need for some form of regulation within the
HRO industry, a claim may be made that intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs) and international tribunals serve as the ultimate arbiter of fact regarding human rights violations. According to this line of reasoning, these
bodies also play an informal external control role, ensuring that only credible HRO information is translated into meaningful findings at the level of
international law. In reality, however, this argument falls short for a number
of reasons. First, international human rights “law-making” does not occur
primarily at the legislative or judicial level, but rather, is advanced by
HROs that have asserted the role of expert advocate in creating these new
norms and facilitating public and elite consensus regarding the need for
them.502 Second, for the reasons expanded upon below, the capacity of
IGOs and international tribunals to act as final arbiter of facts is crippled in
a number of critical ways that effectively diminishes their ability to promote
credibility and accuracy within the HRO industry.
501

B. Lynfield, PA Review Puts NGOs on Defensive, JERUSALEM POST, June 15,
1999, at 2.
502 CLARK, supra note 92, at 133. As noted, HROs not only advocate in favor of
the creation of new norms, but also lead the campaign for their enforcement.
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It is no secret that the discussions of the Commission on Human
Rights—a non-expert UN body—often “reflect the balance of power that
exists within the United Nations” rather than “illuminate problems that exist
in the world.”503 This perspective is even confirmed by HROs, which have
grown intimately familiar with the Commission’s inherent political nature
and inability to produce objective and meaningful directives regarding international human rights. As the UN representative for Amnesty International has commented, the Commission “has always been a political body,”
with Member States taking decisions based on “other issues and relationships, like economic interests.”504 Ironically, HROs have lambasted the
Commission’s most recent iterations—chaired in 2003 by the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya and reelecting Sudan to another two-year term in 2004—especially for its failure to meaningfully address several critical human rights
issues. According to Human Rights Watch, the Commission “has gradually
been hijacked by members bent on squelching criticism.”505 Indeed, the absence of any expertise prerequisite for membership on the Commission has
arguably created a body “in which many of the world’s worst human rights
abusers sit in judgment.”506 Viewed from this perspective, it appears that the
inroads secured by HROs at the Commission over the past 20 years now
risk being undone simply based on the Commission’s current
membership.507
Past HRO gains aside, given the overt political makeup and volatility of the Commission, it clearly cannot be relied upon to act as an effective
filter against unsubstantiated HRO allegations. Moreover, since the Commission alone reserves the right to make determinations as to what it accepts as factual, any outcome it produces, as far as reliable human rights
findings are concerned, is dubious at best. Indeed, this operating reality invites the possibility of the Commission welcoming or even endorsing inac503

J. Kirkpatrick, UN Human Rights Panel Needs Some Entry Standards: A Scandal in Geneva, INT. HERALD TRIB., May 14, 2003, available at http://www.iht.com/
articles/96161.html, last visited December 10, 2003.
504 M. J. Jordan, New Calls for Reform of UN Rights Commission, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, May 7, 2003, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0507/p07
s02-wogi.htm, last visited December 10, 2003.
505 Id. This turn of events at the Commission has resulted in HROs being increasingly shut out of the process and the passage of generally benign or “toothless”
resolutions against states having support within the Commission.
506 Kirkpatrick, supra note 503.
507 For example, it was the Commission that first facilitated the expanded use of
HRO tools such as written and oral statements. See Participation of NGOs in Meetings of the Commission on Human Rights, supra note 163.
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curate HRO allegations for the specific purpose of political gain or
manipulation.
Beyond the overtly political forum of the UN Commission on
Human Rights and its subsidiary organs,508 there are a number of other international fora that hold out the promise of a more balanced and judicious
approach to human rights findings. While these bodies do offer the aura of
greater objectivity, they nevertheless remain imperfect tools for the purpose
of promoting HRO accuracy and accountability overall. It is evident that the
international judicial system is not a mirror replica of its municipal counterparts. This means that courts and other ad hoc tribunals may lack the legal
jurisdiction to hear any number of cases dealing with human rights violations. Perhaps even more significantly, beyond jurisdictional questions,
these bodies also lack the technical capacity to operate in a timely and continuous manner. Consequently, international tribunals that are empowered
to rule on the findings of HROs are incapable of correcting, at least with
any degree of meaningfulness, the damage caused to a given party by misleading or faulty HRO allegations publicized in real time. For example, the
increasing caseload at the European Court for Human Rights (ECHR) has
generated an on-going debate surrounding the necessity for reform. Even
following the changes brought about by Protocol No.11, which replaced the
existing, part-time Court and Commission with a single, full-time Court, the
ECHR’s caseload continued to grow at an unprecedented rate. In the short
period of five years, the number of applications to the Court grew a staggering 130%—from 5,979 in 1998 to 13,858 in 2001.509 At present, the Court
is grappling with the need for additional urgent reforms that will address its
inability to handle the growing volume of cases piling up at its doors.510
In a similar vein, since many international bodies addressing human
rights concerns meet on an annual basis, and then, only consider the human
rights records of a pre-determined list of countries, it may be years before
misleading human rights allegations are officially pronounced as such by a
final international arbiter of fact. For example, the UN Human Rights Committee sits three times a year and is able to consider the human rights situa508

Oral Statements in the Commission on Human Rights, supra note 159, at para.
4. Given the credibility gap of the Commission, the objectivity it exercises in the
selection of special rapporteurs and its determination of which themes and countries are scrutinized under its investigative mechanisms also must necessarily come
into question.
509 The European Court of Human Rights: Historical Background, Organisation
and Procedure, supra note 36, at para. 7.
510 Id.
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tions of approximately 12 selected countries.511 Anne Bayefsky calculates
that this type of scheduling works out to an “average consideration by each
[UN] treaty body of a state for six or seven hours once every five years.”512
Given the detrimental time lag and intermittency associated with existing
third party arbitration of HRO claims, it becomes clear that the watchdog
capacity of international tribunals is significantly curtailed by their inability
to scrutinize even a minimal number of the HRO allegations filed during
the course of a given year.
Beyond the time lags, delays, and small number of total hearings
associated with these international bodies, it also can be argued that even
the more reputable, legalistic international human rights institutions remain
vulnerable to some of the same political limitations that subvert the objectivity of bodies like the UN Commission on Human Rights. For example,
the UN Human Rights Committee, designated as an expert body, is not
immune to having its members appointed through horse-trading of votes
between UN member states.513 Consequently, not only may the information
base presented to the HRC by HROs potentially be biased or inaccurate, but
so too may a given Committee member’s own interpretation of that evidence. As Bayefsky notes, the UN “treaty bodies have been heavily dependent on information from NGOs in preparing for the dialogue with state
parties . . . This dependence has led to a close working relationship between
NGOs and most of the treaty bodies.”514 In turn, this close relationship may
exacerbate problems further, since a treaty body committee’s “holistic understanding of a country situation may be distorted by information coming
from an active, but specialized, NGO which is focused on a very limited
range of matters”515 or from an NGO that knowingly distorts its findings in
an attempt to sway the Committee’s direction. One of Bayefsky’s central
recommendations aimed at preventing this distortion is that the treaty bodies “inform themselves about the sources and expertise of those making
511

Office of the High Commission on Human Rights, Sessions of the Human
Rights Committee, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/sessions.htm, last visited Nov. 23, 2004. In 2005, the Committee is scheduled to meet
for a total of less than 60 days.
512 A. F. BAYEFSKY, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM: UNIVERSALITY AT
THE CROSSROADS xiv (2001).
513 Interviews with Martin Scheinin, UN Human Rights Committee member, Toronto, Can. (Jan. 8, 2003), and Cecilia Medina Quiroga, former UN Human Rights
Committee Chairperson, Toronto, Can. (Jan. 29, 2003).
514 BAYEFSKY, supra note 512, at 42-43. The close working relationship is also
noted at Gordenker & Weiss, supra note 14, at 29.
515 BAYEFSKY, supra note 512, at 44.
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submissions as a part of their effort to ensure that conclusions are based on
reliable information.”516 To be certain, this recommendation is a step in the
right direction for lifting the veil that may be cloaking the true intention of
some HROs presenting materials to the treaty bodies. Still, it falls short of
addressing the damage caused by the time lag between an NGO’s independent release of allegations and those allegations coming before the HRC, in
all likelihood, several years later. Thus, similar to the shortcomings tied to
an action in tort for inaccurate HRO reporting, relying upon the international bodies as an external control also fails to provide an effective check
against unfettered HRO operations.
For an opposing perspective on this line of argumentation, it is
worth examining Philip Alston’s defense of the treaty body system. Alston
marshals four reasons why the process remains a valid one that effectively
screens out disingenuous HRO claims: first, HRO submissions are “very
often juxtaposed against” the submission of other HROs; second, the weight
accorded by the Committee to the information provided “inevitably reflects
the track record” previously accumulated by an HRO; third, governments
are likely to refute any false allegations; and finally, the role of the Committee is to exercise informed judgment.517 Admittedly, the Human Rights
Committee retains the ability to juxtapose HRO reports against one another.
However, this practice in no way guarantees that it will emerge with a reasonable picture of the human rights situation in a given country. Rather the
objectivity of the baseline will only be as good as the HRO information
presented to the Committee. In effect, the voice being communicated to the
HRC is that of a specific subset of HROs that have the organizational savvy
or political motivation to present their findings to the Committee. Ironically, even Alston concedes the existence of an urgent need “to remedy the
current situation in which the great majority of. . .NGOs that are most active at the United Nations level pay little more than lip service to economic,
social and cultural rights.”518 This statement confirms the existence of a bias
inherent in the overall HRO data being submitted to the HRC.
Alston’s second defense is subject to the common stock market caveat that past performance can never be a reliable indicator of future returns. That said, Alston’s third argument is accurate, if inadequate on two
counts: first, the myriad other HRO allegations that the Committee fails to
516

Id. at 46.
P. Alston, Beyond ‘Them’ and ‘Us’: Putting Treaty Body Reform Into Perspective, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING, supra note 12,
at 510.
518 P. Alston, Economic and Social Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR
THE NEXT CENTURY, supra note 66, at 159.
517
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address or discredit retain a lingering power in HRO press releases, web
sites, and annual reports.519 Second, given the infrequency of HRC hearings, it may be years before a government is able to secure an authoritative
third party “ruling” refuting a given allegation. In the interim, this allegation may cause damages ranging from political sanction to the loss of revenue in trade and tourism. Alston’s last defense of the HRC process is
tempered by the encroachment of political bargaining into the appointment
process of Committee members. In the end, Alston concludes that the “exclusion or downgrading of NGO information would certainly not improve
the process.”520 But what is equally clear from the analysis above is that
relying on bodies like the HRC as an external control to weed out HRO
misinformation equally falls short of adequately improving the process and
ensuring credibility and reliability within the HRO industry as a whole.
Interestingly, even if the HRC and other treaty bodies are accepted
as an effective check against overzealous HROs, it appears that HROs
themselves are unwilling to tolerate them as a constraint upon their freedom
of action. Indeed, an emerging pattern seems to testify to the fact that these
UN bodies, which allow states a voice and employ legal tools for decision
making, are being sloughed off by HROs in favor of more direct mechanisms that promise rapid action within the international arena with fewer
procedural encumbrances. For instance, Gaer observes that the impact of
NGOs:
[I]s now greatest as a source of independent information
that triggers special mechanisms and engenders action by
UN special rapporteurs. Human rights NGOs can so profoundly influence attentiveness to human rights . . . that an
ongoing operational role in these areas ranks . . . as more
significant than NGO speeches and representational activities at the Commission on Human Rights, even though such
activities maintain public pressure on governments for
action.521
In other words, NGOs are quickly becoming savvy enough to sidestep the
rigorous legal hurdles—or controls—demanded by the UN’s law-based
treaty bodies in favor of advancing their agenda via the UN’s political organs. As discussed above, bodies like the Commission for Human Rights
519

Consider again LAW’s enduring human rights reportage on the Jenin “massacre”. See supra Part IV(A)(iii).
520 Alston, supra note 517, at 510.
521 Gaer, supra note 107, at 64.
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are more than eager to endorse the manipulation of HROs and human rights
allegations provided it serves their own political objectives.
iii) Free Market
Perhaps the most basic argument that may be marshaled against
regulating the HRO industry stems from the twin pillars of freedom of expression and a belief in free market forces. According to this position,
NGOs should be permitted to express any viewpoint they want, and their
relative success or failure will hinge on their ability to continually persuade
donors and the general public as to the justice and credibility of their cause.
NGOs that are incapable of maintaining this level of credibility will eventually assume an inconsequential position in the human rights arena. With this
free market system in place, no formal intervention is needed or necessary;
in fact, such interference may prove damaging to the industry or otherwise
threaten the marketplace’s representativeness. As each of the previous sections has illustrated, reliance on informal controls such as HRO accountability and operating procedures, the media, donors, or intergovernmental
organizations are either ineffective or no longer adequate for guaranteeing
that the market operate in a reliable and responsible manner. Sophisticated
NGO operations, such as the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, capable
of tapping into a wealth of simpatico donors,522 and the rise of “global idiots”523 operating out of their homes, or worse, out of Internet cafés, can and
will undermine the fabric of international human rights by discrediting the
human rights movement and generally damaging the overall reputation of
HROs.
It is useful to examine the overarching free market argument in defense of the HRO industry and weigh, from a law and economics perspective, whether some kind of regulation of this industry may be justifiable.
This exercise is valuable insofar as law and economics tends to favor the
operation of free markets and informal controls, and only proposes formal
regulation where persistent, fundamental problems exist within a given unregulated system. Accordingly, such an approach not only provides a novel
and innovative method for analyzing the HRO sector, but more significantly, drives home the broader conclusion that given the nature of human
rights principles, HROs cannot continue to operate free of formal regulations. As will be seen, submitting HROs to a law and economics analysis
522

K. Nimmo, The Committee for the Liberation of Iraq: PR Spinning the Bush
Doctrine, COUNTERPUNCH, Nov. 19, 2002, available at http://www.globalpolicy.
org/ngos/credib/2002/1119bush.htm, last visited December 10, 2003.
523 Simmons, supra note 13, at 90.
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reveals a number of characteristics about the industry that would typically
signal a need for government intervention in an otherwise free market.
However, before advancing to this analysis, it is worthwhile to explore the
freedom of expression foundation upon which HROs, and international civil
society at large, have staked their camp.
Benedict Kingsbury argues that a set of informal principles emulating First Amendment liberalism “has been the de facto guide in the construction of international civil society.”524 These principles have encouraged
the establishment of NGOs, which are “attracted by the notion in US public
law that anyone should be free to form a group, to raise funds for it by any
legal means, and to advocate through it virtually any nonviolent political or
moral position.” As Kingsbury rightly points out, apart from some obligations with regard to the use of funds and occasional tort liability, this convenient formula generates very “little responsibility or accountability” on the
part of putative NGOs.525 Indeed, the analysis undertaken in the previous
sections confirms that this internationalized “First Amendment”—or more
universally “freedom of expression”—code serves as a common foundation
for HROs and informs the nature of their activities. Kingsbury’s conclusion
is that this type of liberal international civil society:
[O]ffers few means of NGO accountability except via markets, and it tends to view demands for other forms of accountability with suspicion—as devices used to muzzle
free expression or to introduce content regulation.526
This statement is revealing on a number of levels. First, it accepts
the proposition that NGOs have enveloped themselves in an ideological
blanket that resists accountability; second, it expresses the possibility that
market forces might offer a sufficient means of imposing some form of
informal control over NGOs; and finally, it confirms the fierce tendency of
NGOs to reject calls for accountability by arguing that such demands constitute a threat to their fundamental right of freedom of expression. By falling back on a freedom of expression defense of their activities, HROs
neglect the fact that their profession does not deal in ideas alone, but rather,
in very legalistic notions of human rights which have repercussions that
reach far beyond the simple expression of an idea. Given that human rights
524

Benedict Kingsbury, The Democratic Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations: First Amendment Liberalism as Global Legal Architecture: Ascriptive
Groups and the Problems of the Liberal NGO Model of International Civil Society,
3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 183 (2002).
525 Id. at 184-85.
526 Id. at 186.
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principles comprise nothing less that the shared über-values of humankind,
invoking their violation in the form of allegations against another party carries a weight beyond mere words. Indeed, the leveling of human rights violation charges represents a grave matter that bears implications not only for
the target, but also for the body of international human rights law and for
the HRO community at large. Perhaps most alarming, insofar as HROs have
characterized any opposition to their activities as violative of freedom of
expression rights—or worse, as outright antagonism to human rights—they
have effectively curtailed any legitimate effort to introduce even minimal
standards designed to enhance responsibility and credibility within the industry. In a perverse twist, the free expression rhetoric seized upon by
HROs effectively squelches any close or sustained scrutiny of HRO activities intended to promote best practices or standards. As Kingsbury remarks:
The lack of other ideas about accountability suggests not
only that First Amendment liberalism has been tacitly imported as the prevailing blueprint for NGO participation in
international civil society, but also that it almost exhausts
the field, so that few other principles of international constitutionalism bearing on accountability have been developed or invoked.527
Given the accountability problems inherent in NGO reliance on
freedom of expression liberalism, Kingsbury argues in favor of broadening
the role of other principles of international constitutionalism as a means of
creating alternative opportunities for accountability. While this argument
essentially promotes other “constitutional principles” as a means for increasing accountability and regulation within the HRO industry, it falls
short inasmuch as it continues to favor informal methods of accountability.
In any event, Kingsbury was not the first to identify the shortcomings that may be endemic to an unregulated free market for ideas. Writing
in the 1970s, Ronald Coase observed that the “normal treatment of governmental regulation of markets makes a sharp distinction between the ordinary market for goods and services and . . . ‘the market for ideas.’”
According to Coase, conventional wisdom reasons that “in the market for
goods, governmental regulation is desirable whereas, in the market for
ideas, government regulation is undesirable and should be strictly lim-

527 Id. To Kingsbury’s quote I would only add that given the existing state of affairs, no other principle of international constitutionalism can be invoked to promote accountability.
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ited.”528 Coase argued that this view stems from the fact that self-esteem
and self-interest causes intellectuals “to magnify the importance of their
own market” and work to ensure that “while others are regulated, regulation
should not apply to them.”529 The prescience and ready applicability of this
statement to HROs is made manifest when one considers that HROs today
are hurriedly increasing their efforts to secure agreements with transnational
corporations and IGOs regarding human rights standards,530 but have not
yet proposed or sought to enforce effective standards for reporting their
own activities.531
Coase’s provocative piece, The Economics of the First Amendment:
The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, is a valuable one insofar as
it calls attention to the potential problems which may arise when organized
groups such as HROs are permitted to allege human rights violations without any authoritative standards and without comprehensive information
available to the general public for reaching their own informed decisions
regarding the veracity of those allegations. Coase argues that no fundamental distinction ought to exist between the market for goods and ideas: “In all
markets, producers have some reasons for being honest and some for being
dishonest; consumers have some information but are not fully informed or
even able to digest the information they have.”532 This line of reasoning
brings to the forefront the potential for human rights principles to be
manipulated for political ends, and moreover, the reality that consumers and
other decision makers are being implored to act on these allegations having
imperfect information at best. As Coase points out:
[I]t is hard to believe that the general public is in a better
position to evaluate competing views on economic and social policy than to choose between different kinds of food.
Yet there is support for regulation in the one case but not in
the other.533
While there is certainly an impassioned plea to be made for an unfettered right to freedom of expression generally, this argument must necessarily be tempered in the context of HROs. As argued above, NGOs, like
producers, have motivations for being both honest and dishonest. Similarly,
528

R.H. Coase, The Economics of the First Amendment: The Market for Goods
and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384 (1974).
529 Id. at 386.
530 Spiro, supra note 101, at 168.
531 Spar & Dail, supra note 127, at 172.
532 Coase, supra note 528, at 389.
533 Id. at 389-90.
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with regard to consumers, it is virtually impossible for the media or government officials—let alone the general public—to collect the perfect information necessary for effectively evaluating HRO claims in a timely and
efficient manner.534 Yet, even beyond these basic arguments in favor of
regulating the market of ideas generally, several additional factors, intrinsic
to the HRO market, reinforce the need to intervene for the purpose of establishing some formal baseline of minimal standards. The persuasive power
inherent in morally-infused human rights rhetoric, its legal implications, the
communications revolution, and the prominence of HROs within the international community all underline the reality that the question of HRO regulation is not one of ham-fisted suppression of free speech, but rather of
securing an industry against the manipulation of a set of principles designed
to entrench humankind’s fundamental rights at international law.
While Coase presents an argument in favor of regulating the marketplace of ideas—something that may be unpalatable for many—the case
for regulating HROs becomes even more persuasive when their output—
reports, allegations and press releases—are viewed not only as ideas, but as
“products” or goods. These goods are introduced into a global marketplace
and may ultimately impact both international and domestic legal systems, as
well as shape the future development of human rights norms. By shifting
the conceptualization of human rights output from “ideas” to “products,”
the notion of regulation for the sake of consumer protection suddenly becomes more familiar and less of an intellectual leap. And it is from this
perspective that a law and economics approach becomes immediately useful. Indeed, such an analysis of the HRO industry reveals the telltale signs
of a marketplace ripe for consumer protection regulations.
As Michael Trebilcock proposes, an “essential first step in determining whether there is a consumer protection problem should be to characterize the market in question as either competitive, imperfectly competitive
or non-competitive.”535 Antonio Donini’s analysis of NGOs demonstrates
that, in tandem with the emergence of fly-by-night, low budget or no budget
national NGOs, there is a growing trend towards concentration of influence
on the international level. This concentration is so transparent that Donini
likens it to an oligopoly, with “eight major families or federations of inter534

The fact that HROs employ a bewildering collection of semantic qualifiers to
shade their conclusions is but one practice that hinders this critical task. See supra
Part IV(A)(iii).

535

G.D. Hadfield, R. House & M. J. Trebilcock, Rethinking Consumer Protection
Policy, Aug. 28, 1996, available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inocabc.nsf/en/ca00324e.html, last visited December 10, 2003.
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national NGOs [controlling] almost half an $8 billion market.”536 In addition to identifying a concentration of financial assets among a few select
NGOs, Donini also has noted a parallel trend encouraging “homogenisation
in the practices, management style, and activities of NGOs,”537 which Clifford Bob labels “a homogeneity of humanitarianism.”538 Against this background, it is evident that the HRO market reflects at best a situation of
imperfect competition. However, the nature of the HRO market raises another warning flag insofar as the general public, having an automatic affinity with the notion of ‘human rights,’ has no obvious reason “to doubt their
general expectation of safety,” or as in the case of human rights, their general expectation of the truth. Consequently, since “consumers” of HRO
products exhibit no propensity for doubting the veracity of HRO claims,
their expectation of truth “can easily be exploited.”539 According to Trebilcock, this second finding confirms that a consumer information problem
may exist within a given marketplace.
One key tendency ascribed to free markets is that, given time, they
“are likely to solve most information problems.” However, as noted above,
the factor of timeliness is critical to preserving the integrity of human rights
principles. Consequently, so long as HROs are permitted to operate in realtime without any effective checks, “many consumers may be prejudiced”
until such a time as the market is able to correct itself.540 In other words, the
ability of myriad HROs to disseminate any number of misleading or uncorroborated charges on a continual basis compromises the public’s ability to
effectively separate legitimate allegations from illegitimate ones. Even if
the market is able to correct itself over time, the inevitable time lag associated with this ability enables misleading allegations to be entrenched as
factual, thus damaging an impugned party’s reputation within the international community.
536

Donini, supra note 237, at 91. According to Donini, the UN and the European
Community have “facilitated, if not encouraged, this process of aggregation” since
they find it “easier to do business with semi-structured large consortia than with
atomised individual NGOs.” Indeed, both these IGOs have actively promoted the
creation of networks and coalitions of issue-specific NGOs at the international
level. Simmons confirms that the trend towards an NGO oligopoly “threatens to
crowd out small players, especially local NGOs.” Simmons, supra note 13, at 88.
537 Donini, supra note 237, at 92. As noted above, these practices are informal and
wholly inadequate for fostering credibility across the HRO industry.
538 Bob, supra note 295, at 44.
539 Hadfield, House & Trebilcock, supra note 535.
540 Id.
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Another important characteristic of a free market is the general expectation that “the more obvious a consumer protection problem has become the less of a problem it may come to be.”541 This simply means that
once consumers are alerted to a blatant or widespread problem with a given
market, they will adjust their general expectation of related transactions and
take steps to avoid the product in question. In this manner, consumer action
serves to correct the perceived consumer protection problem. However, if
the enormous growth within the HRO sector—in terms of sheer numbers
and funding dollars—is any indication, no obvious consumer protection
problem has been identified within the industry. Indeed, the analysis provided above points to a situation whereby HRO influence and numbers are
growing at such a rate that fundamental problems like biased operations
have become clouded by the overwhelming support extended to the sector
as a whole. With the flaws discussed above so elaborately woven into the
fabric of legitimate human rights work, it is nearly impossible to separate
the source of the consumer protection problem. Consequently, the self-correcting influence of consumer expectations regarding elements such as
truth, objectivity and accuracy is rendered ineffective.
While this preliminary exploration of consumer protection theory
serves to underscore its relevancy to the HRO marketplace, additional findings are typically required before establishing a formal justification for consumer protection regulations. According to a checklist prepared by the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD):
Government intervention should be based on clear evidence
that a problem exists and that government action is justified, given: the values at stake. . .the likely benefits and
costs of action. . .and alternative mechanisms for addressing the problem. Markets should always be considered as
an alternative to government action, and the capacity of the
private sector and individuals to deal with the problem
should be assessed.542
541

Id.
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Recommendation
of the Council of the OECD on Improving the Quality of Government Regulation
Including the OECD Reference Checklist For Regulatory Decision-Making and
Background Note, OECD Doc. No. OCDE/GD(95)95 (Mar. 9, 1995), available at
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1995doc.nsf/LinkTo/OCDE-GD(95)95, last visited
December 10, 2004. It should be reaffirmed here that that the regulatory framework
proposed by this paper in no way suggests that government should move to regulate
HROs. Rather, this task should be undertaken by the industry itself.

542
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The mere identification of a problem, therefore, does not trigger “a
presumption that government should regulate.”543 Rather, to establish that
intervention is necessary, we must consider the values at stake, benefits of
action, and alternative mechanisms available. In the case of HROs, it is
clear that the values at stake are critical inasmuch as HROs deal in the
loaded currency of human rights principles. In addition, the benefits of formal regulation promise greater clarity and standards within the HRO industry, a means of distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate human
rights actors, and the safeguarding of international human rights principles,
away from the pressures of political manipulation. Finally, as this paper has
demonstrated, the informal market-based controls within the HRO industry
have fallen far short of providing any reasonable degree of consumer protection. Furthermore, since the proposal advanced here does not resort to
government regulation, it already reflects an alternative “private sector”
mechanism for addressing the root of the problem.
Trebilcock’s law and economics approach also favors relying on
market-based solutions for remedying consumer protection problems. Indeed, he requires that government regulators explicitly answer why a market solution “will not emerge in a reasonably timely and effective form, or
why that solution may be socially sub-optimal,” before acceding to regulatory intervention in a given marketplace.544 To reach such a determination,
Trebilcock has developed a set of principles designed to identify conditions
under which a market-based solution is unlikely to emerge. Testing these
principles against the HRO sector is a useful method for confirming the
necessity of a more formal response to the problems undermining this particular marketplace. Significantly, as demonstrated below, virtually all of
Trebilcock’s conditions are readily established within the HRO sector, thus
pointing to a breakdown of the free market system and to a pressing need to
consider some form of regulation within the industry.
1. Repeat Transactions
Where opportunities for repeat transactions are rare, Trebilcock
posits that the performance incentive generated by the promise of repeat
customers is blunted, thus compromising the reliability of the market in
question. Many HROs do rely on continued business from donors and the
media, and recognize the potential of repeat transactions as an incentive for
maintaining reliable performance. However, as this paper has argued, there
is little in the way of controls to determine or limit which individuals or
543
544

Hadfield, House & Trebilcock, supra note 535.
Id.
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organizations are the source for these repeat transactions. In other words, a
financial donor with a biased agenda may repeatedly underwrite the operations of an HRO as a tool for producing ‘objective’ opinions that lend legitimacy to its own subjective viewpoint. Similarly, a biased media outlet may
rely on a specific HRO as an authoritative source for ‘credible’ information,
thereby sustaining media attention on an organization that would otherwise
not obtain repeat business from more objective “satisfied” customers.545
With the free market undermined by HROs whose survival is guaranteed by
a particular set of repeat—albeit biased—customers, the public at large is
forced to contend with a situation that makes distinguishing these HROs
from their more reputable peers virtually impossible. As an outgrowth of
these scenarios, evidence of the existence of repeat transactions within the
HRO sector alone cannot signal a healthy marketplace.
In addition, it should be noted that given the growing trend towards
human rights allegations being communicated cheaply and directly via the
Internet, reliance on repeat transactions as an indicator of a healthy market
may effectively be obviated. Global idiots with fax machines operating as
HROs need not rely on repeat customers to disseminate their messages
widely and continually. Indeed, new information technologies not only de545

For example, even after the UN confirmed as false allegations of a massacre in
Jenin, LAW made no effort to retract its previous statements. In fact, the press
releases remain accessible on the LAW website without any amendment or update.
More importantly, LAW’s international reputation remained untarnished. The HRO
continued to maintain affiliate status with the International Commission of Jurists
(ICJ), the World Organization Against Torture (OMCT) and the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN). Significantly, these three organizations
represent leading international human rights networks: The ICJ is “dedicated to the
primacy, coherence and implementation of international law and principles that advance human rights,” and distinguishes itself based on its “impartial, objective and
authoritative legal approach to the protection and promotion of human rights
through the rule of law.” The OMCT is “the largest international coalition of NGOs
fighting against torture . . . [and] has at its disposal a network . . . consisting of
some 240 non-governmental organisations which act as sources of information. Its
urgent interventions reach daily more than 90,000 governmental and intergovernmental institutions,” as well as NGOs and other interest groups. Finally, the
EMHRN “is a network of human rights organisations based in more than 20 countries from the Euro-Mediterranean region.” See LAW, About LAW, available at
http://www.lawsociety.org/AboutL/Index.html; International Commission of Jurists, About Us, at http://www.icj.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=11&lang=EN;
World Organisation Against Torture, at http://www.omct.org/ (last visited Apr. 26,
2004); and Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, available at http://www.
euromedrights.net/english/engelsk.html, last visited December 21, 2004.
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grade the performance incentive provided by the promise of repeat transactions but completely sever the correlation between an NGO’s ability to
attract repeat business and its continued operation. In essence, by facilitating transactions free of charge 24/7, 365 days a year, the Internet—via listservs and the World Wide Web—circumvents the performance incentive of
repeat business, thus degrading the potential force of this market control.546
2. Entry and exit costs
According to Trebilcock, as the costs associated with entry and exit
into a given industry decrease, the possibility of having a large number of
fly-by-night operators with few sunk costs and only modest investments in
reputational capital will increase. Clearly, this scenario describes precisely
what is transpiring today within the HRO industry. With the benefits of
inexpensive communications innovations and the automatic credibility capital ascribed to “nongovernmental organizations” and “human rights,” political objectives may be easily infused into the human rights discourse, thus
undermining the authority of the entire system and making it virtually impossible to separate legitimate from illegitimate operators.
3. Extra-jurisdictional presence & minimal assets
Where a large number of sellers or producers are extra-jurisdictional, Trebilcock reasons that redress through private law becomes more
difficult for consumers. Typically, this is the case within the HRO industry
given the large number of INGOs and national HROs operating across the
globe. Furthermore, as previously noted, even if judicial redress were considered a viable option, the heavy HRO reliance on the Internet to broadcast
communications further exacerbates the jurisdictional uncertainty surrounding such action.547 Private law also falls short as a remedy against actors
who have few assets against which a judgment may be enforced. In this
respect, it is worth noting that many HROs, particularly smaller, national
organizations, retain assets that likely would not even cover the expenses
associated with a formal trial.548 Finally, even if a court ordered a retraction
546

For example, a Google.com search for “Palestinian Society for the Protection
of” and “massacre” and “Jenin” conducted on May 29, 2003 returned over 300
individual hits. See http://www.google.com.
547 Arguably, a court operating outside of the United States could invoke US First
Amendment law in a trial alleging defamation against a website hosted by servers
outside of the United States.
548 Clearly, a formal trial for defamation is also complicated by freedom of expression issues.
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rather than monetary compensation, if the case of Amnesty’s allegation regarding the Kuwaiti babies is any indicator, that remedial action too would
in all likelihood prove ineffective at stemming the damage of the original
allegation, preventing its continued dissemination, or even downgrading the
HRO’s reputation.549
4. Nature of transactions
Trebilcock points out that a market-based system may also falter
where the costs to consumers of a “bad” transaction are delayed or potentially catastrophic. Such a situation makes ex post relief an inadequate or
unsatisfactory solution. Moreover, in addition to delayed costs, Trebilcock
reasons that small-sized transactions also create a significant disincentive
for seeking ex post relief through the courts.550 This scenario clearly applies
to the HRO industry. Human rights NGOs may present allegations as accurate at the time of their reporting, yet the public may only learn about errors
or misrepresentations months later, if at all. In a similar manner, each HRO
press release, communiqué, report, urgent action, and fact-finding mission
represents a single, discrete, small-sized transaction. However, when considered cumulatively, they create a potentially much larger negative impact
stemming from repeated misstatements, distortions, bias, poor reporting or
faulty fact-corroboration. Ultimately, it is unrealistic to expect the target of
such allegations to continually seek relief via the courts for these smallsized transactions, since they are undertaken hundreds of times a day by
countless HROs across the globe. Indeed, HRO use of small-sized transactions highlights a central hazard of unregulated HRO reporting techniques,
since it is through this practice that legitimate human rights principles risk
being rhetorically diluted and stripped of their essential value.
According to Trebilcock, even if the four factors examined above
point to the inadequacy of a market-based solution, government should only
intervene to regulate where it remains “feasible and cost-effective to do
so.”551 As the following section will demonstrate, the regulatory framework
discussed here can be both those things, provided HROs embrace their role
in devising and implementing meaningful standards across the industry.
549

It should be noted that Amnesty lost very little reputational capital in the wake
of this incident, and that the myth of the Kuwaiti babies continued to be recounted
long after Amnesty issued its formal retraction. See also supra text accompanying
note 406.
550 Hadfield, House & Trebilcock, supra note 535.
551 Id.

R
R

\\server05\productn\B\BFH\10-1\BFH107.txt

390

unknown

Seq: 130

8-FEB-05

13:58

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 10

V. REGULATING HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS: SOME PRELIMINARY GUIDELINES
As the previous sections of this paper have argued, fundamental
problems exist in the way NGOs finance, conduct, report, and publicize
their operations. These problems have been exacerbated by the unprecedented and unregulated growth of NGO numbers, issue-areas, financial contributions, influence and power within the international system.
Furthermore, the informal controls typically cited in defense or preserve of
unfettered HRO activity are demonstrably inadequate for effectively maintaining minimal industry standards, particularly in light of newfound communications abilities generated by recent technological advancements.
Against this background, and with a desire to promote the continued progress of human rights norms, this paper argues that a self-initiated regulatory system provides the most effective and least intrusive means for
promoting credibility, authoritativeness and transparency within the human
rights NGO community.
Understandably, this conclusion may provoke the ire of many HRO
activists and observers, as being heavy-handed, interventionist, or worse,
detrimental to the promotion and enforcement of human rights. Sikkink
agrees that NGOs “may need to think about mechanisms that other professions use to ensure accountability” if they want to safeguard “their role as
social change professionals.” However, she remains ambivalent to “credentialing, monitoring the behavior of members, [or] setting standards for professional behavior,” since these prospects may “undermine what is unique
about NGOs—their flexibility to respond rapidly, their gadfly quality, and
the informality of the global networks.”552 The arguments advanced here
persuasively to demonstrate that the alternative of doing nothing risks the
undermining of recognized international human rights norms as well as the
continued delegitimating of the entire HRO sector.553 Moreover, inaction at
this stage will only strengthen the resolve of critics already hostile to the
function of HROs in the international system, who argue that the “time for
dismantling these [organizations] and creating new, apolitical and profes-

552

Sikkink, supra note 93, at 315.
For the purpose of illustration, consider the government of Canada’s recently
announced report on immigration consultants, which identifies “the fact that certain
consultants have abused the trust [of] their clients” as being “detrimental to the
profession as a whole,” and a central justification for regulating the profession. B.
Trister & R. Augenfeld, Report of the Advisory Committee On Regulating Immigration Consultants 5 (2003), available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/regulate-consult.pdf, last visited December 10, 2004.
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sional . . . agencies is long overdue.”554 Ultimately, given the gravity of the
existing situation, it behooves committed and sincere HRO activists to finally acknowledge and act upon the need to get their own house in order
before the edifice topples over and buries the just cause of international
human rights in its rubble.
A. What Does Regulation Mean?
At this point, the most obvious question that arises is what does
regulation mean exactly? The vision this paper proposes is a modest one,
whereby regulation is sufficient to establish a level of objective standards
and provide the tools necessary for encouraging all HROs to abide by them.
According to Trebilcock, consumer protection regulation “is only likely to
make consumers better off if it either a) improves consumer estimates of the
value of information or b) reduces the cost of information to consumers (or
both).”555 Therefore, regulation of HROs should serve to promote clarity
with respect to how a given organization may label itself as a human rights
organization, what activities fall within HRO mandates, and what guidelines are applied when collecting and disseminating information on human
rights abuses. In this manner, by promoting better definition, enhanced
credibility, and greater accountability, NGOs assuredly can improve consumer estimates of the value of their information.
B. Who Would Regulate?
One certainty in designing a regulatory framework is that governments would have no role to play in setting HRO standards. Nongovernmental organizations generally are uneasy about government intervention in
their operations, and government track records with respect to NGO regulatory legislation justify this apprehension. For example, in 1994, the Suharto
regime in Indonesia announced its intent to “regulate the formation, funding, operations, and dissolution of all Indonesian NGOs.” Although never
554

G. M. Steinberg, The Dirty Politics of Humanitarian Aid, JERUSALEM POST,
Apr. 19, 2002, at A8. Steinberg argues, for example, that Human Rights Watch “is
not a humanitarian agency, but another hostile political organization. If members of
this group were allowed to enter the Palestinian areas. . .past behavior shows that
they would use this opportunity to increase the volume of anti-Israeli propaganda
that is used to justify more homicide bombings.” Steinberg also refers to Human
Rights Watch as an “NGO superpower” eager “to join the Palestinian propaganda
campaign to demonize Israel.” G. M. Steinberg, Human “Wrongs”: Durban, Jenin,
Gaza, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, July 25, 2002, available at http://www.nationalreview.
com/comment/comment-steinberg072502.asp, last visited December 10, 2003.
555 Hadfield, House & Trebilcock, supra note 535.
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implemented, the regulations allegedly stipulated that any NGO could be
banned if it was found to be “undermining the authority [of the state,] discrediting the government . . . hindering the implementation of national development or engaged in other activity that upsets political stability and
security.”556 More recently, Human Rights First (HRF) expressed its concern over a proposed NGO bill in Zimbabwe that “threatens the independence of nongovernmental organizations, in particular of those
organizations that work to promote and protect basic human rights.” According to HRF, if passed, this legislation would “undermine the essential
independence of NGOs” by requiring them “to submit applications for registration to a government-controlled council” and forbidding them “from
receiving foreign funding.”557 There have been numerous additional cases
of heavy-handed attempts at NGO regulations in countries such as India and
Egypt, and by the Palestinian Authority.558
Any effort to develop HRO regulations therefore ought to be advanced by a representative consortium of leading HROs, working together
with independent academic and judicial figures having expertise in international law, human rights and regulatory systems. The makeup of this working group will ensure that HROs are able to take ownership of the final
product while ensuring that the provisions drafted are both sufficient and
effective enough to boost the industry’s legitimacy and professionalism.559
Admittedly, this task is not a simple one. As noted above, NGOs are notorious for safeguarding their independence. According to one UN official, coordinating NGOs is “just like coordinating states, ‘like herding cats.’”560
556

J.V. Riker, NGOs, Transnational Networks, International Donor Agencies, and
the Prospects for Democratic Governance in Indonesia in RESTRUCTURING WORLD
POLITICS, supra note 93, at 194. Indonesian NGOs reacted by issuing a joint statement rejecting the regulations, yet protests triggered increased harassment of NGOs
on the part of the Suharto government.
557 Human Rights First, “Letter to Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe” (Oct. 5,
2004), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/defenders/pdf/ngo-mugabe100504.pdf, last visited December 10, 2004. Human Rights First is the new name
of the Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights. See supra note 258.
558 For example, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights decried a recent
draft Egyptian law aimed at regulating NGOs as evidence of “the hostile policy of
the government,” since it allegedly “gives the executive authority an excessive
power over NGOs, restricting and hindering their work,” supra note 473.
559 Baehr agrees with the essence of this approach, reasoning that NGOs themselves should “find the ways to organize their own international cooperation.”
Baehr, supra note 123. See also Ritchie, supra note 486, at 186.
560 Baehr, supra note 123.
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Nevertheless, the critical nature of this mission and an appreciation for the
future status of human rights should help promote a spirit of cooperation
and professionalism necessary to advance this momentous undertaking.
C. What Would Regulations Cover?
With an eye towards creating identifiable and objective standards
for human rights NGOs, regulations ought to establish guidelines covering a
broad array of issues including but not limited to:
•
•
•
•

mandate delineation;
professional staff and board membership criteria;
financing and financial disclosure transparency;
best practices for operations, including research, factfinding, reporting and Internet communications;
• best practices for working with international and national
HROs as well as during times of crisis and war;561 and
• protocols for issuing public retractions and making
amendments in the event of publication of erroneous or
misleading materials.
In addition, the working group should consider developing supplemental
regulations based on the specific nature of HRO work, such as advocacy,
litigation, reporting, or education-intensive operations.
D. How Would Standards Be Monitored or Enforced?
A diverse range of regulatory solutions already exists across various industries and professions. For example, attorneys and physicians are
typically beholden to their respective Bar or Medical Board and membership is a prerequisite to practice. In a similar manner, manufacturers of
home appliances aspire to meet standards that will ensure their products
obtain the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval. Another model that may
be considered for determining HRO credibility could follow along the lines
of publications like Consumer Reports, which independently ranks the quality and value of consumer products. In the context of HROs, this type of
publication would be disseminated to foundations, governments, the media
and the general public, and provide an authoritative ranking of HROs based
on factors such as transparency and accountability. This type of report
561

For example, in the Sudan and Somalia, “NGOs have subsidized warring factions by making direct and indirect payments to gain access” for humanitarian purposes. Simmons, supra note 13, at 88.
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could also be used to expose HROs which remain unwilling to submit data
or demonstrate substandard conduct.
Whether the optimal system for enforcing standards comes in the
form of an independent monitoring agency, annual ratings measuring quality and reliability, or simply standardizing best practices for financial agreements and fact-finding missions,562 should, as noted above, ideally be left to
the working group. Still, it seems clear that something greater than experience rankings ought to be considered, as this option essentially endorses the
use of past performance as an indicator of future performance. Similarly,
non-binding best practices lack the teeth necessary to address the HRO crisis as it has been portrayed here. As Trebilcock notes, a third party monitoring body may effectively “generate mechanisms to provide information [to
consumers] on the risk and value of transactions.”563 However, to function
effectively, such a body would need legitimacy and authority that can only
come from within the industry itself.
As the European Commission has reasoned:
The right of citizens to form associations to pursue a common purpose is a fundamental freedom in a democracy. Belonging to an association provides an opportunity for
citizens to participate actively in new ways other than or in
addition to involvement in political parties or trade
unions.564
Accordingly, a basic assumption at this preliminary stage remains
that any envisioned independent body would have its ability to carry out
internal HRO audits or recommend penalties strictly limited to those organizations that voluntarily choose to accept the oversight of the independent
body. In other words, this proposal does not seek to bind HROs that refuse
or are otherwise unwilling to accept the relevant standards. That said, only
HROs agreeing to independent oversight will benefit from the credibility
and legitimacy dividend resulting from such a process. Thus, while individuals may remain free to establish fly-by-night HROs, recognized HROs will
have an authoritative and objective tool that can be harnessed to credential
themselves in the eyes of the media, governments, intergovernmental agencies, courts and the public at large.
The advantages associated with securing an external audit are already beginning to pierce the thick skin of NGO independence. For exam562

These suggestions are borrowed from Hadfield, House & Trebilcock, supra
note 535.
563 Id.
564 Building a Stronger Partnership, supra note 98.
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ple, although not an HRO, Montreal-based Faites de la Musique (FDM) is
the first North American NGO to obtain a fiduciary rating that measures
overall trustworthiness rather than simple credit worthiness. Significantly,
FDM’s decision to seek a fiduciary rating is evidence of a growing international trend that reflects a new approach to the NGO sector. RCP & Partners, the agency responsible for FDM’s audit, has already “rated 70 nongovernmental organizations in Europe, Asia and Latin America.”565 Its rating methodology seeks to evaluate “the stability of an organization and its
ability to fulfil the purpose of its mission and maintain the consistency of its
services to beneficiaries.”566 According to the chairman of FDM, the NGO
had no other choice:
We had to make a serious show of diligence and transparence to assert our credibility in the market. If we are going
to raise funds on the public market, we need to be more
accountable and better managed.567
Unquestionably, the trend towards favoring external oversight
within the NGO sector at large confirms the urgency and necessity of advancing a similar endeavor among HROs. Inevitably, the momentum associated with this trend will reach the guarded gates of the human rights
community and proceed to expose the industry’s credibility gap, resulting in
a potentially catastrophic devaluation of HRO authority. Thus, against this
backdrop, the most sensible decision available to the HRO community
points to preempting the inevitable by adopting an independent regulatory
framework designed to promote accountability, professionalism and respect
for the principles of human rights.
One potential model for this type of independent regulatory system
may be found in the European Union’s Eco-Management and Audit
Scheme (EMAS), “a voluntary initiative designed to improve companies’
environmental performance.”568 EMAS, the most demanding environmental
management system to date, aims to identify and reward organizations “that
565

B. Critchley, Credit Rating for NGO a First for North America, FIN. POST, Dec.
6, 2002, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/credib/2002/1206credit.
htm, last visited December 10, 2004. Of the 70 NGOs rated by RCP & Partners to
date, about one-third obtained a “good” rating.
566 Id.
567 Id.
568 EMAS, Introducing EMAS, available at http://www.emas.org.uk/aboutemas/intro.htm, last visited May 28, 2003. Although EMAS is in actuality a European
Union initiative operating under EU Regulation 761/2001, its structure could easily
be adopted to function as an independent, non-governmental body.
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go beyond minimum legal compliance and continuously improve their environmental performance.” Significantly, this scheme requires participating
companies to “regularly produce a public environmental statement that reports on their environmental performance.” The accuracy and reliability of
these statements are then “independently checked by an environmental verifier,” which in turn lends member organizations “enhanced credibility and
recognition.”569 Although EMAS concentrates on environmental regulation,
it is easy to see how its operating principles could be exported to the HRO
industry. In this way, HROs could benefit from advantages similar to those
generated by EMAS, including:
• deriving a credibility dividend for having independently
validated operating procedures;
• preempting growing expectations and pressures for verified human rights reporting;
• demonstrating a concrete commitment to the principles of
international human rights and to the HRO industry in
general;
• securing internal efficiencies and managing reporting
risks; and
• accessing new sources of funding and media
opportunities.570
Perhaps the most promising benefit of the EMAS model is that, in
addition to benefiting member organizations, it actively protects its overall
credibility with teeth. For example, if a firm with EMAS registration is
found in breach of regulation, that firm’s status is revoked until the issue is
completely rectified. Recently, EMAS suspended a British chemical firm,
AH Marks, for breaching environmental regulations. Among the problems
cited as cause for the suspension, an AH Marks plant demonstrated poor
management and failed to properly train its staff.571 Indeed, the rule that
non-compliant organizations must be suspended is a key element differenti-

569
570

Id.

EMAS, Why You Should Register, available at http://www.emas.org.uk/why
register/intro.htm, last visited December 29, 2004.
571 Anglo-Welsh Environment Agency, Poor Management Leads to EMAS Suspension (Mar. 7, 2003) available at http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/news, last
visited December 10, 2003. The issue of staff training is immediately relevant to
the need for HRO standards discussed here.
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ating EMAS from other international environmental management standards,
such as the International Organization for Standardization’s ISO 14001.572
E. What Benefits Would Standards Create?
As discussed in the EMAS model outlined above, the introduction
of regulations to govern HRO conduct promises a number of valuable benefits that will boost the accountability of human rights NGOs as well as
safeguard the legitimacy of human rights principles. More specifically, reorganizing the HRO marketplace and providing a standard for meaningfully
differentiating between HROs can minimize the impact of faulty or frivolous human rights claims, financial misdealings and politically motivated
actions. Accredited HROs will be able to place governments on notice that
their allegations carry the added weight of independent oversight, and pursuant to this, they likely will marshal greater influence and support on the
international level. At the same time, the introduction of regulations will
also empower HROs to confront swiftly and dispose of accusations of bias
typically raised by actors seeking to downplay HRO charges of human
rights violations. Simply stated, HROs agreeing to oversight will be invigorated by a newfound credibility that commands greater authority, while
those organizations electing not to adopt—or unable to adopt—standards
will be left behind, stripped of their ability to ride on the wave of credibility
and authoritativeness traditionally associated with NGOs and human rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
In June 2003, as the original draft for this paper neared completion,
the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a Washington, DC-based conservative think-tank, launched NGOwatch.org, a website dedicated to tracking NGO agendas, sources of funding and levels of accountability. This
move triggered a firestorm of protest among supporters of the NGO movement, who labeled the project nothing less than “a McCarthyite blacklist”573
and rhetorically wondered whether AEI had “lost contact with reality.”574
To be certain, the vociferous and combative response to the prospect of
third party monitoring of NGO activities underscores the urgent need for a
less knee-jerk reaction to the question of NGO—and specifically in this
572

ENDS Environmental Data Services, Europe’s EMAS Scheme Shows Its Teeth,
ENDS ENVIRONMENT DAILY (Mar. 14, 2003), available at http://www.environment
daily.com/articles/index.cfm?action=article&ref=14054, last visited December 10,
2003.
573 Klein, supra note 10.
574 Nader, supra note 10.

R
R

\\server05\productn\B\BFH\10-1\BFH107.txt

398

unknown

Seq: 138

8-FEB-05

13:58

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 10

context, HRO—accountability, making the arguments and ideas developed
here even more relevant today. The move by AEI to establish a watchdog
mechanism to monitor NGO activities is a clear indication that if NGOs fail
to introduce tools to regulate their industry, other actors will not only retain
a valid basis for critiquing NGO activities, but also may take steps to assume an oversight function themselves. More dishearteningly, the reaction
of NGO supporters to the AEI initiative confirms the current inability of
these activists to openly acknowledge the glaring shortcomings of the industry and the urgent need for some kind of reform directed at enhancing
accountability.
If NGO activists truly are committed to defending the important
role carved out by human rights organizations and advancing the cause of
human rights, they must quickly set aside their traditional affinity for a
stubborn brand of independence and embrace a plan for introducing formal
regulations to protect their industry. As this paper has clearly demonstrated,
reliance on traditional informal controls are no longer effective for ensuring
quality within the industry, and moreover, risk exposing HROs to attacks
regarding their relevancy and objectivity. At the same time, it is equally
clear that any form of regulation cannot be imposed or enforced by government. This said, preservation of what Sikkink identifies as unique in
NGOs—“their flexibility to respond rapidly, their gadfly quality, and the
informality of the global networks”575—can no longer outweigh the need to
safeguard their role as agents for social change. Simply put, the continued
failure to develop a more comprehensive and thoughtful response to external critiques and efforts at oversight will result in HROs compromising
their credibility and incrementally relegating their place on the pedestal as
the darling of international society.
This paper has demonstrated that an alternative to the Manichean
confrontation between NGO activists on one hand and putative third party
regulators on the other is not only possible but necessary. By acknowledging the need for and legitimacy of standards and regulations, HROs can
position themselves not only to reformulate their own activities, but also to
take a lead role in how the NGO industry as a whole conducts its operations. Furthermore, by taking control of and responsibility for the regulatory
process as proposed above—including how standards will manifest themselves—HROs can develop a convincing and comprehensive response to
those who seek to challenge their legitimacy both from within and from
without.
575

Sikkink, supra note 93, at 315.

R

